Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 24STCV08238, Date: 2025-01-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV08238    Hearing Date: January 17, 2025    Dept: 54

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

Issa Leigh,

 

 

 

Plaintiff,

 

Case No.:

 

 

24STCV08238

 

vs.

 

 

Tentative Ruling

 

 

Pendry West Hollywood, LLC, et al.,

 

 

 

Defendants.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hearing Date: January 17, 2025

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Motion to Compel Arbitration

Moving Party: Defendants Pendry West Hollywood, LLC, Montage International North America, LLC and Byron Lazaroff-Puck, joined by Defendant Daniel Hernandez

Responding Party: Plaintiff Issa Leigh

 

T/R:     DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION IS DENIED.

DEFENDANT TO NOTICE.

 

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

 

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

 

BACKGROUND

 

On May 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative first amended complaint against Defendants, asserting 12 causes of action for FEHA violations, assault, battery, and wrongful termination.

 

ANALYSIS

 

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate a controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists….”  (CCP § 1281.2.)  The right to compel arbitration exists unless the court finds that the right has been waived by a party’s conduct, other grounds exist for revocation of the agreement, or where a pending court action arising out of the same transaction creates the possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.   (CCP § 1281.2(a)-(c).)  “The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability.”  (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.)

 

A. Existence of Arbitration Agreement and Applicable Law

 

Defendants move to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement executed by Plaintiff on April 6, 2022. (Mot. Exh. 2.) The agreement provides, “The Company and I mutually consent to the resolution by arbitration of all claims or controversies (“claims”), past, present or future, whether or not arising out of my employment (or its termination), that the Company may have against me or that I (and no other party) may have against any of the following: (1) the Company, (2) its officers, directors, employees or agents in their capacity as such or otherwise, (3) the Company’s, parent, subsidiary and affiliated entities, (4) the Company’s benefit plans or the plans’ sponsors, fiduciaries, administrators, affiliates and agents, and/or (5) all successors and assigns of any of them.” (Id.) The agreement states that it is governed by the FAA.

 

Defendants have met their burden to establish an agreement to arbitrate. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to establish any defenses to enforcement.

 

B. Enforceability of Agreement

 

Plaintiff asserts that the agreement is unenforceable under the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (“EFASASHA”), which provides, “...at the election of the person alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute or sexual assault dispute, or the named representative of a class or in a collective action alleging such conduct, no predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute.” (9 U.S.C. § 402(a)).)

 

California Courts of Appeal have held that if a Plaintiff states a claim for sexual harassment or sexual assault, all claims in the case, including those for other torts, are exempt from arbitration if they relate to the harassment or assault claims. (See Jane Doe v. Second Street Corp (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 552, 577 [the EFAA facially applies to ‘a case which ... relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute.’ (9 U.S.C. § 402(a), italics added.)]) By its plain language, then, the statute applies to the entire case, not merely to the sexual assault or sexual harassment claims alleged as a part of the case. It is significant, moreover, that the statute does not require that the pendant claims arise out of the sexual assault or sexual harassment dispute; it is enough that the case relates to the sexual assault or sexual harassment claims.”]; Liu v. Miniso Depot CA, Inc., et al. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 791.)

 

Here, all of Plaintiff’s claims relate to the sexual harassment and assault claims. The Court rejects Defendants’ argument that the claims are not “plausibly pled.” (Yost v. Everyrealm, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2023) 656 F.Supp.3d 563, 584-586.)

 

Defendants’ motion is DENIED.