Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 23STCV07633, Date: 2023-11-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV07633    Hearing Date: November 20, 2023    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: November 20, 2023

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Demurrer to First Amended Complaint and Motion to Strike

Moving Party: Defendants Palmdale School District and Donna Campbell

Responding Party: Plaintiff Cassandra F. Ziskind

T/R:     DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER IS OVERRULED.

THE MOTION TO STRIKE IS DENIED.

DEFENDANTS TO FILE AND SERVE ANSWERS TO THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHIN 30 DAYS OF NOTICE OF RULING.

DEFENDANTS TO NOTICE. 

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

On May 16, 2023, Plaintiff Cassandra F. Ziskind filed the operative first amended complaint against Defendants Palmdale School District, Donna Campbell, and Raul Maldonado, asserting 13 causes of action for retaliation, racial harassment and discrimination, failure to prevent harassment and discrimination, breach of contract, violation of the Bane Act, IIED, defamation, and Labor Code violations.

ANALYSIS

A demurrer to a complaint may be taken to the whole complaint or to any of the causes of action in it.  (CCP § 430.50(a).)  A demurrer challenges only the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the truth of its factual allegations or the plaintiff's ability to prove those allegations.  (Picton v. Anderson Union High Sch. Dist. (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 726, 732.)  The court must treat as true the complaint's material factual allegations, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  (Id. at 732-33.)  The complaint is to be construed liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated.  (Id. at 733.)

A. Defendant Campbell’s Demurrer to the Eleventh Cause of Action for IIED

Defendant Campbell demurs to the eleventh cause of action for IIED on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to allege extreme and outrageous conduct and failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

The elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) severe emotional suffering; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress. (See Moncada v. West Coast Quartz Corp. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 768, 780; Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009.) To satisfy the element of extreme and outrageous conduct, defendant’s conduct “‘must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.’” (Moncada, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at 780 (quoting Trerice v. Blue Cross of California (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 878, 883).)

Plaintiff alleges Campbell made disparaging statements to Plaintiff regarding her race, displayed antagonistic paraphernalia, falsely accused her of being responsible for a “$2.2 million mistake,” and stated that she hated Plaintiff and wanted to “pick up a stapler and smash her face in.” A reasonable jury could find that this conduct is extreme and outrageous.

Plaintiff alleges compliance with Government Claims Act claim presentation requirements by filing complaints with the EEOC and DFEH. Plaintiff alleges she filed a claim with the EEOC on October 20, 2022, stating Campbell had engaged in racial harassment against Plaintiff. Defendants assert this was insufficient notice because Plaintiff did not make a claim to the employing agency, Defendant Palmdale School District. In opposition to the motion, Plaintiff asserts she has alleged substantial compliance because the EEOC complaint gave the district notice, and an opportunity to investigate and respond to her claims against Campbell. This is sufficient at the pleading stage to establish compliance with the Government Claims Act. (See Westcon Construction Corp. v. County of Sacramento (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 183, 200 [“The Government Claims Act requires only substantial compliance with the claims presentation requirement.”)

Defendant Campbell’s demurrer is OVERRULED.

B. Defendants’ Demurrer to the Tenth Cause of Action for Violation of the Bane Act

Defendants demur to the tenth cause of action on the ground that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts. A claim for violation of the Bane Act can be brought by an individual against a private person where that person interferes with the Plaintiff’s legal rights by threat, intimidation, or coercion. (Civ. Code § 52.1(a), (b).) To allege a cause of action under Civil Code section 52.1, the plaintiff must allege that “the defendant interfered with or attempted to interfere with the plaintiff’s legal right by threatening or committing violent acts.” (Doe v. State (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 832, 842.)

Plaintiff alleges on April 28, 2022, Campbell stated she hated Plaintiff and threatened to “pick up a stapler and smash her face in”. Campbell’s fists were balled as if ready to strike. Campbell took these as actions to intimidate Plaintiff, to silence her from making additional complaints about Campbell’s imposition of a hostile work environment. This is sufficient to allege a cause of action for violation of the Bane Act.

Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED.

C. Motion to Strike

Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, and allegations regarding a statement about Black mothers that purportedly was not mentioned in Plaintiff’s prelitigation government claim. As discussed, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a claim for IIED against Campbell; this is sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. The Court declines strike the allegation regarding Black mothers. This allegation is in line with Plaintiff’s allegations of racial harassment as detailed in the claims made against Defendant District.

The motion to strike is DENIED.