Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 23STCV03508, Date: 2023-10-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV03508    Hearing Date: October 27, 2023    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: October 27, 2023

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Demurrer to First Amended Complaint and Motion to Strike

Moving Party: Defendant Southern California Healthcare System dba Southern California Hospital at Culver City

Responding Party: Plaintiff John Doe

T/R:      DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER IS OVERRULED.

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE IS GRANTED.

PLAINTIFF TO FILE AND SERVE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHIN 30 DAYS OF NOTICE OF RULING. DEFENDANT TO FILE AND SERVE A RESPONSE WITHIN 30 DAYS THEREAFTER.

DEFENDANT TO NOTICE.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

On June 14, 2023, Plaintiff John Doe filed the operative first amended complaint against Defendant Southern California Healthcare System dba Southern California Hospital at Culver City, asserting causes of action for (1) violation of the Bane Act; (2) assault and battery; (3) false arrest and imprisonment; (4) negligence; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (6) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s security guards violently attacked Plaintiff after he complained about Defendant’s treatment of Plaintiff’s teenage daughter.

ANALYSIS

A demurrer to a complaint may be taken to the whole complaint or to any of the causes of action in it.  (CCP § 430.50(a).)  A demurrer challenges only the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the truth of its factual allegations or the plaintiff's ability to prove those allegations.  (Picton v. Anderson Union High Sch. Dist. (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 726, 732.)  The court must treat as true the complaint's material factual allegations, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  (Id. at 732-33.)  The complaint is to be construed liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated.  (Id. at 733.)

A. First Cause of Action for Violation of the Bane Act

A claim for violation of the Bane Act can be brought by an individual against a private person, where that person interferes with the Plaintiff’s legal rights by threat, intimidation, or coercion. (Civ. Code § 52.1(a), (b).) To allege a cause of action under Civil Code section 52.1, the plaintiff must allege that “the defendant interfered with or attempted to interfere with the plaintiff’s legal right by threatening or committing violent acts.” (Doe v. State (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 832, 842.)

Defendant demurs to the first cause of action for violation of the Bane Act on the ground that Plaintiff has failed allege sufficient facts. Plaintiff alleges Defendant interfered with his right to be free from bodily harm under Civ. Code § 43 and to be free from restraint by violently attacking him. This is sufficient to allege a cause of action for violation of the Bane Act.

The demurrer to the first cause of action is OVERRULED.

B. Seventh Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) severe emotional suffering; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress. (See Moncada v. West Coast Quartz Corp. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 768, 780; Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009.) To satisfy the element of extreme and outrageous conduct, defendant’s conduct “‘must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.’” (Moncada, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at 780 (quoting Trerice v. Blue Cross of California (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 878, 883).)

Defendant asserts Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing extreme and outrageous conduct. Plaintiff alleges that security attacked him and smashed his face on the pavement after he complained that Defendant had improperly released his minor child, who had been brought in for an overdose. A reasonable jury could find that this constitutes extreme and outrageous behavior.

The demurrer to the fifth cause of action is OVERRULED.

C. Sixth Cause of Action for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

California courts have recognized that NIED is not an independent tort, but the tort of negligence such that the traditional elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages apply. (See, e.g., Spates v. Dameron Hospital Association (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 208, 213; Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 583, 588.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant “owed a duty to exercise ordinary care for the emotional wellbeing of hospital patrons—including both patients and their visitors—and for the concerned parents of the children admitted into DEFENDANT SCHS’s care by ambulance.” (FAC 113.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant breached this duty when “After admitting PLAINTIFF’s 16- year-old, who arrived by ambulance in an incapacitated and possibly suicidal state, DEFENDANTS released his daughter to wander alone, lost and confused, for almost one hour. By failing to notify PLAINTIFF or Jane Doe, DEFENDANTS concealed the fact of their daughter’s release, and, ergo, the threat to their child’s safety and wellbeing—even though one parent, Jane Doe, was in the waiting room at the time and had demanded multiple times to be allowed to see and comfort her child.” (FAC 114.) This is sufficient to state a cause of action for NIED.

The demurrer to the sixth cause of action is OVERRULED.

D. Motion to Strike

“Any party, within the time allowed to response to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part" of that pleading. (CCP § 435(b)(1).) “The Court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false or improper matter asserted in any pleading; (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the Court." (CCP § 436.)

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing malice, oppression, or fraud and failed to allege corporate ratification. As Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged IIED, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support punitive damages. However, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing corporate ratification. The motion is GRANTED.