Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 23STCV30760, Date: 2024-08-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV30760 Hearing Date: August 15, 2024 Dept: 54
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Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles |
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Hsiang Chi “Lisa”
Huang, |
Plaintiff, |
Case
No.: |
23STCV30760 |
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vs. |
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Tentative Ruling |
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Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., etc., et al., |
Defendants. |
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Hearing Date: August
15, 2024
Department 54, Judge Maurice
Leiter
Demurrer to First
Amended Complaint; Motions to Strike
Moving Party: Defendant US Bank
Trust National Association, as Trustee of FW-BKPL Series I Trust; Defendant
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Responding Party: Plaintiff Hsiang
Chi “Lisa” Huang
T/R: DEFENDANT US BANK
TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE OF FW-BKPL SERIES I TRUST’S DEMURRER
IS SUSTAINED WITH 30 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND AS TO THE FIRST, SECOND, AND EIGHTH
CAUSES OF ACTION AND OVERRULED AS TO THE FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION.
THE MOTIONS TO STRIKE FILED BY DEFENDANT
US BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE OF FW-BKPL SERIES I TRUST AND
DEFENDANT WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. ARE BOTH GRANTED WITH 30 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND.
DEFENDANT
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. TO NOTICE.
If the parties wish to submit
on the tentative, please email the courtroom at¿SMCdept54@lacourt.org¿with notice to opposing
counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the
hearing.
The Court considers the moving papers,
opposition, and reply.
This
is an action arising from the alleged wrongful foreclosure of real property
located at 1806 Camden Avenue, South Pasadena, CA 91030. On December 18, 2023,
Plaintiff Hsiang Chi “Lisa” Huang sued Defendants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., U.S.
Bank Trust National Association, as Trustee of FW-BKPL Series I Trust, Clear
Recon Corp., Massis Tarbinian, and Houry Kelian. On March 14, 2024, Plaintiff
filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleging causes of action
for (1) wrongful foreclosure; (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of contract;
(4) negligence; (5) negligence; (6) cancellation of instruments; (7) quiet
title; and (8) violation of Bus. and Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.
On
May 13, 2024, Plaintiff dismissed the fourth cause of action against Wells
Fargo. The second and eighth causes of action are the only ones asserted
against Wells Fargo.
On
May 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Substitution of Attorney Form indicating that
she was now self-represented.
Before
the Court are Wells Fargo’s Motion to Strike, and US Bank’s demurrer to the
first, second, fifth, and eighth causes of action in the FAC, and its motion to
strike.
Plaintiff’s
opposition to US Bank’s demurrer indicates that she is now represented by Adam
Apollo, Esq. Mr. Apollo has not substituted into this action through a
substitution of attorney form. The Court will consider Plaintiff’s opposition
to the demurrer. Plaintiff is advised to comply with the requirements of the
Code of Civil Procedure and California Rules of Court.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
The Court GRANTS Defendant
US Bank’s request for judicial notice. (Evid. Code §§ 452, 453.)
ANALYSIS
“A demurrer tests
the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law.” (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183
Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.) “[T]he court gives the complaint a reasonable
interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts
properly pleaded.” (Ibid.) A
demurrer accepts as true all well pleaded facts and those facts of which the
court can take judicial notice but not deductions, contentions, or conclusions
of law or fact. (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068,
1078.) Although courts construe pleadings liberally, sufficient facts must be
alleged to support the allegations pled to survive a demurrer. (Rakestraw v.
California Physicians' Serv. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) In ruling on a
demurrer, “[t]he complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable
inferences from the facts pleaded.” (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87
Cal.App.4th 513, 517.)
The court may, upon a motion, or at any time
in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant,
false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., §
436(a).) The court also may strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or
filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of
the court. (Id., § 436(b).)
A. First Cause of
Action for Wrongful Foreclosure
“The basic elements of a tort
cause of action for wrongful foreclosure track the elements of an equitable
cause o faction to set aside a foreclosure sale.” (Miles v. Deutsche Bank
National Trust Co. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394, 408.) “They are: (1) the
trustee or mortgagee caused an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive
sale of real property pursuant to a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of
trust; (2) the party attacking the sale . . . was prejudiced or harmed; and (3)
in cases where the trustor or mortgagor challenges the sale, the trustor or
mortgagor tendered the amount of the secured indebtedness or was excused from
tendering.” (Ibid.) “[M]ere technical violations of the foreclosure
process will not give rise to a tort claim; the foreclosure must have been
entirely unauthorized on the facts of the case.” (Id. at p. 409.) A
plaintiff is “required to allege tender of the amount of . . . indebtedness in
order to maintain any cause of action for irregularity in the sale procedure .
. . .” (Abdallah v. United Savings Bank (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1101,
1109.)
Plaintiff’s
allegations that she fully performed under the Loan Agreement by paying the
loan continuously and regularly and “was not in default either under the Loan
or the conditions within the Deed of Trust” conflict with US Bank’s Request for
Judicial Notice. (FAC, ¶ 29.) The Court “disregard[s] any allegations of [a]
complaint that conflict with judicially noticed documents as well as those that
represent bare legal conclusions.” (York v. City of Los Angeles (2019)
33 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1193.) As of April 29, 2022, Plaintiff was in default in
the amount of $23,310.63 as to the Deed of Trust. (RJN at Ex. 16.) Plaintiff
failed to cure the default pursuant to the Deed of Trust. (RJN at Ex. 17.)
Plaintiff makes no allegation that she tendered the amount of indebtedness.
(FAC, ¶ 32.) Plaintiff’s allegation that she was not in default conflicts with
Defendant US Bank’s request for judicial notice. Plaintiff has failed to allege
that she tendered the amount of indebtedness; the first cause of action is
insufficient.
The
Court SUSTAINS the demurrer of US Bank to the first cause of action in the FAC
with 30 days leave to amend.
B. Second Cause of
Action for Breach of Contract
To state a cause of action for breach of contract, a party
must be able to establish “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s
performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the
resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis
West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.) If a breach of
contract claim “is based on alleged breach of a written contract, the terms
must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written
agreement must be attached and incorporated by reference.” (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999)
74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) In some circumstances, a plaintiff may also “plead
the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language.” (Construction Protective Services, Inc. v.
TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.) “
The second cause of action for
breach of contract is insufficiently alleged. (FAC, ¶¶ 37-42.) Plaintiff has
failed to set forth the verbatim language of the Loan Agreement and Deed of
Trust or to attach a copy of the documents to the FAC. Plaintiff merely alleges
that “[u]nder the Loan Agreement and Deed of Trust, Plaintiff . . . agreed to
pay the total loan amount of $166,200. The Loan owner, Defendant [Wells Fargo]
has a duty to accept Plaintiff’s . . . monthly repayment if Plaintiff . . .
tenders the payment in a way that complies with the agreement.” (FAC, ¶ 38.)
Plaintiff has not stated the terms of repayment or the payment instructions.
The demurrer of US Bank to the
second cause of action is SUSTAINED with 30 days leave to amend.
C. Fifth Cause of
Action for Negligence
To
state a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must allege the following:
(1) a legal duty to use due care; (2) a breach of such legal duty; and (3) the
breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury. (Ladd v.
County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.) Whether a duty of care
exists is a question of law to be determined on a case-by-case basis. (Parsons
v. Crown Disposal Co. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 456, 472.)
“Lenders and borrowers operate at
arm’s length.” (Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing (2013) 221
Cal.App.4th 49, 64.) “[A]s a general rule, a financial institution owes no duty
of care to a borrower when the institution’s involvement in the loan
transaction does not exceed the scope of its conventional role as a mere lender
of money.” (Ibid.) “Liability to a borrower for negligence arises only
when the lender actively participates in the financed enterprise beyond the
domain of the usual money lender.” (Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savings & Loan
Assn. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1089, 1096.) “In general, there is not recovery
in tort for negligently inflicted purely economic losses, meaning financial
harm unaccompanied by physical or property damage.” (Sheen v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 922.) This economic loss rule also
“functions to bar claims in negligence for pure economic losses in deference to
a contract between litigating parties.” (Ibid.)
The
economic loss rule does not bar Plaintiff’s cause of action for negligence because
Plaintiff has alleged she lost her ownership interest in the Property. (FAC, ¶
57.) Plaintiff has not alleged only economic losses. Plaintiff alleges that US
Bank did not provide proper notice of prior alleged defaults or of the
subsequent foreclosure sale. (FAC, ¶ 55.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant US
Bank breached its duty to provide possible foreclosure alternatives to
Plaintiff. (FAC, ¶¶ 52-53.)
The
demurrer to the fifth cause of action for negligence in the FAC is OVERRULED.
D. Eighth Cause of Action for Violation of Bus. and Prof.
Code § 17200, et seq.
California
Business and Professions Code section 17200 prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business act or practice.” (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; see Clark
v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 605, 610.) “An unlawful business
practice or act is an act or practice, committed pursuant to business activity,
that is at the same time forbidden by law.” (Klein v. Earth Elements, Inc.
(1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.)¿As for fraud, to establish a fraudulent
practice under the UCL, the plaintiff must show that members of the public are
likely to be deceived. (See West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214
Cal.App.4th 780, 806.)¿Lastly, “[a] business practice is unfair within the
meaning of the UCL if it violates established public policy or if it is
immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous and causes injury to consumers
which outweighs its benefits.” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006)
142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1473.) A cause of action for violation of Bus. &
Prof. Code § 17200 must be directed “at a minimum, ongoing conduct.” (Mangini
v. Aerojet-General Corp. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1125, 1156.)
The eighth
cause of action is insufficiently alleged. Plaintiff alleges only past conduct but
does not allege any ongoing conduct by US Bank. (FAC, ¶¶ 68-77.)
The Court SUSTAINS
the demurrer of US Bank to the eighth cause of action in the FAC with 30 days
leave to amend.
E. Motions to Strike
US Bank and Wells Fargo each filed motions
to strike. Plaintiff failed to oppose either one. Plaintiff has conceded to the
arguments in the motions to strike; “[c]ontentions are waived when a party
fails to support them with reasoned argument and citations to authority.” (Moulton
Niguel Water Dist v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215.)
The Court has sustained the
demurrers to the first, second, and eighth causes of action. The Court GRANTS
the motions to strike with 30 days leave to amend.