Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 23STCP04659, Date: 2025-05-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCP04659    Hearing Date: May 12, 2025    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: May 12, 2025

Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter

Motion for Attorney’s Fees

Moving Party:  Petitioner Andrea Grano

Responding Party:  (1) Real Party in Interest Hi Point M, LLC and (2) Respondent City of Los Angeles

T/R:     Petitioner Grano’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs is GRANTED as to the request for fees in the amount of $41,492.50 and DENIED as to the request for costs in the amount of $209.79.           

PETITIONER TO NOTICE.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

            The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

The instant Petition for Writ of Mandate (23STCP04659) filed by Petitioner Andrea Grano and the related Petition for Writ of Mandate (21STCP02223) filed by Real Party in Interest Hi Point M, LLC pertain to approvals issued by Respondent City of Los Angeles for a development with 20 dwelling units located at 1447 South Hi Point Street (the “Project”). 

            In 21STCP02223, this Court granted in part Hi Point M, LLC’s Petition for Writ of Mandate.  On March 9, 2023, the Court ordered City of Los Angeles to vacate and set aside its approval of the Project, including the City’s award of “Tier 3” TOC Incentives under the TOC Affordable Housing Incentive Program. 

            After issuance of the Writ in 21STCP02223 on September 28, 2023, the City reapproved its action and re-adopted its findings and CEQA determination.  On November 1, 2023, Grano filed a CEQA appeal objecting that the Project did not qualify for the Class 32 Categorical Exemption from CEQA.  On November 14, 2023, the City rejected the CEQA appeal, maintaining that the City had no authority to process it. 

            On October 25, 2023, Hi Point filed its Verified Supplemental Petition for Writ of Mandate in 21STCP02223 challenging the City’s re-approval of the Project.  On December 20, 2023, Grano filed her Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate in this action, 23STCP04569 challenging the re-approval and the City’s denial of Grano’s appeal of the re-approval. 

On September 13, 2024, the Court issued a tentative ruling granting Hi Point’s Supplemental Petition. Hi Point requested abandonment of the Project the next day; the City issued a letter of abandonment on September 16, 2024. 

On November 13, 2024, the Court dismissed the Petitions in 23STCP04569 and 21STCP0223 as moot.  On February 7, 2025, the Court granted Hi Point’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees in 21STCP0223 in the amount of $99,897.50. 

ANALYSIS

Legal Standard

            “Attorney fees are recoverable under section 1021.5(1) by a successful party, (2) in an action that has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, (3) if a significant benefit has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, and (4) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate. The statute's purpose is to encourage public interest litigation that might otherwise be too costly to pursue.”  (Lyons v. Chinese Hosp. Ass'n (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1343.)

            “The ‘significant benefit’ that will justify an attorney fee award under section 1021.5 need not represent a ‘tangible’ asset or a ‘concrete’ gain but, in some cases, may be recognized simply from the effectuation of a fundamental constitutional or statutory policy.  Because the public always has a significant interest in seeing that legal strictures are properly enforced, in a real sense, the public always derives a ‘benefit’ when illegal private or public conduct is rectified.  However, the Legislature did not intend to authorize an award of attorney fees in every case involving a statutory violation.  Accordingly, the trial court must determine the significance of the benefit, as well as the size of the class receiving benefit, from a realistic assessment, in light of all the pertinent circumstances, of the gains which have resulted in a particular case.”  (Keep Our Mountains Quiet v. County of Santa Clara (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 714, 737 (citing Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 939).)  Once a party has demonstrated that it has met all of the statutory criteria, the Court does not have the discretion to deny fees. (City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297.)

Request for Judicial Notice

            Petitioner’s Request for Judicial Notice of Exhibits A and B, portions of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (“LAMC”) and Los Angeles City Ordinance No. 186338 is GRANTED.

Analysis

            Petitioner initially requested fees of $27,992.50 for 76.8 hours of work.  Petitioner argues she satisfies the criteria for recovery of fees under CCP §1021.5.  Petitioner says she also enforced an important right affecting the public interest by preventing determination of a CEQA exemption without right of appeal and conferred a significant benefit on the public by vindicating the right of appeal in CEQA and local law and upholding fundamental principles of government accountability. 

            Petitioner also argues the Housing Accountability Act (“HAA”) does not apply here.  Petitioner argues her action did not challenge approval of a housing development project.  Petitioner contends she could not challenge approval the Project because City refused to hear her appeal.  Petitioner argues the City’s refusal to accept the appeal was also manifestly unreasonable. 

            In opposition, City and Hi Point argue that the HAA bars Petitioner from recovering attorney’s fees since Government Code section 65589.5 provides that Petitioner’s success in preventing an affordable housing project “shall rarely, if ever,” confer a significant benefit on the public or a large class of persons to warrant a fee award.  City and Hi Point contend the Project satisfies the criteria in Government Code §65589.5(h)(6)(D)(i)(I) through (III), which will frequently prevent a petitioner from recovering its fees and costs under Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5.  City and Hi Point say the City approved the Project in good faith and it satisfies the criteria under Government Code §65589.5(h)(6)(D)(i)(I) through (III). 

Petitioner satisfies the elements of CCP §1021.5

            “In order to effectuate that policy, we have taken a broad, pragmatic view of what constitutes a “successful party.  Our prior cases uniformly explain that an attorney fee award may be justified even when plaintiff's legal action does not result in a favorable final judgment.”  (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4^th 553, 565.)  Even if an action becomes moot, a fee award under CCP §1021.5 may still be appropriate if the relief is obtained as a result of the litigation.  (See e.g. Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 317.)

            Petitioner establishes that she prevailed on her petition. The Court’s tentative ruling found that the City improperly refused Petitioner Grano’s CEQA appeal of the Exemption Determination. Shortly after issuance of the tentative ruling Real Party abandoned the Project entitlement.  Defendant does not dispute Petitioner’s status as prevailing party.

            Petitioner also establishes that this action enforced important rights affecting the public interest and that the action conferred a significant benefit on the public.  Petitioner sought to vindicate her fundamental right to petition and appeal the City’s decision.  The litigation enforced Petitioner’s and the public’s right to challenge the City’s decision and to hold it accountable. (Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 318.) 

            City and Hi Point argue that a public benefit was not conferred, based on the HAA.  City asserted the identical argument based on the HAA in opposition to Hi Point’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees in 21STCP02223.  The Court rejected City’s arguments based on the HAA in 21STCP02223 and incorporates that conclusion here.

            “Upon any motion for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Section 1021.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in a case challenging a local agency's approval of a housing development project, a court, in weighing whether a significant benefit has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons and whether the necessity of private enforcement makes the award appropriate, shall give due weight to the degree to which the local agency's approval furthers policies of this section, including, but not limited to, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c), the suitability of the site for a housing development, and the reasonableness of the decision of the local agency. It is the intent of the Legislature that attorney's fees and costs shall rarely, if ever, be awarded if a local agency, acting in good faith, approved a housing development project that satisfies conditions established in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 65589.5.1 or paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 65589.5.2.”  (Gov. Code §65589.5(p)(1).)

            The Court agrees with Grano that her case did not “challenge a local agency’s approval of a housing development project.”  The focus of Grano’s petition and the point she ultimately prevailed on was a procedural point—her right to have her appeal accepted and heard.  City and Hi Point also offer no response to Grano’s arguments that her Petition successfully challenged the denial and rejection of her appeal. 

            Moreover, the record does not support a finding of good faith in rejecting her appeal.  The Court found in connection with Hi Point’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees that City did not act in good faith when it reapproved the Project, and it was this reapproval that prompted Grano to file an appeal with the City. 

            Finally, Grano establishes that the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement makes an attorney’s fees award here appropriate.  Grano’s action vindicated a procedural right.  There was no monetary judgment or award, nor did vindication of such a right bestow any monetary value on Grano’s property.  Because vindication of procedural rights would not generally yield any economic benefit, award of attorney’s fees is appropriate.

Petitioner’s requested fees are excessive and reduced to $41,492.50

            City and Hi Point do not dispute the reasonableness of Grano’s requested fees.  Grano’s initial request was $27,992.50 based on 76.8 hours of work.  However, on reply, Grano included an additional $27,720 in fees preparing this Motion for Fees (34.8 hours) and defense of the Motion (24 hours). 

            The additional $27,720 in fees for preparation of this Motion and defense of it is excessive.  Grano seeks fees for 58.8 hours in connection with the Motion for Fees.  Litigation of the underlying Petition required 76.8 hours, just 18 hours more than this motion for fees.  Grano admits that the opposition was identical to the opposition filed in 21STCP02223.  Grano’s reply was only five pages long.  These facts do not justify an additional 58.8 hours of work.  The Court reduces the fees recoverable for this Motion to $13,500.

            The total fees awarded to Grano are $41,492.50. 

Petitioner fails to provide authority that would allow recovery of $209.79 in costs  

            Petitioner asks that the Court award her $209.79 in costs that she incurred for filing her CEQA Appeal with the City.  Petitioner cites to Edna Valley Watch v. County of San Luis Obispo (2011) 197 Cal.App.4^th 1312 as authority for recovery of filing costs incurred in the administrative proceeding before the City.  However, Edna Valley Watch did not involve a request for recovery of such costs.  Edna Valley Watch addressed whether the underlying CEQA proceeding that was the subject of the petitioner’s petition for writ of mandate qualified as an “action” for purposes of attorney’s fees under CCP §1021.5.  (Edna Valley Watch, supra, 197 Cal.App.4^th at 1318.)  CCP §1021.5 also makes no mention of recovery of costs of any type, much less costs incurred in an administrative proceeding.  Petitioner’s request for costs in the amount of $209.79 is denied.