Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 23STCV23176, Date: 2024-02-20 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV23176 Hearing Date: February 20, 2024 Dept: 54
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Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles |
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Inkwon Yuh, |
Plaintiff, |
Case No.: |
23STCV23176 |
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vs. |
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Tentative Ruling |
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Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, |
Defendant. |
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Hearing Date: February 20, 2024
Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter
Motion to Compel Arbitration
Moving Party: Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC
Responding Party: Plaintiff Inkwon Yuh
T/R: DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL
ARBITRATION IS GRANTED.
DEFENDANT TO NOTICE.
If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the
courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing
counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.
The Court considers the moving
papers, opposition, and reply.
BACKGROUND
This is a lemon law action arising out
of Plaintiff’s lease of a 2023 Mercedes-Benz EQE350X manufactured and distributed by
Defendant A Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC.
ANALYSIS
“On petition of a party to an
arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to
arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate a
controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to
arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the
controversy exists….” (CCP §
1281.2.) The right to compel arbitration
exists unless the court finds that the right has been waived by a party’s
conduct, other grounds exist for revocation of the agreement, or where a
pending court action arising out of the same transaction creates the
possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (CCP § 1281.2(a)-(c).) “The party seeking arbitration bears the
burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party
opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as
unconscionability.” (Pinnacle Museum
Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223,
236.)
A. Existence of Arbitration Agreement
Defendant moves to compel arbitration
based on the arbitration provision in the lease agreement executed by Plaintiff
on May 29, 2023. (Decl. Ameripour, Exh. 2.) The agreement provides, in
pertinent part, “Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort
or otherwise (including any dispute over the interpretation, scope, or validity
of this lease, arbitration section or the arbitrability of any issue), between
you and us or any of our employees, agents , successors, assigns, or the
vehicle distributor, including Mercedes-Benz USA LLC (each a ‘Third-Party
Beneficiary’), which arises out of or relates to a credit application, this
lease, or any resulting transaction or relationship arising out of this lease
(including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this
contract) shall, at the election of either you, us, or a ThirdParty
Beneficiary, be resolved by a neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court
action.” (Id.) Defendant is a
non-signatory to the agreement.
B. Non-Signatory
Defendant moves to compel arbitration
at a third-party beneficiary of the lease agreement. Generally, a plaintiff or
defendant must be a party to the arbitration agreement to be bound by it or
invoke it. (See JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193
Cal.App.4th 1222, 1236.) A nonsignatory may be compelled to arbitrate a dispute
when the nonsignatory is a third-party beneficiary of the contract containing
the arbitration agreement. (See Epitech, Inc. v. Kann (2012) 204
Cal.App.4th 1365, 1371.) The contract must show an intent by the contracting
parties to confer a benefit on the third party. (See id. at 1372.)
“‘[I]t is not enough that the third party would incidentally have benefited
from performance.’” (Id. (quoting Souza v. Westlands Water Dist. (2006)
135 Cal.App.4th 879, 891).)
Defendant is specifically named as a
third-party beneficiary to the lease agreement. This shows an intent to confer
a benefit to Defendant. In opposition, Plaintiff asserts this is insufficient but
provides no authority stating a named third-party beneficiary cannot compel
arbitration.
Defendant’s motion to compel
arbitration is GRANTED. The action is STAYED.