Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 23STCV02162, Date: 2023-09-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV02162    Hearing Date: September 7, 2023    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: September 7, 2023

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Motion to Compel Arbitration

Moving Party: Defendant USAC Airways 695 LLC

Responding Party: Plaintiff Alma Noelle Donati

RULING:          DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION IS GRANTED.

THE ACTION IS STAYED.

DEFENDANT TO NOTICE.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

On February 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants, asserting 12 causes of action for Labor Code and FEHA violations.

ANALYSIS

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate a controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists….”  (CCP § 1281.2.)  The right to compel arbitration exists unless the court finds that the right has been waived by a party’s conduct, other grounds exist for revocation of the agreement, or where a pending court action arising out of the same transaction creates the possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.   (CCP § 1281.2(a)-(c).)  “The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability.”  (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.)

A.           Existence of Arbitration Agreement and Applicable Law

Defendant moves to compel arbitration based on the Arbitration Agreement executed by Plaintiff on November 4, 2021. (Decl. Amorrotu, Exh. B.) The agreement provides, “...you and Aero agree that any and all disputes, causes of action, or claims arising from or relating to this letter agreement your employment with Aero or the termination of your employment, will be resolved pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1-16, to the fullest extent permitted by law, by final, confidential, and binding arbitration.” (Id.)

Defendant has met its burden to establish an agreement to arbitrate. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to establish any defenses to enforcement.

B. Enforceability of Agreement

1. Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act

Plaintiff asserts that the agreement is unenforceable under the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (“EFASASHA”), which provides, “...at the election of the person alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute or sexual assault dispute, or the named representative of a class or in a collective action alleging such conduct, no predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute.” (9 U.S.C. § 402(a).) Plaintiff alleges causes of action relating to sexual harassment.

Defendant argues EFASASHA is inapplicable because Plaintiff’s causes of action accrued before the statutes were enacted on March 3, 2022. “The Act, and the amendments made by th[e] Act, shall apply with respect to any dispute or claim that arises or accrues on or after the date of enactment of this Act.” (9 U.S.C. § 402(a).) Plaintiff was terminated on January 9, 2022. EFASASHA does not apply.

2. Unconscionability

Plaintiff asserts that the arbitration agreement is procedurally unconscionable as an adhesion contract. Regarding procedural unconscionability, the California Supreme Court has stated:

“[T]here are degrees of procedural unconscionability. At one end of the spectrum are contracts that have been freely negotiated by roughly equal parties, in which there is no procedural unconscionability . . . . Contracts of adhesion that involve surprise or other sharp practices lie on the other end of the spectrum. [Citation.] Ordinary contracts of adhesion, although they are indispensable facts of modern life that are generally enforced (see Graham v. Scissor–Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807, 817–818, 171 Cal.Rptr. 604, 623 P.2d 165), contain a degree of procedural unconscionability even without any notable surprises, and ‘bear within them the clear danger of oppression and overreaching.’ (Id. at p. 818 [171 Cal.Rptr. 604, 623 P.2d 165].)” (Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 469, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773, 165 P.3d 556.)

(Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1244.)

Generally, in the employer-employee context, there is unequal bargaining power. (See Amendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 115 [“in the case of preemployment arbitration contracts, the economic pressure exerted by employers on all but the most sought-after employees may be particularly acute, for the arbitration agreement stands between the employee and necessary employment, and few employees are in a position to refuse a job because of an arbitration requirement.”]

The Court finds that a very low degree of procedural unconscionability exists here; the agreement is one of adhesion. This low degree of procedural unconscionability does not render the arbitration agreement unconscionable; to find the agreement unenforceable, the degree of substantive unconscionability must be high. (See Dotson v. Amgen, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 975, 981.)

Plaintiff asserts that the agreement is substantively unconscionable because it limits venue to “San Francisco, CA, or, at your option, the County in which you primarily worked when the arbitrable dispute or claim first arose.” This alone is insufficient to establish a high degree of substantive unconscionability.

Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. The action is STAYED.