Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 23STCV05855, Date: 2024-02-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV05855 Hearing Date: February 6, 2024 Dept: 54
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Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles |
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Evike.com Inc., et al., |
Plaintiffs, |
Case No.: |
23STCV05855 |
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vs. |
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Tentative Ruling |
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2801 Mission Road Properties, LLC, |
Defendant. |
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Hearing Date: February 6, 2024
Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter
Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint
and Motion to Strike
Moving Party: Defendant 2801 Mission Road
Properties, LLC
Responding Party: Plaintiffs Evike.com, Inc. And Matrix
Airsoft, Inc.
T/R: DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER IS OVERRULED.
THE MOTION TO STRIKE IS DENIED.
DEFENDANT TO FILE AND SERVE AN ANSWER
TO THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHIN 30 DAYS OF NOTICE OF RULING.
DEFENDANT TO NOTICE
If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please
email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with
notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the
day of the hearing.
The Court considers the moving papers,
opposition, and reply.
BACKGROUND
On November 6, 2023, Plaintiffs
Evike.com, Inc. And Matrix Airsoft, Inc. filed the operative second amended
complaint against Defendant 2801 Mission Road Properties, LLC, asserting causes
of action for (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of covenant of good faith and
fair dealing; (3) intentional interference with contractual relations; (4)
intentional interference with prospective economic relations; (5) negligent
interference with prospective economic relations; and (6) declaratory relief.
Plaintiffs are commercial tenants of a
warehouse owned by Defendant. Plaintiffs allege Defendant has misrepresented
that Plaintiffs are in default on lease to prevent Plaintiffs from exercising
their option to extend the lease and instead negotiate a new lease.
ANALYSIS
A. Demurrer to
Second Amended Complaint
A demurrer to a complaint may be taken to the whole complaint or to any
of the causes of action in it. (CCP §
430.50(a).) A demurrer challenges only
the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the truth of its factual
allegations or the plaintiff's ability to prove those allegations. (Picton v. Anderson Union High Sch. Dist. (1996)
50 Cal. App. 4th 726, 732.) The court
must treat as true the complaint's material factual allegations, but not
contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Id. at 732-33.) The complaint is to be construed liberally to
determine whether a cause of action has been stated. (Id. at 733.)
Defendant demurs to the third, fourth and fifth causes of action for
tortious interference with economic relations on the ground that the lease bars
liability for these claims. Defendant relies on Section 8.8 of the lease, which
states:
8.8 Exemption of
Lessor and its Agents from Liability. Notwithstanding the negligence or breach
of this Lease by Lessor or its agents, neither Lessor nor its agents shall be
liable under any circumstances for: (i) injury or damage to the person or
goods, wares, merchandise or other property of Lessee, Lessee's employees,
contractors, invitees, customers, or any other person in or about the Premises,
whether such damage or injury is caused by or results from fire, steam,
electricity, gas, water or rain, indoor air quality, the presence of mold or
from the breakage, leakage, obstruction or other defects of pipes, fire
sprinklers, wires, appliances, plumbing, HVAC or lighting fixtures, or from any
other cause, whether the said injury or damage results from conditions arising
upon the Premises or upon other portions of the building of which the Premises
area part, or from other sources or places, (ii) any damages arising from any
act or neglect of any other tenant of Lessor or from the failure of Lessor or
its agents to enforce the provisions of any other lease in the Project, or
(iii) injury to Lessee's business or for any loss of income or profit
therefrom. Instead, it is intended that Lessee's sole recourse in the event of
such damages or injury be to file a claim on the insurance policy(ies) that
Lessee is required to maintain pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 8.
(Compl. Exh.
A.)
Defendant points to
subsection (iii), reading the section as “Notwithstanding the negligence or
breach of this Lease by Lessor or its agents, neither Lessor nor its agents
shall be liable under any circumstances for... injury to Lessee's business or
for any loss of income or profit therefrom.” Defendant asserts this provision bars
any claims for tortious interference.
In opposition, Plaintiff
argues that Section 8.8 applies only to personal injury and/or property damage.
Plaintiff emphasizes the first subsection, which limits liability for “injury
or damage to the person or goods, wares, merchandise or other property of
Lessee, Lessee's employees, contractors, invitees, customers, or any other
person in or about the Premises...” Plaintiff asserts that subsection (iii) prohibits
liability for damages to Plaintiff’s business arising from personal or property
injury.
This difference in
interpretation cannot be resolved on demurrer.
Defendant’s demurrer is
OVERRULED.
B. Motion to Strike
“Any party, within the time allowed to response to a pleading, may serve
and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part" of that
pleading. (CCP § 435(b)(1).) “The Court may, upon a motion made pursuant to
Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper:
(a) Strike out any irrelevant, false or improper matter asserted in any
pleading; (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in
conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the
Court." (CCP § 436.)
Punitive damages are available in noncontract cases where the defendant
is guilty of “oppression, fraud, or malice.”
(Civil Code § 3294(a).)
Conclusory allegations are insufficient to support a claim for punitive
damages. (See, e.g., Fisher v. San
Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 620.) However, “the stricken language must be read
not in isolation, but in the context of the facts alleged in the rest of
petitioner's complaint.” (Perkins v.
Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6.)
Defendant moves to strike
Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages on the grounds that Plaintiffs have
failed to allege malice, fraud, or oppression with specificity, and the
allegations amount only to breach of contract. Plaintiff alleges Defendant
intentionally and in bad faith misrepresented that Plaintiff had defaulted on
the lease to negotiate a new lease. This is sufficient at the pleading stage to
support punitive damages.
The motion to strike is
DENIED.