Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 23STCP04483, Date: 2024-12-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCP04483    Hearing Date: December 10, 2024    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: December 10, 2024

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Petitions for Writ of Mandate

Moving Parties: Petitioners Studio City Residents Association, Save Los Angeles River Open Space, and Save Weddington, Inc.,

Responding Parties: Respondent City of Los Angeles; Real Parties in Interest Harvard-Westlake School and 4141 Whitsett LLC

T/R:     THE PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF MANDATE BY STUDIO CITY RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION, SAVE LA RIVER OPEN SPACE, AND SAVE WEDDINGTON, INC., ARE DENIED.

PETITIONER STUDIO CITY RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION TO NOTICE.

Petitioners claim in these lawsuits that the City of Los Angeles failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) in approving the Harvard-Westlake River Park Project. The Court finds that the City complied with CEQA. The environmental impact report properly analyzed air quality, greenhouse gas, noise, aesthetic, and emergency access impacts of the project, as well as possible wildlife disruption, the impact on tribal cultural resources, and the potential health effects of artificial turf. It properly addressed issues concerning tree replacement, concluding that replacing invasive Mexican fan palms with native species would result in a 36% net increase in trees, enhance canopy coverage and carbon sequestration, and mitigate urban heat island effects. The report adequately described the project, and properly analyzed a reasonable range of alternatives to achieve Harvard-Westlake’s objective of expanding its athletic and recreational facilities, while mitigating potentially significant environmental impacts.  

The City provided a fair hearing, in accordance with due process principles. While the City Planning Commission President and Vice President could have more fully disclosed their relationships to Harvard-Westlake, Petitioners have not shown bias, or that the possible appearance of bias requires invalidating the project’s approval. The record demonstrates that the project was approved on its merits. After the CPC’s decision the City Council conducted its own, independent review. The decision-making process included public hearings, allowing Petitioners and other stakeholders to provide comments, submit evidence, and raise objections. The Court finds that substantial evidence in the administrative record supports the project’s approval.

I.    BACKGROUND

The Harvard-Westlake River Park Project includes an 80,249-square-foot gymnasium, a 52-meter pool, artificial turf athletic fields, tennis courts, a below-grade parking structure, and a stormwater reuse system. The Project includes landscaped pathways and open space that will be available to the public; members of the community also will have access to the sports facilities.

The Project site is adjacent to the Los Angeles River and the Zev Yaroslavsky Los Angeles River Greenway. Previously located at the site was Studio City Golf & Tennis, or Weddington Golf & Tennis. For more than 60 years the site featured golf and tennis facilities, open to public recreational use.  

Area residents and other stakeholders raised concerns about the Project’s potential environmental impacts, including tree canopy loss, nighttime lighting, wildlife disruption, noise, and use of artificial turf; these concerns resulted in some modifications to the Project.  The City of Los Angeles’s three-years-long evaluation of the environmental issues, required by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), culminated in an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) totaling more than 22,000 pages. The City Planning Commission approved the project on August 24, 2023. Upon appeal by Petitioners to the City Council, the Council’s Planning and Land Use Management Committee subsequently recommended that the appeal be denied, and the Project be approved. On November 14, 2023, the City Council unanimously approved the Project and certified the EIR.

Petitioners filed the writ petitions at issue here on December 13 and 14, 2023. On February 20, 2024, the Court related the two cases, and has adjudicated them together.

On April 29, 2024, the Court denied Petitioners’ joint motion for a preliminary injunction to stop site preparation and construction activities until the Court decided the merits of their CEQA claims.

II.    REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Petitioners’ Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED as to Exhibits 1-7, pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (b), (c), and (h). 

Petitioners’ Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED as to Exhibits 8-9, pursuant to Evidence Code § 452, subdivisions (c) and (h). 

III.    EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Petitioners object to the Declaration of James DeMattte on the basis that the Declaration and its Exhibit 1 are irrelevant, outside-the-record evidence in a case that must be decided on an administrative record.  Exhibit 1 consists of photographs of the Project site, purportedly taken in September and October 2024.  Petitioners also argue that the DeMatte declaration makes statements regarding completed tree removal, ongoing grading, and adherence to construction protocols which are irrelevant to the Court’s review of whether the City’s CEQA compliance at the time of approval was adequate.  Since neither the Declaration nor Exhibit 1 is in the administrative record, the Court finds that the Declaration and its exhibits are inadmissible; it sustains Petitioners’ evidentiary objections.

IV.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

A party may seek to set aside an agency decision by petitioning for a writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5) or traditional mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085).  A petition for administrative mandamus is appropriate when the party seeks review of a “determination, finding, or decision of a public agency, made as a result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in a public agency, on the grounds of noncompliance with [CEQA].” (Pub. Resources Code § 21168.)

In an action challenging an agency’s decision under CEQA, the trial court reviews the agency’s decision for a prejudicial abuse of discretion. (PRC § 21168.5.) “Abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence.” (Ibid.; see also Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 435.) “The standard of review in administrative mandate proceedings is well-settled: whether the agency acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, whether there was a fair hearing, and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the agency did not proceed in the manner required by law, its order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).)” (Hubbard v. California Coastal Com. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 119, 135.) The court reviews “the administrative record to determine whether the Agency’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.  (Id.) 

In actions challenging an agency’s factual determinations, substantial evidence is defined as “enough relevant evidence and reasonable inferences from this information that a fair argument can be made to support a conclusion, even though other conclusions might also be reached.” (14 CCR § 15384(a).) “A court may not set aside an agency’s approval of an EIR on the ground that an opposite conclusion would have been equally or more reasonable.” (Laurel Heights Improvement Association v. Regents of the University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 393.) “The reviewing court must resolve reasonable doubts in favor of the administrative finding and decision.” (Ibid.)

Challenges to an agency’s failure to proceed in a manner required by CEQA are subject to a less deferential standard than challenges to an agency’s factual conclusions.  (Vineyard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at 435.) In reviewing these claims, the Court must “determine de novo whether the agency has employed the correct procedures.” (Ibid.; see Dry Creek Citizens Coalition v. County of Tulare (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 20, 26.)  “When the determination of an administrative agency’s jurisdiction involves a question of statutory interpretation, ‘the issue of whether the agency proceeded in excess of its jurisdiction is a question of law.’ … ‘[A] court does not ... defer to an agency’s view when deciding whether a regulation lies within the scope of the authority delegated by the Legislature.’” (Security National Guaranty, Inc., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at 414.) “The rules of statutory construction, which are equally applicable to administrative regulations, are also well-settled. The fundamental rule is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent in order to give effect to the purpose of the law.” (Hubbard v. California Coastal Com. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 119, 135.) When interpreting a statute, the words should be given their ordinary meaning without rendering any part of the language unnecessary. (Id.) The interpretation must consider the context, purpose, and intent of the legislature and aim for a practical, common-sense understanding that avoids absurd outcomes. (Id.) The “interpretation should be practical, not technical, and should also result in wise policy, not mischief or absurdity.” (Id.) Statutes should be interpreted within the broader legal framework to maintain harmony. (Id.) If the statutory language is clear, it should not be altered.  (Id. at 136.) “If, however, there is more than one reasonable interpretation of a statute, then it is ambiguous.” (Id.) In such a case, the court may consider secondary factors like legislative history, public policy, and the broader circumstances surrounding the statute’s enactment to determine its meaning. (Id.)

An agency is presumed to have regularly performed its official duties. (Evid. Code § 664.) The petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate, by citation to the administrative record, that the EIR is legally inadequate, and that the agency abused its discretion in certifying it. (See South Orange County Wastewater Authority v. City of Dana Point (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1604, 1612; Cherry Valley Pass Acres and Neighbors v. City of Beaumont (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 316, 327-28.)

V.    ANALYSIS

A.   Tree Removal and Excavation Issues Are Not Moot

Real Parties argue that several of Petitioners’ claims, including those related to tree removal and excavation, are moot because the activities in question already have been completed or are nearing completion, with no evidence of the impacts Petitioners allege. The Court finds that these claims are not moot. The Court still may impose remedies to address ongoing environmental impacts, procedural deficiencies, and operational concerns regarding tree removal and excavation.  

B.   The City Complied With CEQA in Approving the Project

1.    Aesthetic Impacts

Petitioners argue that the EIR inadequately analyzed and mitigated the Project’s significant impacts on scenic vistas by denying the presence of scenic vistas and focusing on a lack of panoramic views. The Project removes 240 trees visible from public rights of way and replaces them with athletic facilities, 10-foot security walls, and 80-foot light poles, eliminating scenic resources. The Initial Study described scenic views from the north as dominated by “existing mature trees” and vegetation, but it did not analyze the impacts of losing these features. Petitioners emphasize that the site’s scenic importance was raised during scoping. While the EIR claims no significant impact due to limited panoramic views, Petitioners contend this overlooks key public vistas. Petitioners highlight that the Project’s 22 light poles, each 80 feet tall, conflict with the City’s 30-foot height limit and land use plan designations that protect visual quality. Petitioners also assert that the City ignored temporary construction impacts, despite a three-year construction period and removal of screening vegetation.  

Petitioners assert the EIR failed to provide comparative visual renderings of the Project site before and after development since the simulations included in the EIR depict only the proposed Project, often from misleading angles, and rely on speculative assumptions about mature vegetation that will not exist initially, preventing an adequate understanding of visual impacts. Petitioners claim the EIR uses unrealistic angles for its visual simulations, such as views from above the Project or the middle of the LA River, making buildings appear less obtrusive than they are. For example, the renderings suggest buildings will be invisible from the street, which Petitioners argue is untrue.  

The Initial Study concluded that potential impacts to scenic vistas and resources would not be significant. The City found that the site lacks meaningful scenic vistas, scenic resources, or significant visual quality due to urban development, trees, and elevation differences. The Court finds that the analysis in the Initial Study is entitled to substantial deference. Although Petitioners claim the EIR ignored smaller impacts, the EIR addressed both focal and panoramic vistas, concluding neither exists on the site.  The Initial Study concluded that the installed light poles would not affect scenic resources because they are narrow, spaced apart, and shorter than existing golf course poles. The City determined that visual impacts in urban areas were not significant under its thresholds due to construction. And the EIR included renderings depicting future site conditions and project features, including site entrances, athletic facilities, trails, public access improvements, and retained features like the clubhouse.    

The Court finds that the City sufficiently analyzed aesthetic impacts, including scenic resources, construction impacts, and renderings.

2.    Air Quality Impacts

Petitioners argue that the EIR provides a misleading and inconsistent analysis of construction-related emissions by failing to aggregate on-road and off-road emissions, making it impossible for decision-makers and the public to understand the Project’s true air quality impacts. For example, Table IV.B-8 in the EIR reports total mitigated construction emissions that are lower than the off-road emissions alone, which Petitioners claim is a mathematical impossibility. Petitioners point to expert analysis from SWAPE which shows discrepancies between the emissions values in the DEIR and the California Emissions Estimator Model (CalEEMod) modeling outputs, allegedly revealing errors in the reported maximum mitigated regional construction emissions. Petitioners state the EIR failed to address these issues adequately, and incorrectly claimed that SWAPE used unmitigated data, despite the CalEEMod outputs showing mitigated data.  

Petitioners also argue that the EIR failed to analyze risks related to Valley Fever, a fungal illness caused by airborne spores from disturbed soil. Petitioners claim that Valley Fever cases have risen in Los Angeles, and the Project’s soil disturbance increases exposure risk. Petitioners submitted expert testimony highlighting the potential for Valley Fever spore transmission in the Project area, but the EIR dismissed these concerns, finding that the Project site’s risk was low because spores are commonly found in the Antelope Valley, not near the Project site. Petitioners state that the City failed to account for spores documented in the region around the site and relied on the unlikely occurrence of Northridge Earthquake-scale dust clouds to deny significant impacts, without evidence that such large dust clouds are necessary to pose risks.  

In opposition, Real Parties argue that the City’s experts analyzed air pollutants associated with the Project’s construction and operational activities using the CalEEMod, and the EIR addressed and refuted criticisms from Petitioners’ expert, SWAPE, demonstrating that SWAPE’s report contained methodological flaws and incorrect assumptions. The EIR found that construction emissions would be less than significant with the implementation of mitigation measures, specifically Mitigation Measure AQ-MM-1, and addressed all purported issues raised by SWAPE.   

The Court finds that the City’s rejection of SWAPE’s claims was within its discretion. Disagreements among experts do not render an EIR inadequate.  (Chico Advocates for a Responsible Economy v. City of Chico (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 839, 851.)

As to Valley Fever impacts, the City consulted data from the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health, concluding that the fungus causing Valley Fever is not commonly found in the area. The City also found that grading activities would not produce dust emissions comparable to conditions that have historically caused Valley Fever outbreaks (such as landslides during the Northridge earthquake). The Project includes mitigation measures to address environmental and health concerns: (1) compliance with South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) Rule 403 to control fugitive dust, such as watering unpaved areas; (2) providing respirators to workers upon request to mitigate potential health risks; (3) suspension of construction activities during windy conditions to prevent airborne dispersal of dust and particles; and (4) implementation of additional soil stabilization and precautionary measures to minimize the potential transport of fungal spores.  

The Court finds that the EIR’s air quality analysis is supported by substantial evidence and adequately addressed potential construction emissions and Valley Fever impacts. The EIR evaluated fugitive dust, construction-related emissions, and compliance with applicable SCAQMD regulations, including Rule 403 for dust control. It also included mitigation measures such as soil stabilization, respirators for workers upon request, and suspension of construction during high winds, all of which were enforceable through the Mitigation Monitoring Program. The EIR reasonably concluded that the Project’s adherence to these measures would minimize risks of Valley Fever, citing expert reviews and the absence of documented Valley Fever spores in the area.  

3.    Artificial Turf Impacts

Petitioners argue that the EIR fails to substantiate its conclusion that the use of approximately 200,000 square feet of artificial turf on athletic fields will not result in significant health or safety hazards. They point to evidence demonstrating that artificial turf can reach dangerously high surface temperatures, exceeding those of natural grass, with some studies recording temperatures as high as 156°F. While the EIR acknowledges the potential for thermal injuries, Petitioners state that it fails to propose adequate mitigation measures or enforceable conditions to protect users.    

Petitioners also argue that the EIR inadequately addresses the environmental and health risks associated with per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) used in artificial turf. PFAS are highly toxic, persistent chemicals linked to cancer, hormone disruption, and other severe health issues. Petitioners state the EIR acknowledges PFAS are used in the manufacturing of artificial turf but does not analyze their potential leaching or environmental impacts. Petitioners argue the EIR fails to use the required metric—total organic fluorine—to assess PFAS levels in artificial turf, as mandated by Assembly Bill 1423. Petitioners point to studies in the record that demonstrate that artificial turf emits PFAS over time, which can contaminate nearby water sources, including the Los Angeles River, via runoff from impervious surfaces. Petitioners argue that the EIR’s claim that PFAS leaching is unlikely lacks supporting evidence and contradicts findings from other studies. Experts identified positive detections of multiple PFAS compounds, which Petitioners state should have been disclosed.    

In opposition, Real Parties argue that the EIR extensively analyzed potential health impacts from artificial turf, relying on peer-reviewed studies and analyses from government agencies, and found these impacts to be less than significant.  It also evaluated the “urban heat island” effect. As to health and safety impacts due to increased surface temperatures, Real Parties state that these arguments were not raised in Petitioners’ original petitions, and cannot be introduced now. They also say that such safety concerns do not fall under CEQA, which addresses environmental impacts on persons in general, not impacts on specific individuals.  (Mira Mar Mobile Community v. City of Oceanside (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 477, 492; Eureka Citizens for Responsible Government v. City of Eureka (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 357, 377.)

The Court finds that the EIR’s analysis of artificial turf, including potential health impacts and the presence of PFAS, was supported by substantial evidence. The City addressed public concerns and ensured that all risks were mitigated effectively. The EIR addressed concerns about heat-related illness from artificial turf, citing studies such as the New York State Department of Health report, which found minimal difference in heat stress indicators between synthetic turf, grass, and sand surfaces. As to PFAS, the DEIR disclosed the potential use of PFAS in artificial turf manufacturing and the EIR provided an analysis of possible PFAS exposure, including technical reports. The EIR concluded that any PFAS present would be in minuscule quantities below public health screening thresholds, posing negligible health risks. The EIR also countered criticisms regarding the detection of PFAS by explaining that the “total fluorine” test overestimates PFAS presence and that expected exposures would be minimal. Despite the Governor’s veto of a proposed bill banning PFAS in artificial turf (Assembly Bill 1423), Harvard-Westlake voluntarily agreed to a condition of approval that mandates compliance with the proposed bill’s standards, ensuring no PFAS in the artificial turf components. And the EIR explained that artificial turf would include permeable fabrics for drainage and that the Project’s stormwater capture system would manage all surface runoff, including any potential contaminants. The EIR also scrutinized available studies, concluding that significant leaching of PFAS was unlikely and any exposure would be minimal.  

            The Court finds that the EIR sufficiently assessed artificial turf impacts, and the City relied on substantial evidence to conclude that the artificial turf would not cause significant hazards.

4.    Impacts on Biological Resources

Petitioners argue that the EIR inadequately analyzed replacement tree mortality, reflected and scattered light, and enforceable lighting mitigations. Petitioners say that experts concluded that large box trees are prone to higher mortality rates, disease, and stunted growth; the proposed oak replacements are particularly susceptible to Sudden Oak Disease. The EIR does not account for expected tree mortality rates, which Petitioners argue would undermine claims about increased canopy coverage, heat island effects, carbon sequestration, and ecological benefits. Urban tree mortality studies indicate a median 6.6–7% mortality rate, which could result in the loss of approximately 121 trees within five years—nearly erasing the Project’s claimed net increase of 150 trees. The tree replacement plan (BIO-MM-3) does not mandate replanting trees that die from ordinary risks, leaving canopy coverage recovery uncertain. Petitioners state the EIR’s reliance on vague, unenforceable private contracts and unsupported claims violates CEQA’s requirements for transparent and enforceable mitigation measures.  Petitioners also say that the EIR fails to analyze or disclose short-term ecological impacts from reduced canopy coverage and tree loss, particularly for sensitive species like the Western Yellow Bat, which depend on mature tree habitats and have low reproductive rates.  

As to the lighting analysis, Petitioners state the EIR’s reliance on Los Angeles Municipal Code standards, which address property line impacts, fails to account for on-site wildlife impacts. The Project’s nighttime lighting, including 192 LED lights and three scoreboards, will triple light emissions and introduce harmful short-wavelength blue light.  The EIR’s analysis of lighting impacts fails to account for reflected and scattered light or the harmful spectra of high-temperature LED lights, which will exacerbate light pollution and disrupt wildlife such as migratory birds, raptors, and special-status bats. Petitioners argue that despite expert recommendations for reducing light intensity and turning off lights at night, the EIR proposes no enforceable mitigations. Petitioners state that the EIR claims lighting impacts will be mitigated through “precise optics and shields,” but these measures are neither enforceable nor included in the Conditions of Approval. Petitioners claim the EIR improperly incorporates specific Musco lighting products into its analysis while attempting to obscure this reliance by deleting references to Musco fixtures in the final EIR.  

In opposition, Real Parties state the Project will result in a 36% net increase in trees, replacing invasive Mexican fan palms with native species that enhance canopy coverage and carbon sequestration. Mitigation Measure BIO-MM-3 ensures street trees are replaced at a 2:1 ratio, significant trees at a 1:1 ratio, and requires a tree expert to monitor the health of replacement trees for three years after construction. The EIR concluded that the Project complies with all relevant local biological resource policies, including the City’s General Plan, the Los Angeles River Master Plan Landscaping Guidelines, and the RIO District Ordinance. Real Parties reject Petitioners’ claims about potential tree mortality rates, which they claim are speculative and unsupported by substantial evidence. The City responded to these concerns, citing the landscape architect’s expertise and the robust measures to ensure tree vitality, including appropriate species selection and maintenance practices.  

The Court finds that Real Parties sufficiently show that the Project achieves a net increase in tree canopy and will likely enhance ecosystem benefits over time.

As to lighting impacts, Petitioners dispute Real Parties’ assertion that existing lumens data is unavailable, pointing out that LPP’s analysis relied on information provided in the EIR itself. Petitioners also state that Real Parties rely on the DeMatte declaration to assert that Musco fixtures will be used, and this post-EIR declaration cannot cure defects in the EIR’s analysis. The declaration fails to confirm whether the specified models will match those analyzed in the EIR. 

As noted, the Court is not considering the DeMatte declaration. The Court finds that the EIR sufficiently analyzed the lighting impacts by including technical reports and modeling, which demonstrated that the Project’s lighting design would meet or exceed all applicable standards, reduce offsite glare, and improve existing lighting conditions. For example, the Project will eliminate 17 light poles to reduce spillover effects.  The City also addressed issues raised about light projection, reflected light, and wildlife impacts. The EIR concluded that the lighting complies with RIO District and Title 24 standards, minimizing light pollution and spillover. Petitioners argue the EIR’s lighting analysis assumed the use of specific Musco Lighting fixtures not mandated by the Project approvals, but Real Parties show that the EIR used real-world data from Musco Lighting to model impacts, and the Project will, in fact, use these fixtures, ensuring consistency with the EIR’s analysis. The Court finds that the Project’s lighting design adheres to regulatory requirements, including shielding and directional lighting, and aims to reduce preexisting impacts; any remaining impacts, such as “sky glow,” will not be exacerbated.  

The EIR sufficiently assessed biological resources impacts.

5.    GHG Impacts and Mitigation

Petitioners argue that the EIR’s greenhouse gas (GHG) analysis is inadequate because it relies on inapplicable policies, misrepresents quantitative emissions impacts, and fails to address the short-term impacts of tree removal. Although the Project increases GHG emissions from construction, mobile sources, electricity, and natural gas, the EIR dismisses these impacts by relying solely on consistency with GHG reduction plans under Threshold (b). The EIR claims consistency with various statewide policies, such as SB 350 and SCAG plans, to justify its findings. But, Petitioners argue, many of these policies do not apply to the Project directly, and the EIR fails to explain how their implementation ensures the Project’s incremental contribution to cumulative GHG impacts is insignificant. For instance, Petitioners state the EIR incorrectly claims compliance with the state’s cap-and-trade program and SB 350, despite that these programs do not apply to private development projects. And they claim the EIR fails to explain how these policies ensure the Project’s incremental GHG emissions are not cumulatively considerable. Petitioners state that the EIR relies on policies from the 2017 CARB Scoping Plan, which primarily assign responsibility to state agencies and do not apply to individual projects. Petitioners argue this violates CEQA, which requires a connection between project impacts and applicable policies (Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2015) 62 Cal.4th 204, 229-30; Friends of Oroville (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 832, 843.) 

While the EIR adopts both Threshold (a) (quantitative GHG analysis) and Threshold (b) (compliance with GHG reduction plans), Petitioners state it redundantly applies compliance with GHG plans to both, creating a misleading impression that quantitative emissions are less than significant. The EIR acknowledges the Project will increase GHG emissions, yet it fails to evaluate the significance of this increase under Threshold (a). Petitioners also highlight that the removal of 240 mature trees significantly reduces carbon sequestration and exacerbates urban heat island effects. A study confirms that even two years after the Project begins operation, the replacement trees will not offset the carbon sequestration loss. The Project’s 30-month construction timeline, coupled with the delayed maturity of replacement trees, leaves a minimum 4.5-year gap in carbon sequestration services. The Project compounds impacts with the installation of artificial turf, which absorbs heat and intensifies urban heat island effects.  

In opposition, Respondents assert that CEQA grants agencies discretion to select an appropriate threshold to analyze GHG impacts. The City relied on qualitative thresholds, evaluating the Project’s consistency with local and statewide GHG reduction plans, which is an accepted methodology under CEQA. (Guidelines, § 15064.4, subds. (a)-(b); Center for Biological Diversity v. California Department of Fish & Wildlife (2015) 62 Cal.4th 204, 228-231.) The City also made a good faith effort to estimate GHG emissions, finding operational emissions of 2,719 MMTCO2e, which would be reduced by 32% through project features. While quantitative thresholds were not applied, Respondents state this approach aligns with CEQA’s requirement to qualitatively analyze GHG emissions based on compliance with adopted policies.  (Mission Bay Alliance v. Office of Community Investment & Infrastructure (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 160, 201-202.)

Respondents also argue that GHG reducing features were properly integrated into the Project. Respondents state that Petitioners incorrectly characterized the Project’s design features, such as PDF-GHG-1 (solar installation), as mitigation measures when the EIR explains that these features are inherent to the Project and align with CEQA guidelines. The EIR assessed GHG emissions both with and without these features, addressing Petitioners’ concerns about compressed analysis.  

The Court finds that the EIR evaluated GHG emissions based on the Project’s consistency with applicable GHG reduction plans, including CARB’s Climate Change Scoping Plan, SCAG’s RTP/SCS, the City’s Green New Deal, and the Los Angeles Building Code. The Court finds that this demonstrates the Project’s alignment with performance-based standards and supports a conclusion of less-than-significant impacts.  The EIR also incorporated specific measures, such as obtaining electricity from LADWP’s renewable portfolio and including energy efficiency features, which aim to have consistency with statewide GHG reduction goals.    

The EIR also analyzed the Project’s tree replacement program, concluding it would result in long-term benefits, including a 49% increase in tree count and a 53% increase in canopy coverage. Newly planted trees would surpass the carbon sequestration rates of existing trees within two years of planting, sequestering 8,672,675 pounds of CO2 over their lifetime—more than triple current levels. While Petitioners argue the program fails to offset impacts immediately, Respondents argue that CEQA does not require instant mitigation. The Court agrees and finds that the EIR sufficiently demonstrates how increased canopy coverage and the use of sustainable landscaping would mitigate urban heat island effects.  

The Court finds that the City sufficiently evaluated GHG impacts by comparing the Project’s consistency with applicable regulations, plans, and policies, and relied on substantial evidence to conclude that impacts would be less than significant. 

6.    Inconsistencies with Land Use Plans

Petitioners argue that the Project violates the City’s Open Space Plan, part of the General Plan, which mandates the conservation of Open Space to mitigate environmental impacts and preserve natural, scenic, and historical resources.  (Gov. Code, §§ 65561, 65562.) Open Space is defined as land “essentially free of structures and buildings” and intended for recreation, scenic, and environmental benefits.  Petitioners contend the Project introduces significant new structures, including a gymnasium, pool, and artificial turf fields, which reduce the Open Space function of the site. The EIR states that the Project increases Open Space by adding publicly accessible areas, but Petitioners claim it fails to apply the correct definition of Open Space, which excludes sites with significant structures. Further, they state the Project increases site intensity and parking requirements. Although Appendix J acknowledges “partial conflicts” with Open Space policies, Petitioners assert that the main EIR text misrepresents this by claiming no conflicts exist. Petitioners assert that the Open Space Plan explicitly requires preservation of historic monuments located on Open Space lands. Yet, the Project demolishes most of the Studio City Golf and Tennis Center, a City Historic Cultural Monument. Petitioners also argue that the City improperly relies on discretionary policies in the Open Space Element to justify its findings and fails to address the mandatory requirement to preserve cultural and historic resources. Petitioners contend that such mandatory policies cannot be balanced against other discretionary policies, as CEQA requires the City to disclose and analyze the inconsistency.  (Sierra Club v. Board of Supervisors (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 698, 704.)

The Court finds that the EIR’s analysis of land use impacts is consistent with CEQA requirements and supported by substantial evidence. A project is consistent with a general plan if it furthers the objectives and policies without obstructing their attainment.  The EIR concluded that the Project is consistent with the General Plan’s open space policies, as it would provide 5.4 acres of publicly accessible open space, replace invasive trees with native species, and enhance accessibility to the Los Angeles River. The Community Plan’s open space designation identifies deficiencies in accessible open space, which the Project would address by providing park areas, recreational facilities, and ADA-compliant pathways to the Los Angeles River Greenway. Appendix J analyzes the Project’s consistency with specific policies and objectives and finds no substantial conflicts. Respondents state that Petitioners misconstrue the General Plan’s definition of open space, which includes land that provides recreation, scenic, or cultural value, regardless of whether it contains structures. The Court agrees. The City’s interpretation of its General Plan is reasonable and entitled to deference, and Petitioners fail to show that no reasonable person could have reached the same conclusion. (Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 467, 501 [“A project need not conform perfectly to every general plan policy to be consistent with the general plan.”].) And Petitioners fail to demonstrate how any purported inconsistencies would lead to significant environmental impacts. (Joshua Tree Downtown Business Alliance v. County of San Bernardino (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 677, 695-696.)

            The Court finds that the EIR adequately analyzed the Project’s potential land use and planning impacts.

7.    Impacts to Emergency Access and Response

Petitioners argue that the EIR fails to adequately disclose, analyze, and mitigate the Project’s significant impacts on emergency access and response, particularly regarding queuing, parking garage evacuation, and construction-related hazards.  Petitioners state the City relied on incomplete or deferred mitigation measures without clear performance standards. Petitioners argue the driveways surrounding LAFD Fire Station 78 compromise emergency response times by creating significant traffic congestion. They state the two driveways, one on Whitsett Avenue and one on Valleyheart Drive, will generate consistent congestion from vehicles, shuttles, and security screening, impeding emergency vehicle access. Experts predict queueing near the Valleyheart entrance due to the security kiosk and prolonged delays at the Whitsett exit, which could block emergency vehicles. The EIR relies on mitigation measures such as a flashing warning light (TRAF-PDF-2), but Petitioners remark this feature is manually activated, unenforceable, and insufficient to prevent conflicts.  

Petitioners also assert that the EIR does not address the significant risks associated with evacuating the single-lane parking garage during emergencies. Traffic experts found it could take over an hour to clear the garage, with queueing extending 275 feet, blocking the main aisle and exacerbating evacuation delays. The EIR acknowledges these delays but suggests attendees could evacuate by foot, which Petitioners claim is an impractical solution. Finally, Petitioners argue the EIR violates CEQA by deferring analysis and mitigation of construction-related impacts through post-approval preparation of a Construction Management Plan (CMP).  

In opposition, Real Parties argue that the EIR thoroughly examined potential impacts on emergency access and response, including access to LAFD Fire Station 78 and evacuation from the Project’s parking lot. The analysis required a CMP to minimize impacts during construction and incorporated Project Design Features TRAF-PDF-1 and TRAF-PDF-2 to enhance emergency access. As to congestion and queuing, Real Parties assert that since 2020, CEQA no longer considers automobile delay or queuing a significant environmental impact.  (Guidelines, § 15064.3(a); Ocean St. Extension Neighborhood Assn. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 985, 1021.) The Project eliminates two conflict points by removing specific driveways and provides a traffic signal feature (TRAF-PDF-2) allowing emergency vehicles to hold back exiting traffic as needed.  Security personnel will manage vehicle queues within the parking garage, ensuring traffic does not impede emergency access. Petitioners argue that a single garage exit lane will hinder evacuation; however, Real Parties provide that in emergencies, both driveways can be used for evacuation and visitors can also evacuate on foot if necessary. 

Real Parties also assert that Petitioners mischaracterize TRAF-PDF-1 (CMP) and TRAF-PDF-2 (traffic signal light) as mitigation measures, when they are in fact integrated components of the Project’s design. Mitigation measures are not required for impacts that are not significant.  (Guidelines, § 15126.4(a)(3).) Real Parties argue the CMP is enforceable through the Mitigation Monitoring Program (MMP), which mandates City approval, detailed compliance requirements, and regular meetings to ensure adherence.  The TRAF-PDF-2 feature is not a mitigation measure but a design component that ensures the traffic signal is always available for Fire Station 78’s use. Emergency vehicles retain discretion on its activation, consistent with its purpose. Real Parties state that courts routinely uphold the deferral of specific mitigation details when they cannot be finalized until closer to construction. (Rialto Citizens for Responsible Growth (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 899, 944; City of Maywood*(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 362, 409.)  

            In reply, Petitioners highlight specific issues with the Project’s design that would create new hazards for emergency access. They state that Real Parties provide no evidence that queuing conflicts will be effectively managed or that vehicles will reliably clear paths for emergency responders during congestion. They state the proposed warning light is unenforceable and insufficient to address these issues. They state that the EIR acknowledges that evacuating the parking garage may take over an hour but fails to analyze the feasibility of using its two exits effectively. Experts counter that visitors are unlikely to abandon their vehicles during emergencies, further compounding evacuation delays and obstructing emergency vehicle access.  

Petitioners also criticize the Project’s reliance on design features and deferred mitigation measures. While Real Parties claim that the Construction Management Plan (TRAF-PDF-1) and traffic light (TRAF-PDF-2) are not mitigation measures, the EIR relies on these features to conclude that the Project would not have significant emergency access impacts. Petitioners argue that this approach compresses the analysis of impacts and mitigation measures in violation of CEQA. Additionally, the CMP lacks specific performance standards to ensure its effectiveness, failing CEQA’s requirement for detailed and enforceable mitigation measures. (Guidelines, §15126.4.) Petitioners state the EIR also does not analyze the circulation and safety impacts caused by construction, leaving emergency access issues unaddressed.  

The Court finds that the EIR sufficiently disclosed and mitigated any potential impacts to emergency access. Petitioners fail to demonstrate a prejudicial abuse of discretion in the City’s findings. The EIR examined emergency access impacts, including those related to queuing, parking garage evacuation, and construction activities. The Project includes design features, such as the Construction Management Plan (TRAF-PDF-1) and a traffic signal light (TRAF-PDF-2), to ensure emergency access. The CMP is enforceable through the Mitigation Monitoring Program, which requires City approval, oversight, and regular monitoring. TRAF-PDF-2 allows emergency vehicles to activate a warning signal to manage traffic flow during emergencies, providing a practical solution.  

Petitioners’ concerns regarding traffic congestion and queuing near LAFD Fire Station 78 are insufficient to demonstrate a significant impact under CEQA. As Real Parties correctly note, automobile delay or queuing is no longer considered a significant environmental impact under CEQA Guidelines section 15064.3(a). Moreover, the Project removes two existing conflict points and incorporates features to facilitate emergency access, such as security personnel to manage vehicle queues and the use of both driveways for emergency evacuation when needed.  

The EIR acknowledges potential delays in garage evacuation but provides reasonable solutions, including the use of both driveways and the option for visitors to evacuate on foot during emergencies. Petitioners’ claim that visitors would not abandon vehicles is speculative and does not undermine the City’s reliance on these measures.

Petitioners’ challenge to the deferred mitigation measures in the CMP lacks merit.  Courts have upheld the deferral of specific mitigation details when practical reasons necessitate finalization closer to construction, provided enforceable performance standards are in place. (Rialto Citizens for Responsible Growth (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 899, 944 [“Thus, when, for practical reasons, mitigation measures cannot be fully formulated at the time of project approval, the lead agency may commit itself to devising them at a later time, provided the measures are required to ‘satisfy specific performance criteria articulated at the time of project approval.’”]; City of Maywood (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 362, 409.) The CMP contains sufficient oversight mechanisms and ensures the Project will not create significant impacts during construction.  

8.    Tribal Cultural Resource Impacts

Petitioners argue that the EIR failed to adequately analyze and mitigate impacts to tribal cultural resources.  The Kizh Nation advised the City that the Project site was within the historic Village of Cahuenga and is highly culturally sensitive. The Kizh pointed to the site’s proximity to sacred watercourses and trade routes, indicating a high potential for impacting tribal cultural resources. Petitioners argue that the City prematurely closed its consultation process with tribal representatives, rejecting proposed mitigation measures and concluding impacts would be less than significant without substantial evidence. They contend that that this decision ignored Appendix G’s directive to consider the significance of tribal cultural resources to Native American tribes.  

Petitioners also state that the City improperly required evidence of identified resources on the Project site itself, a standard inconsistent with CEQA. Section 21084.3(b) mandates mitigation for projects that “may cause a substantial adverse change to a tribal cultural resource” and does not require physical evidence of known resources onsite. Petitioners state the City’s standard condition of approval for TCRs was not included in the MMP, violating Section 21081.6. As to whether these issues are moot, Petitioners argue that while grading has progressed, it is not yet complete. Even if it were, the issue of whether the City can exclude its standard condition of approval from the MMP remains a matter of broad public interest, making the case eligible for the discretionary exception to mootness. (Epstein v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1411 [discussing three discretionary exceptions to the rules regarding mootness: “(1) when the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur [citation]; (2) when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties [citation]; and (3) when a material question remains for the court’s determination.”].)

In opposition, Respondents and Real Parties state the City met AB 52 obligations by notifying and consulting with the Fernandeño Tataviam Band of Mission Indians (FTBMI) and the Gabrieleño Band of Mission Indians—Kizh Nation, as documented in the Draft EIR. These consultations occurred before the DEIR was released.  

The Court finds that the EIR’s analysis of tribal resources was based on substantial evidence. The City reasonably concluded that no mitigation measures were necessary based on the finding that there were no tribal cultural resources identified within the Project site, and no substantial evidence that the Project would have significant impacts on tribal cultural resources. To address the possibility of unforeseen discoveries during construction, the City included an enforceable Condition of Approval requiring cessation of ground-disturbing activities, coordination with tribes, and other actions.  Respondents show that the City considered tribal evidence, including claims that the site was within the Village of Cahuenga, but concluded that the absence of archaeological findings and the low likelihood of tribal cultural resources in the area supported a less-than-significant impact finding. The City used Appendix G thresholds of significance, which are standard under CEQA, and weighed evidence, including input from the tribes, to determine the Project’s impacts. The Court is also persuaded by Respondents’ arguments that the condition of approval was not a mitigation measure given that no significant impacts were identified.

The City adequately analyzed tribal impacts in the EIR; substantial evidence supports its findings.

9.    Project Description

Petitioners argue that the Project description in the EIR is insufficient by providing limited and inconsistent information about the extent of public access to these new facilities. The EIR claims the facilities would be available to the public “when not in use by the school,” but it also adds numerous restrictions, including preapproval, formal registration, and liability insurance, effectively excluding most community members. Petitioners state the EIR also conflicts in estimating public availability, claiming availability during school hours yet prohibiting access when the school is using any facilities.  

The Court disagrees, and finds that the EIR sufficiently describes the “whole of the action” by including sufficient detail to allow for evaluation of environmental impacts. The EIR outlines the Project’s objectives, such as creating new publicly accessible open space and enhancing the Los Angeles River and Zev Yaroslavsky Greenway.  The Project Description also provides public access hours, specifying that various facilities would be open to the public daily from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., with specific windows for certain facilities. For example, athletic fields, the gymnasium, and tennis courts are fully available to the public during specific times. A reservation system further supports public accessibility. The lack of exact school-use schedules does not render the description inadequate.

10. Alternatives Analysis

Petitioners argue that the EIR’s alternatives analysis was insufficient and that it impermissibly narrowed the project objectives. Commenters suggested a reduced-density alternative to mitigate impacts, but the EIR dismissed it on the basis that it would not meet all project objectives. The EIR also rejected alternatives such as using natural turf instead of artificial turf, despite health concerns raised by the public and recommendations from officials. Petitioners take issue with the EIR’s including only three alternatives, each allegedly designed to fail by increasing impacts or removing key components of the Project, such as public access or stormwater capture. They claim that none of the alternatives effectively reduced the Project’s significant and unavoidable impacts, such as construction noise. They state one alternative elevated an athletic field, increasing environmental impacts, while the others reduced or eliminated public access to the facilities.  

CEQA requires an EIR to include a reasonable range of alternatives that feasibly achieve most of the Project’s objectives while reducing significant impacts. This analysis is governed by the “rule of reason.” (Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (a); Mann v. Community Redevelopment Agency (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1143, 1150.) The Court finds that the alternatives analyzed were sufficient. The EIR analyzed four alternatives, including a “No Project” alternative and three alternatives that modified site use and configuration to address the Project’s significant and unavoidable construction noise impacts. It also considered and rejected alternatives involving different sites, incompatible land uses, or elimination of school facilities. The EIR states that the Project’s core purpose is to enhance Harvard-Westlake School’s athletic and recreational facilities to support its educational mission, which informed the development of nine objectives. Respondents state that these objectives were sufficiently broad to allow for meaningful evaluation of alternatives.  

Respondents show that the EIR crafted alternatives based on the judgment of educational professionals about Harvard-Westlake’s needs while considering public input and the Project’s significant impacts. CEQA does not require alternatives to meet all objectives or fully eliminate impacts—only to reduce or avoid significant effects where feasible. (Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (f).) The Court finds that the City relied on substantial evidence to support the alternatives analysis, including feasibility considerations and the balance between achieving objectives and mitigating impacts.

C.   The City Provided Due Process

Petitioners argue that the City Planning Commission (CPC) failed to provide a fair hearing, violating due process principles under the California Constitution and CEQA.  They emphasize that an unbiased decision-making body is essential to a fair adjudicative process, and even the appearance of bias from personal interests or procedural irregularities creates an unacceptable risk of bias. (Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. State Water Res. Control Bd. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 731, 737.) Petitioners assert that undisclosed relationships with Harvard-Westlake by CPC President Samantha Millman and Vice President Caroline Choe created an unacceptable risk of bias. According to Petitioners, Choe was a founding member of the school’s Korean-American Alumni Network, had an endowment fund in her name, and donated over $500,000 to the school. Millman and Choe were prominently recognized in Harvard-Westlake reports for their substantial contributions. Choe and Millman disclosed that they were Harvard-Westlake alumni, but they omitted material details about their financial and leadership roles. Petitioners point out that the financial support here was far greater than the donations deemed permissible in Breakzone Billiards v. City of Torrance (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1205, where contributions totaled less than $2,000. Petitioners claim that Choe’s significant financial contributions to Harvard-Westlake represent a direct and unconditional expression of support.  

It appears that Commissioners Millman and Choe did not fully disclose their financial and leadership ties to Harvard-Westlake. As noted, Petitioners contend that Choe donated over $500,000 to Harvard-Westlake; while Real Parties argue that this is an “estimate” created by Petitioners, it is derived at least in part from Harvard-Westlake annual reports, and Real Parties do not provide any evidence to rebut it. These financial contributions likely are substantial, and likely surpass the donations in Breakzone Billiards. Choe and Millman disclosed their alumni status, but they did not reveal the extent of their continued involvement with the school, including Choe’s leadership as a founding member of the Korean-American Alumni Network and the endowment fund established in her name. These suggest a significant ongoing relationship with the school.

However, the Court finds that the failure to fully disclose Choe’s and Millman’s financial contributions and leadership roles did not result in a denial of due process. Due process in an administrative setting is measured by whether the parties had an opportunity to be heard and present their case to an impartial decision-making body. As pointed out by Respondents, courts presume that administrative adjudicators act impartially unless concrete evidence proves otherwise. Donations to alma maters or participation in alumni networks are not evidence of prejudice. (Independent Roofing Contractors v. Cal. Apprenticeship Council (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339-1340.) Petitioners have not shown sufficient, “concrete facts” to justify a suspicion that the CPC was unable to consider fairly the evidence before it. (See BreakZone Billiards v. City of Torrance (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th at 1236–1237.)

The decision-making process here protected the due process rights of Petitioners and other stakeholders. The CPC and City Council conducted public hearings, allowing Petitioners and other stakeholders to provide comments, submit evidence, and raise objections to the Project. The CPC’s unanimous decision to approve the Project was reviewed independently by the City Council, which conducted a de novo review of the Project, providing an additional layer of scrutiny. The record reflects that the Project was approved on its merits, and the Court has found that substantial evidence in the administrative record supports the Project’s approval.

In balancing these considerations, the Court finds that the lack of full disclosure did not rise to the level of a due process violation that would warrant invalidating the Project’s approval. The decision-making process provided adequate procedural safeguards to ensure fairness and compliance with due process principles under the California Constitution and CEQA.