Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 23STCV06193, Date: 2024-07-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV06193    Hearing Date: July 5, 2024    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: July 5, 2024

Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter

Demurrer to First Amended Cross-Complaint

Moving Party: Cross-Defendants Vardui Rose Barsamyan and Barsamyan Family Law

Responding Party: Unopposed  

T/R:     CROSS-DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER IS SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND AS TO THE SECOND, THIRD, AND FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION AND OVERRULED AS TO THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION.

            CROSS-DEFENDANTS TO NOTICE.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at¿SMCdept54@lacourt.org¿with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

The Court considers the moving papers. No opposition papers were filed.

BACKGROUND

This is an action arising from alleged nonpayment of wages. On March 21, 2023, Plaintiff Vardui Rose Barsamyan sued Defendants Stolar Law Group and Steven Stolar, alleging causes of action for: (1) Unpaid Wages; (2) Inaccurate Wage Statements; (3) Waiting Time Penalties; (4) Unfair Business Practices; and (5) Failure to Provide Records.  

On March 4, 2024, Defendants and Cross-Complainant Stolar Law Group filed the operative First Amended Cross-Complaint (“FAXC”) against Cross-Defendants Vardui Rose Barsamyan and Barsamyan Family Law, alleging causes of action for (1) Breach of Oral Contract; (2) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Tortious Interference with Contract; and (4) Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage.  

JUDICIAL NOTICE

            The Court GRANTS Cross-Defendants’ request for judicial notice. The Court can take judicial notice of the discovery responses of Defendant and Cross-Complainant Steven Stolar. (Bounds v. Superior Court (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 468, 478.)

ANALYSIS

“A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law.”  (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.) “[T]he court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded.”  (Ibid.) A demurrer accepts as true all well pleaded facts and those facts of which the court can take judicial notice but not deductions, contentions, or conclusions of law or fact. (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078.) Although courts construe pleadings liberally, sufficient facts must be alleged to support the allegations pled to survive a demurrer. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians' Serv. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) In ruling on a demurrer, “[t]he complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded.” (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 517.)

A. Responses to Requests for Admission

            Cross-Defendants contend that Cross-Complainants admitted in discovery to a violation of Penal Code § 476a and admitted that they stopped payment on Plaintiff’s paycheck and reimbursement check. Cross-Defendants argue that these admissions mean that all causes of action asserted in the FAXC fail and the demurrer should be sustained.  

            On a demurrer, the Court analyzes the pleadings; it does not rely on deemed admissions. (Barker v. Hull (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 221, 224.) Owens v. Kings Supermarket (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 379, relied on by Cross-Defendants is inapposite; it addressed inconsistent allegations in a pleading. Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020 did not address the issue of requests for admission in the context of a demurrer. And Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. Superior Court (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 978 does not stand for the proposition that responses to requests for admissions can be used to sustain a demurrer.

            Cross-Defendants essentially argue that the responses to requests for admission mean there is no factual dispute concerning certain issues. Cross-Defendants may file a motion for summary judgment. The Court cannot determine on demurrer that certain issues are undisputed.

B. Sufficiency of the First Cause of Action for Breach of Oral Contract  

To state a cause of action for breach of contract, a party must be able to establish “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)

            The first cause of action for breach of oral contract is sufficiently alleged. Cross-Complainants have alleged the existence of a contract, their performance, the breach of Cross-Defendants, and damages. (FAXC, ¶¶ 8-11, 19-23.)  

The demurrer to the first cause of action is OVERRULED.

C. Sufficiency of the Second Cause of Action for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing   

            “A breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing involves something beyond breach of the contractual duty itself and it has been held that bad faith implies unfair dealing rather than mistaken judgment.” (Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1394.) “If the allegations do not go beyond the statement of a mere contract breach and, relying on the same alleged acts, simply seek the same damages or other relief already claimed in a companion contract cause of action, they may be disregarded as superfluous as no additional claim is actually stated … [T]he only justification for asserting a separate cause of action for breach of the implied covenant is to obtain a tort recovery.” (Id. at pp. 1394-1395.) To recover in tort for breach of the implied covenant, the defendant must “have acted unreasonably or without proper cause.” (Id. at p. 1395, citations and italics omitted.)

            The second cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not go beyond the allegations of breach of the purported oral contract. (FAXC, ¶¶ 24-29.)

            The demurrer to the second cause of action is SUSTAINED with 30 days leave to amend.

D. Sufficiency of the Third Cause of Action for Tortious Interference with Contract

            To state a cause of action for tortious interference with contract, Cross-Complainants must allege: (1) a valid contract between cross-complainants and a third party; (2) cross-defendants’ knowledge of this contract; (3) cross-defendants’ intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage. (Hahn v. Diaz-Barba (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1196.)

            Cross-Complainants have not alleged that they had valid contracts with third parties. (FAXC, ¶¶ 30-37.) Cross-Complainants also have failed to allege a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship. (FAXC, ¶¶ 30-37.)

            The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the third cause of action with 30 days leave to amend.

E. Sufficiency of the Fourth Cause of Action for Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage

            “An interference with prospective economic advantage cause of action requires (1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) the defendant’s intentional acts designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the defendant’s acts.” (SC Manufactured Homes, Inc. v. Canyon View Estates, Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 663, 672, fn. 7, citation omitted.)

            Cross-Complainants have failed to allege that Cross-Defendants intended to disrupt an economic relationship between Cross-Complainants and a third party. (FAXC, ¶¶ 38-44.) Also, Cross-Complainants have failed to allege an actual disruption of an economic relationship. (FAXC, ¶¶ 38-44.)

            The demurrer to the fourth cause of action is SUSTAINED with 30 days leave to amend.

F. Tertiary Arguments

            In the notice of motion, Cross-Defendants argue that Defendant and Cross-Complainant Steven Stolar was improperly added as a Cross-Complainant in the FAXC without leave of court. Cross-Defendants’ memorandum of points and authorities does not address this contention. Cross-Defendants have waived this argument. “Contentions are waived when a party fails to support them with reasoned argument and citations to authority.” (Moulton Niguel Water Dist v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215.)