Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 23STCV03405, Date: 2023-11-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV03405    Hearing Date: February 21, 2024    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: February 21, 2024

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Demurrer to First Amended Complaint;

(2) Motions to Strike

Moving Party: Defendants Dignity Health dba St. Mary Medical Center, Carolyn Caldwell, Charles Anderson and Christopher Pook

Responding Party: Plaintiffs Dr. Nayyer Ali, M.D. and Dr. Mauricio Heilbron, M.D.

T/R:      DEFENDANT POOK’S DEMURRER IS SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

THE REMAINING DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER IS OVERRULED.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO STRIKE ARE GRANTED.

PLAINTIFF ALI TO FILE AND SERVE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHIN 30 DAYS OF NOTICE OF RULING. DEFENDANTS TO FILE AND SERVE A RESPONSE WITHIN 30 DAYS THEREAFTER.

DEFENDANTS TO NOTICE.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

The Court considers the moving papers, oppositions, and replies.

BACKGROUND

On February 16, 2023, Plaintiffs Dr. Nayyer Ali, M.D. and Dr. Mauricio Heilbron, M.D. sued Defendants Dignity Health dba St. Mary Medical Center, Carolyn Caldwell, Charles Anderson and Christopher Pook, asserting causes of action for (1) intentional interference with prospective economic relations; and (2) retaliation. Plaintiffs allege Defendants retaliated against Plaintiffs for advocating for the medical staff and patients.

On June 15, 2023, the Court granted Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion in part.

On October 5, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the operative first amended complaint for retaliation and UCL violations.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendants’ request for judicial notice of Exh. A is DENIED. Defendants’ request for judicial notice of Exh. B is GRANTED as to the existence of the document, not as to the truth of the matters asserted in it.

ANALYSIS

A. Demurrer to First Amended Complaint

A demurrer to a complaint may be taken to the whole complaint or to any of the causes of action in it.  (CCP § 430.50(a).)  A demurrer challenges only the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the truth of its factual allegations or the plaintiff's ability to prove those allegations.  (Picton v. Anderson Union High Sch. Dist. (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 726, 732.)  The court must treat as true the complaint's material factual allegations, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  (Id. at 732-33.)  The complaint is to be construed liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated.  (Id. at 733.)

Defendants demur to Plaintiff Ali’s cause of action for retaliation in violation of Health & Safety Code § 1278.5 on the grounds that Ali did not complain about patient care and Ali was not subject to an adverse employment action. Defendants demur to the cause of action for UCL violations on the same grounds.

Section 1278.5(b)(1) provides that “[a] health facility shall not discriminate or retaliate” against Plaintiffs because Plaintiffs have “[p]resented a grievance, complaint, or report” or “initiated, participated, or cooperated in an investigation or administrative proceeding relating to the quality of care, services, or conditions at the facility . . . .”

Ali alleges that (i) Caldwell, Anderson, and the Hospital terminated Dr. Ali’s teaching contract in retaliation for his patient advocacy; (ii) all Defendants further retaliated against Dr. Ali when he complained that Defendants’ retaliation efforts against him were negatively affecting patient care, including allowing a patient’s body to decompose in their patient bed all night instead of allowing a physician present at the Hospital to declare the patient dead; and (iii) after he reported to the Hospital Community Board changes to improve ICU patient care, Defendants retaliated against him by taking actions to limit referrals to him. This is sufficient to allege Ali reported concerns about patient care and experienced adverse employment action as a result.

Defendants also assert Ali has failed to allege any wrongdoing by Defendant Pook. Plaintiffs argue that the allegations that include all “Defendants” are sufficient to allege liability against Pook. The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs must allege facts against Pook to maintain causes of action against him.

Defendant Pook’s demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend. The remaining Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED.

B. Motion to Strike Plaintiff Ali’s Demand for Jury Trial

“Any party, within the time allowed to response to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part" of that pleading. (CCP 435(b). “The Court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false or improper matter asserted in any pleading; (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the Court." (CCP 436.)

Defendants move to strike Ali’s demand for a jury trial on the ground that Ali is not entitled to a jury trial on the claims for violations of the UCL and the Health & Safety Code. Defendants rely on Shaw v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 983. The California Supreme Court in Shaw held that the language of Health & Safety Code § 1278.5 requires adjudication by the Court rather than a jury. The Court held that this did not violate the California Constitution because a claim under this section is not the exclusive means to remedy an alleged retaliatory termination. The Court explained that a Plaintiff may recover damages from a jury for retaliatory termination under the common law cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy; the language of section 1278.5 does not displace this claim. Rather, section 1278.5 expands on these rights and allows a court to impose both legal and equitable remedies for retaliation.

In opposition, Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to a jury because they seek primarily the legal remedy of damages. But Plaintiffs have not brought any common law claims; Plaintiffs have brought only claims for statutory violations. The California Supreme Court has held that there is no right to a jury trial under both section 1278.5 and the UCL. (See Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc. v. Superior Court of Alameda County (2020) 9 Cal.5th 279, 30 [“...it is clear that the Legislature intended that a cause of action under the UCL... is to be tried by the court rather than by a jury.”])

Defendants’ motion to strike Ali’s demand for a jury trial is GRANTED.

C. Motion to Strike Plaintiff Heilbron’s Claims and Demand for Jury Trial

Defendants’ move to strike Plaintiff Heilbron’s claims from the FAC on the ground that Heilbron was not permitted to amend after Defendants appealed the Court’s anti-SLAPP ruling regarding Heilbron’s claims in the original complaint. The Court agrees. Defendants sought via anti-SLAPP to strike all Heilbron’s claims on the ground that they were based on protected activity. Heilbron may not amend the operative pleading while its allegations are being challenged on appeal. (See Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Delfino (2020) 35 Cal.4th 180.)

Defendants’ motion to strike Heilbron’s claims is GRANTED.