Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 24STCV02715, Date: 2025-03-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV02715    Hearing Date: March 21, 2025    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: March 21, 2025

Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter

Anti-SLAPP Motion

Moving Party: Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Jeanette Polk

Responding Party: Defendant/Cross-Complainant The Kristine Taylor Philanthropies

T/R:     CROSS-DEFENDANT'S ANTI-SLAPP MOTION IS GRANTED.

CROSS-DEFENDANT TO NOTICE

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

On July 24, 2024, Plaintiff Jeanette Polk filed the operative first amended complaint against Defendants, asserting causes of action for (1) quiet title and (2) financial elder abuse. Plaintiff alleges Defendants engaged in a scheme targeting elderly people to transfer title to their homes to Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants wrongfully induced her to transfer title to her home to Defendant The Kristine Taylor Philanthropies on or about June 5, 2018.

On October 17, 2024, The Kristine Taylor Philanthropies filed the operative first amended cross-complaint against Jeanette Polk and Tracey K. Reed, asserting causes of action for (1) breach of contract; (2) slander/quiet title; (3) fraud; (4) ejectment; and (5) damage to real property. The FACC alleges that Polk breached their sale agreement and committed fraud by filing the underlying lawsuit and recording a lis pendens on the subject property.

ANALYSIS

In ruling on a special motion to strike pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, or anti-SLAPP motion, the court applies a two-prong test. First, the court determines whether the moving defendant has met his or her burden to establish that the “challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity.” (Equilon Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 66.) The moving defendant meets this burden by demonstrating that “the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken ‘in furtherance of the [defendant]'s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue,’ as defined in the statute.” (Id.)

The court then moves to the second prong, in which the burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of the complaint. (Id.) “To establish such a probability, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” (Matson v. Dvorak (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 539, 548.) “Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89.)

A. Protected Activity

Cross-Defendant moves to strike allegations from the FACC that reference Cross-Defendant's filing of the underlying lawsuit and recordation of the lis pendens on the subject property. Cross-Complainant alleges that Cross-Defendant is liable for the claims "by filing a lawsuit to obtain title to the property without purchase" and "by the recording of a Lis Pendens clouding title." (FACC ¶ 15.) These allegations seek redress for Cross-Defendant's protected petitioning activity.

The burden shifts to Cross-Complainant to establish a probability of success on the merits.

B. Probability of Success on the Merits

“To establish such a probability, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” (Matson, supra 40 Cal.App.4th at 548.) “Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.” (Navellier, supra 29 Cal.4th at 89.)

Cross-Defendant asserts that Cross-Complainant cannot establish a probability of success on the merits because the filing of the underlying lawsuit and recordation of the lis pendens are protected by the litigation privilege. The Court of Appeal has explained the litigation privilege as follows,  

Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), a codification of the litigation privilege, provides that, “A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [¶] ... [¶] (b) In any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2....” “ ‘The purposes of section 47, subdivision (b), are to afford litigants and witnesses free access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions, to encourage open channels of communication and zealous advocacy, to promote complete and truthful testimony, to give finality to judgments, and to avoid unending litigation. [Citation.] To effectuate these purposes, the litigation privilege is absolute and applies regardless of malice. [Citation.] Moreover, “[i]n furtherance of the public policy purposes it is designed to serve, the privilege prescribed by section 47[, subdivision (b) ] has been given broad application.” [Citation.]’ ” (Komarova v. National Credit Acceptance, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 324, 336, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 880.) 

“Although originally enacted with reference to defamation [citation], the privilege is now held applicable to any communication, whether or not it amounts to a publication [citations], and all torts except malicious prosecution. [Citations.] ... [¶] The usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action. [Citations.]” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212, 266 Cal.Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365; see Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 398, 163 P.3d 89; La Jolla Group II v. Bruce (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 461, 472, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 716.)

(Tom Jones Enterprises, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1293-4.)

Cross-Complainant alleges tort liability for communications protected by the litigation privilege. Cross-Complainant does not allege any claims that are exempted from this privilege. Cross-Complainant provides no legal authority or analysis showing otherwise.

Cross-Complainant has failed to establish a probability of success on the merits. Cross-Defendant’s anti-SLAPP is GRANTED. The following portions of the FACC are stricken:

• ¶ 7 of the FACC;

• The portion of ¶ 15 of the FACC alleging Cross-Defendant’s breach of contract “by filing a lawsuit to obtain title to the property without a purchase, by the recording of a Lis Pendens clouding title;”

• ¶ 16 of the FACC;

• The entire Second Cause of Action for Slander to Title/Quiet Title: ¶¶ 19-21 of the Second Cause of Action, and;

• ¶¶ 1-2 in the Prayer for Relief for the Second Cause of Action.