Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 23STCV13486, Date: 2025-06-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV13486    Hearing Date: June 3, 2025    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: June 3, 2025

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Motions for Summary Adjudication

Moving Party: Defendants Amcor Flexibles, LLC, Amcor Flexibles North America, Inc. And Carmen Flores

Responding Party: Plaintiff Maria Rodriguez de Casas

T/R:     DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS DENIED.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF THE SEVENTH, EIGHTH AND NINTH CAUSES OF ACTION IS GRANTED.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF THE REMAINING CAUSES OF ACTION IS DENIED.

DEFENDANTS TO NOTICE. 

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing. 

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

On June 13, 2023, Plaintiff Maria Rodriguez de Casas filed a complaint against Defendants Amcor Flexibles, LLC, Amcor Flexibles North America, Inc. and Carmen Flores, asserting causes of action for (1) disability discrimination; (2) failure to accommodate; (4) failure to engage in the interactive process; (4) wrongful termination; (5) FEHA retaliation; (6) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (7) CFRA retaliation; (8) failure to provide CFRA leave; (9) interference with CFRA leave; (10) gender harassment; (11) gender discrimination; (12) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment and retaliation; and (13) wrongful termination on the basis of age.

Plaintiff, who was employed by Defendants has a factory worker, alleges Defendants wrongfully terminated her for requesting accommodations for her repetitive strain injury caused by Plaintiff’s working tasks.

EVIDENCE OBJECTIONS

“In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion.” (CCP § 437c(q).) Defendants’ objections to the declarations of Plaintiff, Susanna Noelia Vasquez Ortega and Rosalba Hernandez are OVERRULED.

ANALYSIS

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Trial judges are required “to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant has met that burden, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.)  To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce “substantial responsive evidence.” (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

A. Disability Discrimination and Retaliation

To establish a claim for discrimination in violation of FEHA, the plaintiff must generally prove that (1) he or she was a member of a protected class; (2) that he or she was qualified for the position he or she sought or was performing competently in the position he or she held; (3) that he or she suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job; and (4) some other circumstance suggesting discriminatory motive. (See Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355.)

Defendants assert that Plaintiff cannot establish a claim for disability discrimination or retaliation because Plaintiff did not suffer from a qualifying disability that interfered with major life activity. Defendants represent that Plaintiff testified that she was always able to do her job and that she didn’t need the medical restrictions. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s request to take a 10-minute break every hour would have placed undue hardship on Defendants, forcing them to potentially shut down factory equipment and slow production.

In opposition, Plaintiff presents evidence showing her doctor diagnosed her with a musculoskeletal condition, a repetitive strain injury to her wrist, elbow, shoulder, and neck, and placed her on modified duties and restrictions, eventually requiring additional rest breaks. Plaintiff argues that her requests for breaks would not have placed undue hardship on Defendants as supervisors and machine operators already coordinated 45 to 60 breaks per shift. This is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to disability discrimination.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the first, fourth and fifth causes of action is DENIED.

B. Failure to Accommodate and Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process

Government Code section 12940(n) provides that it is an unlawful employment practice “[f]or an employer . . . to fail to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee or applicant to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee or applicant with a known physical or mental disability or known medical condition.” (Govt. Code, § 12940(n).) Government Code section 12940(m) provides that it is an unlawful employment practice “[f]or an employer . . . to fail to make reasonable accommodation for the known physical or mental disability of an applicant or employee.” (Govt. Code, § 12940(m)(1).)

Defendants argue that the claims for failure to accommodate and failure to engage in the interactive process fail because Plaintiff did not request accommodation. Defendants assert that Plaintiff did not directly communicate with her supervisor or Human Resources about her ability to do her job and whether she thought she needed any accommodations when she presented and signed her medical notes. In opposition, Plaintiff presents evidence showing that Defendants failed to accommodate the restrictions listed on the medical notes and terminated her employment shortly after Plaintiff made an additional accommodation request. This is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact.

Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the second and third causes of action is DENIED.

C. CFRA Violations

Defendants assert that Plaintiff cannot a establish a claim for violation of CFRA because Plaintiff did not request CFRA leave. Plaintiff fails to address these causes of action in opposition.

Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the seventh, eighth and ninth causes of action is GRANTED.

D. Sexual Harassment

FEHA makes it unlawful for an employer to “harass an employee because of the employee’s ‘sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, . . . [or] sexual orientation.’” (Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1235-36 (quoting Govt. Code, § 12940(j)(1)).) “A hostile work environment sexual harassment claim requires a plaintiff employee to show: (1) he or she was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, conduct or comments; (2) the harassment was based on sex; and (3) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.” (Lewis v. City of Benicia (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1524; see also Taylor, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at 1236.)

Defendants argue that the cause of action of sexual harassment fails because Plaintiff did not experience sufficiently severe or pervasive harassment. Defendants present evidence showing that any sexually offensive comments were not directed toward Plaintiff herself and Plaintiff did not report any of the comments. In opposition, Plaintiff represents that male workers made repeated, vulgar comments about women and used homophobic slurs. Plaintiff presents evidence showing she complained to her supervisor about the conduct in the year before her termination. This is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact.

Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the tenth cause of action is DENIED.

E. Gender Discrimination

Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot claim gender discrimination because Plaintiff believes she was terminated for her disability rather than gender. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the hostile work environment was a form of discrimination. Plaintiff presents evidence that her supervisor used gendered terms of endearment for men such as “sweetie,” “baby,” and “my king,” while excluding female employees from similar treatment. Plaintiff asserts that her supervisor made sexist and ageist comments to the female workers, including referring to one as a “donkey.” And Plaintiff represents that she complained about this conduct to her supervisor, who dismissed the complaint. This is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to gender discrimination.

Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the eleventh cause of action is DENIED.

F. Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Harassment and Wrongful Termination

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish the claims for failure to prevent discrimination and harassment and wrongful termination because they are derivative of Plaintiff’s other underlying claims. Defendants do not address Plaintiff’s age discrimination claims in the legal arguments of their memorandum. As discussed, Plaintiff has created a triable issue of fact as to these underlying claims.

Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the twelfth, thirteenth and sixth causes of action is DENIED.

G. Punitive Damages

California Civil Code section 3294 authorizes the recovery of punitive damages in non-contract cases where “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice . . . .” (Civ. Code § 3294(a).) When the defendant is a corporation, “the oppression, fraud, or malice must be perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Wilson v. Southern California Edison Company (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123, 164; see Civ. Code § 3294(b).) 

Defendants assert that the claim for punitive damages fails because no managing agent of Defendants acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. In opposition, Plaintiff presents evidence showing that managing agents, including Human Resources Director, Joshua Ingram and Human Resources Manager, Paulette Perez, were actively involved in Plaintiff’s termination and had significant authority and influence in the company. This is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact.

Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the claim for punitive damages is DENIED.