Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 24STCV02578, Date: 2024-06-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV02578    Hearing Date: June 3, 2024    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: June 3, 2024

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Demurrer to Complaint and Motion to Strike

Moving Party: Defendant AIDS Healthcare Foundation

Responding Party: Plaintiff Danny J. Torrez II

T/R:     DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER IS OVERRULED.

THE MOTION TO STRIKE IS DENIED.

DEFENDANT TO FILE AND SERVE AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN 30 DAYS OF NOTICE OF RULING.

DEFENDANT TO NOTICE. 

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

On January 31, 2024, Plaintiff Danny J. Torrez II sued Defendant AIDS Healthcare Foundation, asserting causes of action for (1) violation of Civil Code § 1941.1; (2) violation of Civil Code § 17920.3; (3) violation of Civil Code § 1942.4; (4) negligence; (5) nuisance; (6) IIED; (7) breach of contract; (8) UCL violations; and (9) fraudulent concealment.

This is a landlord tenant action. Tenant Plaintiff alleges Landlord Defendant concealed a bedbug infestation to induce Plaintiff to rent from Defendant. Plaintiff alleges the infestation was apparent within the first month of Plaintiff’s tenancy. Plaintiff alleges Defendant refused to remediate the infestation after being notified, causing severe emotional and physical distress.

ANALYSIS

A demurrer to a complaint may be taken to the whole complaint or to any of the causes of action in it.  (CCP § 430.50(a).)  A demurrer challenges only the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the truth of its factual allegations or the plaintiff's ability to prove those allegations.  (Picton v. Anderson Union High Sch. Dist. (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 726, 732.)  The court must treat as true the complaint's material factual allegations, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  (Id. at 732-33.)  The complaint is to be construed liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated.  (Id. at 733.)

A. First and Second Causes of Action for Breach of the Warranty of Habitability under Civil Code § 1941.1 and Health & Safety Code § 7920.3

Defendant demurs to the first, second and third causes of action on the ground that Civil Code §§ 1941.1 and Health & Safety Code § 7920.3 do not provide a private right of action. Defendant asserts that these statutes merely list conditions that make a dwelling uninhabitable. As stated in the complaint and the opposition to the demurrer, the first and second causes of action are for breach of the warranty of habitability. Plaintiff alleges Defendant breached the warranty by allowing the conditions listed in Civil Code §§ 1941.1 and Health & Safety Code § 7920.3. Plaintiff alleges Defendants knew of, concealed, and failed to remedy a bed bug infestation. Plaintiff has stated causes of action for breach of the warranty of habitability.

The demurrer to the first and second causes of action is OVERRULED.

B. Third Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code § 1942.4

Defendant asserts the third cause of action fails because Plaintiff does not allege that the premises failed an inspection while Plaintiff was a tenant. Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed an inspection in 2021 and failed to remedy the infestation. There is no requirement under this statute that the inspection takes place during Plaintiff’s tenancy.

The demurrer to the third cause of action is OVERRULED.

C. Fifth Cause of Action for Nuisance

Defendant demurs to the fifth cause of action on the ground that it is duplicative of the fourth cause of action for negligence. The Court declines to sustain the demurrer on this basis. Plaintiff may allege alternative theories of liability under the same the facts as other causes of action.

The demurrer to the fifth cause of action is OVERRULED.

D. Sixth Cause of Action for IIED

Defendant asserts the sixth cause of action for IIED fails because Plaintiff cannot allege extreme and outrageous conduct. Defendant argues that there is no extreme and outrageous conduct because the lease disclosed that bedbugs had previously been found in the building and that remediation efforts were ongoing. (Compl. Exh. A.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant represented that there were no bedbugs in Plaintiff’s unit and then failed to remediate the issue after notification from Plaintiff causing extreme emotional and physical distress. A reasonable jury could find this conduct extreme and outrageous.

The demurrer to the sixth cause of action is OVERRULED.

E. Ninth Cause of Action for Fraudulent Concealment

Defendant demurs to the ninth cause of action on the ground that Plaintiff has failed to allege a duty to disclose. Fraud by omission and fraud by concealment require allegations demonstrating the defendant was under a legal duty to disclose the allegedly omitted or concealed facts. (See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. Insomniac, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 803, 831.) Nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud when: (1) there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties; (2) the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. (See id.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant concealed the existence of bedbugs in Plaintiff’s unit. Under the above factors, the allegations show Defendant had exclusive knowledge, made partial representations in the lease, and actively concealed material facts. This is sufficient to state a cause of action for fraudulent concealment.

The demurrer to the ninth cause of action is OVERRULED.

F. Motion to Strike

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s prayers for punitive damages and attorney’s fees. As Plaintiff has stated claims for fraud and IIED, Plaintiff has alleged entitlement to punitive damages. The Court declines to strike the request for attorney’s fees at the pleading stage. Whether Plaintiff is entitled to fees is not dependent on the prayer in the complaint.

The motion to strike is DENIED.