Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 23STCV27285, Date: 2024-12-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV27285    Hearing Date: December 2, 2024    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: December 2, 2024

Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter

Demurrer to First Amended Complaint and Motion to Strike

Moving Party: Defendant Arthur Diller

Responding Party: Plaintiff David Raff

T/R:      DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER IS OVERRULED.

THE MOTION TO STRIKE IS DENIED.

DEFENDANT TO FILE AND SERVE AN ANSWER TO THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHIN 30 DAYS OF NOTICE OF RULING.

DEFENDANT TO NOTICE.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

On September 30, 2024, Plaintiff David Raff filed the operative first amended complaint against Defendant Arthur Diller, asserting causes of action for (1) breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment; (2) harassment; (3) nuisance; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) violation of Unruh Act; (6) discrimination in violation of FEHA; (7) tortious breach of the warranty of habitability; (8) negligent violation of statutory duty to maintain habitable conditions; and (9) breach of contract.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant maintained Plaintiff’s unit in uninhabitable condition, threatened him with violence, and wrongfully evicted him for his disability.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED as to the existence of the documents, but not as to the truth of the matters asserted in them.

ANALYSIS

A demurrer to a complaint may be taken to the whole complaint or to any of the causes of action in it.  (CCP § 430.50(a).)  A demurrer challenges only the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the truth of its factual allegations or the plaintiff's ability to prove those allegations.  (Picton v. Anderson Union High Sch. Dist. (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 726, 732.)  The court must treat as true the complaint's material factual allegations, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  (Id. at 732-33.)  The complaint is to be construed liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated.  (Id. at 733.)

A. Collateral Estoppel/Issue Preclusion

“Issue preclusion prohibits the relitigation of issues argued and decided in a previous case, even if the second suit raises different causes of action.”  (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824.) “Under issue preclusion, the prior judgment conclusively resolves an issue actually litigated and determined in the first action.” (Id.) “[I]ssue preclusion applies: (1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party.” (Id. at 825.)

Defendant demurs to the fifth cause of action for Unruh violations and the sixth cause of action for disability discrimination on the ground that they are barred by collateral estoppel/issue preclusion. The parties previously were involved in an unlawful detainer action that settled via stipulated judgment on January 31, 2024. (RJN, Exh. 9.) The judgment awarded possession of the premises to Defendant (the Plaintiff in the unlawful detainer action). The judgment also states that Plaintiff’s (the Defendant in the unlawful detainer action) “rights under lease or rental agreement are forfeited.”

Defendant asserts that this judgment bars any of Plaintiff’s claims relating to the right of possession and Defendant’s purported reasons for Plaintiff’s eviction because they could have been litigated, and were raised as affirmative defenses in Plaintiff's answer in the unlawful detainer action. Defendant also argues that the claims are barred by the forfeiture of rights under the lease in the judgment.

The Court is unpersuaded that the claims are barred by collateral estoppel. At the pleading stage the Court must consider the allegations in the complaint as true, and may consider only limited extrinsic evidence. There is a stipulated judgment for possession, but this judgment does not show that the same issues as those in the fifth and sixth causes of action were actually litigated and decided. And it is not clear that the “forfeiture” of rights under the lease is a release of previous claims rather than a mere forfeiture of possession. There are no explicit releases in the judgment.

The demurrer to the fifth and sixth causes of action is OVERRULED.

B. Second Cause of Action for Harassment

Civil Code § 1940.2 states that it is unlawful for a landlord to influence a tenant to vacate a dwelling through certain enumerated conduct, including, use of or threat to use force, willful threats, or menacing conduct.

Defendant asserts Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing harassment. Plaintiff alleges that “a man named Arnold showed up on the property and threatened Plaintiff over the phone that he would remove all of Plaintiff’s possessions due to nonpayment of rent from the months of October and November 2021, although Plaintiff was protected by relevant Covid-19 protection laws during those months. After this incident, given the inflicted stress and emotional distress, Plaintiff suffered a major heart attack and was rushed to the hospital during his vacation in Mexico. Plaintiff underwent major heart surgery which left him permanently disabled with congestive heart failure.” This is sufficient to allege harassment.

The demurrer to the second cause of action is OVERRULED.

C. Fourth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) severe emotional suffering; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress. (See Moncada v. West Coast Quartz Corp. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 768, 780; Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009.) To satisfy the element of extreme and outrageous conduct, defendant’s conduct “‘must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.’” (Moncada, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at 780 (quoting Trerice v. Blue Cross of California (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 878, 883).)

Defendant demurs to the fourth cause of action on the ground that Plaintiff has not alleged extreme and outrageous conduct. As stated, Plaintiff alleges Defendant threatened him. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant kept the property in uninhabitable condition which included pest infestations and unworking A/C and heat. And Plaintiff alleges Defendant evicted him for his disability. A jury could find that this conduct is extreme and outrageous.

The demurrer to the fourth cause of action is OVERRULED.

D. Ninth Cause of Action for Breach of Contract

“The standard elements of a claim for breach of contract are: ‘(1) the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) damage to plaintiff therefrom.’” (Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1178.)

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action for breach of the lease for requiring Plaintiff to pay for trash pickup because the lease states, “The Tenant shall pay for all … telephone service, and other services supplied to the Premises, except as herein provided. Landlord shall supply water service within reason.” This does not explicitly state that Plaintiff was required to pay for trash.

The demurrer to the ninth cause of action is OVERRULED.

E. Remaining Causes of Action

Defendant demurs to the remaining causes of action on the ground that they are duplicative of the claim for breach of the warranty of habitability. The Court will not sustain the demurrer on these grounds. Plaintiff may allege alternative theories of liability based on the same facts.

The demurrer to the remaining causes of action is OVERRULED.

R. Motion to Strike

“Any party, within the time allowed to response to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part" of that pleading. (CCP § 435(b)(1).) “The Court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false or improper matter asserted in any pleading; (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the Court." (CCP § 436.)

Punitive damages are available in noncontract cases where the defendant is guilty of “oppression, fraud, or malice.”  (Civil Code § 3294(a).)  Conclusory allegations are insufficient to support a claim for punitive damages.  (See, e.g., Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 620.)  However, “the stricken language must be read not in isolation, but in the context of the facts alleged in the rest of petitioner's complaint.”  (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6.)

Defendant moves to strike the prayers for punitive damages. As stated, Plaintiff alleges Defendant threatened him, maintained the premises in uninhabitable condition, and evicted him based on his disability. This is sufficient to allege entitlement to punitive damages.

The motion to strike is DENIED.