Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 23STCV11963, Date: 2024-08-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV11963 Hearing Date: August 8, 2024 Dept: 54
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Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles |
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Luis Licea, |
Plaintiff, |
Case No.: |
23STCV11963 |
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vs. |
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Tentative Ruling |
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International House
of Music, Inc., |
Defendant. |
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Hearing Date: August
8, 2024
Department 54, Judge Maurice
Leiter
Defendant International
House of Music, Inc.’s Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Default and Default
Judgment
Moving Parties:
Defendant
International House of Music, Inc.
Responding Party:
Plaintiff Luis Licea
T/R: The motion is granted.
Defendant to give notice.
If the parties wish to submit
on the tentative, please email the courtroom at¿SMCdept54@lacourt.org¿with notice to opposing
counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the
hearing.
The Court considers the moving
papers, oppositions and replies.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
Luis Licea, a blind individual, filed this disability-access “tester” suit
against defendant International House of Music, Inc. on May 26, 2023. Plaintiff
alleges Defendant operates a commercial website that is not compatible with the
screen-reading technology Plaintiff and other blind individuals use to access
the Internet.
On
July 27, 2023, the clerk entered Defendant’s default. On April 11, 2024, the
Court entered default judgment for Plaintiff.
On
May 9, 2024, Defendant moved to set aside and vacate the default and default
judgment.
EVIDENTIARY
RULINGS
Plaintiff objects to paragraph
11 and Exhibit G of the Declaration of Catherine Corfee. The objection is
sustained.
ANALYSIS
“The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a
party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or
other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief . . .
shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after
the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
473(b).)
Defendant is not entirely
clear about what ground he relies on for relief. The papers suggest several
times that the default or default judgment might have been caused by the
mistake of counsel. But it is unclear how counsel’s failure to appear for a
single hearing in April 2024 could have caused the default entered in July 2023,
before she was retained. Also, counsel does not attest to mistake so much as
she accuses her opposing counsel of bad-faith disregard for her unavailability.
If Defendant means to rely on the mistake of counsel, it has not been shown.
But Defendant has
demonstrated it failed to act out of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable
neglect. Defendant’s principal attests that he “mistakenly believed that the
[instant] lawsuit ... was similar to a scam [he] previously experienced in
2021”, and it was not until January 2024 that his (prior) counsel “inform[ed]
[him] of the seriousness of the action against [him] ... .” (Naranjo Decl., ¶¶
9-10.) When Plaintiff discovered the “seriousness”, he immediately retained
counsel and sought to set aside the default. (Id., ¶ 11.)
The law favors disposition of
disputes on the merits. (See Rappleyea v. Campbell¿(1994) 8 Cal. 4th 975,
981-82.) And Mr. Naranjo’s declaration demonstrates
good-faith confusion about the state of the lawsuit, who was representing him,
and to what extent. (See e.g., Naranjo Decl., ¶ 11 [“I received a phone call
from my lawyer at the [sic] Gonzalez ... providing me with the name of
my defense counsel”].) Without clear guidance, Defendant may reasonably have
assumed this suit was not to be taken seriously based on its similarity to a
prior, near-identical lawsuit against it. (See id., ¶ 9.)
The Court does not address
here Defendant’s arguments that Plaintiff lacks standing to sue, or that Defendant
made best efforts to correct accessibility problems on its website.