Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 23STCV14540, Date: 2025-04-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV14540    Hearing Date: April 2, 2025    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: April 2, 2025

Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter

Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Adjudication

Moving Party: Defendant Richard Lomeli

Responding Party: Plaintiff Patrome Collins

T/R: DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION IS DENIED.

DEFENDANT TO NOTICE.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

On June 22, 2023, Plaintiff Patrome Collins filed a complaint against Defendants, asserting causes of action for (1) harassment; (2) failure to prevent harassment and/or discrimination; and (3) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. Plaintiff alleges he was subjected to racial harassment and discrimination while employed by Defendants.

ANALYSIS

“In moving for summary judgment, a ‘plaintiff . . . has met’ his ‘burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if’ he ‘has proved each element of the cause of action entitling’ him ‘to judgment on that cause of action.’”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849 (as modified (July 11, 2001).)  The plaintiff “must present evidence that would require a reasonable trier of fact to find any underlying material fact more likely than not—otherwise, he would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but would have to present his evidence to a trier of fact.”  (Id., at 851, original italics.)

Once the plaintiff has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.  (CCP § 437c(p)(1).)  “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 850.)  The defendant “shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (CCP § 437c(p)(1).)

Defendant Lomeli moves for summary judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication of Plaintiff's first cause of action for racial harassment.

The Fair Employment and Housing Act prohibition on harassment states: “It is an unlawful employment practice. . . .[f]or an employer, labor organization, employment agency, apprenticeship training program or any training program leading to employment, any other person, because of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or military veteran status, to harass an employee, an applicant, an unpaid intern or volunteer, or person providing services pursuant to a contract.” (Govt. Code, § 12940(j)(1).) A hostile work environment is a recognized form of harassment. To establish a hostile work environment, harassment must be so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment based on the protected characteristic. (See Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1045, 1043.)

Gov. Code § 12923(b) provides, “[a] single incident of harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence of a hostile work environment if the harassing conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's work performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”

Plaintiffs allege that on February 20, 2022, Lomeli referred to Plaintiff Collins and another employee as “Heckle and Jeckle” – referencing a comedic pair of cartoon anthropomorphic magpies with black feathers and yellow beaks. Plaintiff alleges this comment was racially motivated as the cartoon characters “have been noted for exemplifying racial stereotypes of Black people.”

Lomeli asserts that this conduct cannot form the basis for racial harassment because Plaintiff cannot prove that the comment was racially motivated, and because the comment was an isolated incident that did not create a hostile working environment. In opposition, Plaintiff presents evidence showing Lomeli has made disparaging comments about Black people and used slurs to refer to Black people several times. Plaintiff also presents evidence showing he was severely offended and distressed by the comment, affecting his ability to work. This is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to harassment.

Lomeli’s motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, motion for summary adjudication is DENIED.