Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 24STCP02615, Date: 2024-11-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCP02615 Hearing Date: November 15, 2024 Dept: 54
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Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles |
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Northrup Grumman Systems, |
Petitioner, |
Case No.: |
24STCP02615 |
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vs. |
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Tentative Ruling |
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Triumph Aerostructures, LLC, |
Respondent. |
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Hearing Date: November 15, 2024
Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter
Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award
and Cross-Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award
T/R: THE PETITION TO CONFIRM ARBITRATION
AWARD IS GRANTED.
THE CROSS-PETITION TO VACATE
ARBITRATION AWARD IS DENIED.
PETITIONER TO NOTICE.
If the parties wish to submit on the
tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel
(or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.
The Court considers the moving papers,
opposition, reply, and surreply.
Any party to an arbitration in which an award has been made may petition
the court to confirm, correct or vacate the award. (CCP § 1285.) Northrup has
complied with CCP § 1285.4 as it has set forth the name of the arbitrators,
attached documents evidencing an agreement to arbitrate and attached a copy of
the arbitration award. Triumph opposes the petition and cross-petitions to
vacate the arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrators exceeded their
authority under the parties’ agreement.
Any party to an arbitration in which an award has been made may petition
the court to confirm, correct or vacate the award. (CCP § 1285.)
“Except for the very limited grounds set forth in section 1286.2 and
1286.6, awards are immune from judicial review.” (Cinel v. Christopher (2012) 203 Cal.
App. 4th 759, 767, n.5 [citing Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3
Cal. 4th 1, 12–13.) CCP § 1286.2(a)
permits the Court to vacate an arbitration award for any of the following
reasons:
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means.
(2) There was corruption in any of the arbitrators.
(3) The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced
by misconduct of a neutral arbitrator.
(4) The arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award
cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the
controversy submitted.
(5) The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced
by the refusal of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause
being shown therefor or by the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence
material to the controversy or by other conduct of the arbitrators contrary to
the provisions of this title.
(6) An arbitrator making the award either: (A) failed to
disclose within the time required for disclosure a ground for disqualification
of which the arbitrator was then aware; or (B) was subject to disqualification
upon grounds specified in Section 1281.91 but failed upon receipt of timely
demand to disqualify himself or herself as required by that
provision. . . .
Arbitrators do not “exceed their powers” merely by rendering an
erroneous decision on a legal or factual issue.
(Moncharsh, supra at 28.)
Respondent Triumph asserts that the
arbitrators exceeded their authority by rewriting the contract at issue in the
dispute and awarding relief not permitted by the contract. The arbitration concerned
the parties’ financial responsibilities to remediate environmental
contamination at certain properties. Respondent’s predecessor-in-interest
purchased these properties from Petitioner in 2000 and entered into an Asset
Purchase Agreement. The dispute centers around section 9.8 of this agreement,
which provides in pertinent part,
(a) Seller shall
not have any financial obligation or liability for Pre-Closing Environmental
Liabilities unless the aggregate of all Pre-Closing Environmental Liabilities
for which Seller, but for this sentence, would be liable exceeds an amount
equal to $7,500,000, in which case Seller's liability shall be for eighty
percent (80%) and Buyer's liability shall be for twenty percent (20%) of any
such excess over $7,500,000 until the amount of such excess reaches a total
amount of$30,000,000, and thereafter Seller shall be liable for 100% of any
such excess over $30,000,000. The provisions of Section 9.3 shall be applicable
to this Section 9.8. In accordance with the foregoing, Buyer's maximum total
liability for Pre-Closing Environmental Liabilities shall be $12,000,000.
...
(c) Buyer acknowledges and
agrees that its sole and exclusive remedy with respect to any and all claims
against Seller relating to environmental, health and safety matters shall be
pursuant to the indemnification provisions set forth in this Section 9.8. In
furtherance of the foregoing, Buyer hereby waives, to the fullest extent
permitted under applicable law, any and all rights, claims and causes of action
it may have against Seller, its officers, directors, employees and agents
arising under or based upon any Environmental Law.
...
(e) Notwithstanding any other
provision of this Agreement to the contrary, Seller shall have no liability
pursuant to this Section 9.8 for Pre-Closing Environmental Liabilities: (i) not
made known to Seller by Buyer in a written statement within ten (10) years of
the Closing Date setting forth in reasonable detail the nature and extent of
each Pre-Closing Environmental Liability covered thereby and (ii) as to
Remedial Actions, for which any expenditures are made or costs incurred twenty
(20) years or more after the date of Closing; provided, however, that
expenditures for Pre-Closing Environmental Liabilities that are not Remedial
Actions (e.g., a Third Party Claim based on a common law tort cause of action)
are not subject to the 20 year time limit provided in this Section 9.8(e)(ii).
...
(h)(i)(i) Seller shall remain
responsible for and shall direct the performance of Remedial Action related to
any Pre-Closing Environmental Condition and the costs of such Remedial Action
shall be allocated pursuant to subsection (a) of this Section 9.8. In addition,
with the written approval of the other party, either party may undertake such
Remedial Action as is required under any Environmental Law or otherwise is
appropriate. In the event Seller shall no longer desire to direct the
performance of Remedial Action for Pre-Closing Environmental Conditions at one
or more sites, Seller may request that Buyer direct such performance. Buyer
may, at its sole discretion, agree to direct the performance of the Remedial
Action, and Buyer and Seller may allocate responsibilities for such direction
subject to such terms and conditions as they may determine.
(Pet., Exh. A.)
Petitioner argued that under section
9.8(e), its liability for pre-closing contamination ended 20 years after
closing. in 2020. and that Respondent owed Petitioner indemnity for any costs
incurred by Petitioner for remediation after 2020.
Respondent argued that subsections (e)
(i) and (ii) must be read together to mean that the 20-year limit applied only
to remediation of unknown pre-closing contamination. Respondent also argued
that under section 9.8(a), Respondent’s total liability for pre-closing
contamination was limited to $12,000,000.00 (and was reached several years
prior to the subject dispute) and under subsection (c), Petitioner’s remedies
were limited to indemnification and excluded remedies such as injunctive
relief.
Two arbitrators in a three-member panel
found in favor of Petitioner, ruling that Petitioner’s liability expired after
20 years. The majority ordered Respondent to pay
$11,464,212.00 in damages to
reimburse Petitioner for post-2020 remediation costs. The majority also ordered
that Respondent take over all remediation. The third member of the panel issued
a lengthy dissent, agreeing with Respondent’s interpretation of the contract.
The dissent opined that the majority exceeded their authority as arbitrators by
rewriting the contract.
Respondent argues that the award must
be vacated because the panel majority exceeded their authority. Respondent
asserts that section 9.8 vests all responsibility for remediation with
Petitioner under subsection (h)(i)(i) and limits any
remedies to indemnification under subsection (c). Respondent asserts that its
liability is strictly limited to $12,000,000.00 under subsection (a).
Respondent also represents that the Environmental Protection Agency does not
allow the transfer of liability for environmental contamination. Respondent
contends that these actions by the arbitrators essentially rewrote the parties’
agreement.
Generally, courts do not review the
merits of the controversy, the validity of the arbitrator’s reasoning, or the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the arbitrator’s award. (See Moncharsh
v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 11.) When interpretation of a contract underlying a dispute is “within the
matter submitted to arbitration,” even an interpretation that amounts to an
error of law does not exceed the arbitrators’ powers within the meaning of
section 1286.2. (Moshonov v. Walsh (2000) 22 Cal.4th 771, 779.) Only
when an interpretation is “completely irrational” do courts find that an
arbitrator has exceeded their authority. (See California Dep’t of Human Res.
v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000 (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1420, 1430.)
The arbitrators’ interpretation of the contract is plausible. The
contract states there is a 20-year limit to Petitioner’s remediation
responsibilities and the arbitrators were within their authority to find this. The
arbitrators also were within their authority to award remedies which bear a
rational relationship to the contract and the alleged breach. (See Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362, 367.) The
arbitrators did so here, ordering Respondent to comply with their
interpretation of the contract and assume responsibility for remediation. The
arbitrators’ interpretation was not “completely irrational” and did not exceed
their authority.
The petition to confirm arbitration is GRANTED. The cross-petition to
vacate arbitration is DENIED.