Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 23STCV12926, Date: 2024-01-02 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV12926 Hearing Date: January 2, 2024 Dept: 54
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Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles |
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Misael Luna Jeronimo, |
Plaintiff, |
Case No.: |
23STCV12926 |
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vs. |
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Tentative Ruling |
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Adams Hummus Bar JV, LLC, et al., |
Defendants. |
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Hearing Date: January 2, 2024
Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter
Motion to Compel Arbitration
Moving Party: Defendant GJohnny, LLC, joined by
Defendants Adams Hummus Bar JV LLC, Romaine Hummus Bar JV,
LLC, Daniel Elmaleh and Gabriela A. Castro
Responding Party: Plaintiff Misael Luna Jeronimo
T/R: DEFENDANT GJOHNNY’S MOTION TO COMPEL
ARBITRATION IS GRANTED.
MOTION TO JOIN BY DEFENDANTS ADAMS HUMMUS BAR JV LLC, ROMAINE HUMMUS BAR JV, LLC, AND DANIEL ELMALEH
IS GRANTED.
DEFENDANT CASTRO’S MOTION IS DENIED.
DEFENDANT GJOHNNY TO NOTICE.
If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please
email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with
notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the
day of the hearing.
The Court considers the moving papers
and oppositions.
BACKGROUND
On June 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint
against Defendants, asserting 14 causes of action for FEHA and Labor Code
violations.
ANALYSIS
“On petition of a party to an
arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to
arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate a
controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to
arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the
controversy exists….” (CCP §
1281.2.) The right to compel arbitration
exists unless the court finds that the right has been waived by a party’s
conduct, other grounds exist for revocation of the agreement, or where a
pending court action arising out of the same transaction creates the
possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (CCP § 1281.2(a)-(c).) “The party seeking arbitration bears the
burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party
opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as
unconscionability.” (Pinnacle Museum
Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223,
236.)
A. Existence of
Arbitration Agreement
Defendant GJohnny moves to compel
arbitration based on the Dispute Resolution Agreement executed by Plaintiff on February
5, 2021. (Decl. Elmaleh, Exh. A.) The agreement provides, “I and GJohnny, LLC
dba Johnny’s West Adams (“the Company”) agree to utilize binding individual
arbitration to resolve all disputes that might arise out of or be related in
any way to my employment by the Company.” (Id.) The agreement states that it is
governed by the FAA.
Defendant has met its burden to
establish the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. The burden shifts to Plaintiff
to establish any defenses to enforcement.
B. Enforceability of Agreement
1. Unconscionability
Plaintiff asserts that the arbitration
agreement is procedurally unconscionable because it is an adhesion contract.
Plaintiff asserts Defendant required Plaintiff to sign the agreement as a
condition of transfer to another restaurant and only after Plaintiff had
complained about Labor Code violations.
Regarding procedural unconscionability,
the California Supreme Court has held:
“[T]here are degrees of procedural unconscionability. At
one end of the spectrum are contracts that have been freely negotiated by
roughly equal parties, in which there is no procedural unconscionability . . .
. Contracts of adhesion that involve surprise or other sharp practices lie on
the other end of the spectrum. [Citation.] Ordinary contracts of adhesion,
although they are indispensable facts of modern life that are generally
enforced (see Graham v. Scissor–Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807,
817–818, 171 Cal.Rptr. 604, 623 P.2d 165), contain a degree of procedural
unconscionability even without any notable surprises, and ‘bear within them the
clear danger of oppression and overreaching.’ (Id. at p. 818 [171
Cal.Rptr. 604, 623 P.2d 165].)” (Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42
Cal.4th 443, 469, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773, 165 P.3d 556.)
(Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc.
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1244.)
Generally, in the employer-employee
context, there is unequal bargaining power. (See Amendariz v. Foundation
Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 115 [“in the case of
preemployment arbitration contracts, the economic pressure exerted by employers
on all but the most sought-after employees may be particularly acute, for the
arbitration agreement stands between the employee and necessary employment, and
few employees are in a position to refuse a job because of an arbitration
requirement.”]
The Court finds that a moderate degree
of procedural unconscionability exists here as there is unequal bargaining
power and the agreement was a condition of Plaintiff’s ability to transfer to
another location. Plaintiff also represents that he was required to sign the
agreement only after complaining about Defendant’s labor practices.
This moderate degree of procedural
unconscionability does not render the arbitration agreement unconscionable; to
find the agreement unenforceable, the must be some degree of substantive
unconscionability. (See Dotson v. Amgen, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th
975, 981.) Plaintiff asserts that the agreement is substantively unconscionable
because of the level of procedural unconscionability. Plaintiff does not point
to any provision in the agreement that is unfairly one-sided. This is
insufficient to establish substantive unconscionability.
Defendant GJohnny’s motion is GRANTED.
C. Defendants Adams Hummus Bar JV LLC, Romaine Hummus Bar JV, LLC, Daniel Elmaleh and
Gabriela A. Castro’s Joinder to Motion to Compel Arbitration
Joinder Defendants, who are non-signatories, move to compel arbitration
under the Dispute Resolution
Agreement on the ground that the agreement includes claims against GJohnny’s
“parent, subsidiary, affiliated or client entities as well as against as
owners, directors, officers, managers, employees, agents ….” Joinder Defendants
also seek arbitration under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which provides,
“a nonsignatory defendant may invoke an arbitration clause to compel a
signatory plaintiff to arbitrate its claims when the causes of action against
the nonsignatory are ‘intimately founded in and intertwined’ with the
underlying contract obligations.” (Boucher v. Alliance Title Co., Inc.
(2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 262, 271.)
The entity Defendants represent that they are affiliated entities and
Elmaleh is the owner of all entity Defendants, including GJohnny. Plaintiff
alleges the entities and individuals are alter egos and agents of each other.
Adams Hummus Bar JV LLC, Romaine Hummus Bar JV, LLC, and Daniel Elmaleh may
compel arbitration.
Defendant Castro has defaulted in this action and cannot move to compel
arbitration.