Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 24STCV08663, Date: 2025-05-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV08663 Hearing Date: May 30, 2025 Dept: 54
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Superior Court
of California County of Los
Angeles |
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Jourdan Whitehead, |
Plaintiff, |
Case No.: |
24STCV08663 |
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vs. |
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Tentative Ruling |
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T3 Micro, Inc., |
Defendants. |
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Hearing Date: May 30, 2025
Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter
Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the
alternative, Motion for Summary Adjudication
Moving Party: Plaintiff Jourdan Whitehead
Responding Party: Defendant T3 Micro, Inc.
T/R: CROSS-COMPLAINANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION IS DENIED.
CROSS-COMPLAINANT TO NOTICE
If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please
email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with
notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the
day of the hearing.
The Court considers the moving papers,
opposition, and reply.
BACKGROUND
On April 5, 2024, Plaintiff Jourdan Whitehead
filed a complaint against Defendant T3 Micro, Inc., asserting causes of action
for nonpayment of wages and waiting time penalties. Plaintiff alleges she was
hired as a print model for a photoshoot with Defendant and Defendant failed to
timely pay Plaintiff's wages.
EVIDENCE
OBJECTIONS
“In granting or denying a motion for summary
judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections
to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion.” (CCP §
437c(q).) Plaintiff’s objections to the declaration of Ashoo Jain are
OVERRULED.
ANALYSIS
“In moving for summary judgment, a
‘plaintiff . . . has met’ his ‘burden of showing that there is no defense to a
cause of action if’ he ‘has proved each element of the cause of action
entitling’ him ‘to judgment on that cause of action.’” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
25 Cal.4th 826, 849 (as modified (July 11, 2001).) The plaintiff “must present evidence that
would require a reasonable trier of fact to find any
underlying material fact more likely than not—otherwise, he would not be
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but would have to
present his evidence to a trier of fact.”
(Id., at 851, original italics.)
Once the plaintiff has met that burden,
the burden shifts to the defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more
material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense
thereto. (CCP § 437c(p)(1).) “There is a triable issue of material fact
if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find
the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance
with the applicable standard of proof.”
(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 850.) The defendant “shall not rely upon
the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue
of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts
showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause
of action or a defense thereto.” (CCP §
437c(p)(1).)
Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the complaint for violation of
Labor Code § 203.
Labor Code § 203(a) provides: If an employer willfully fails to pay,
without abatement or reduction, in accordance with Sections 201, 201.3, 201.5,
201.6, 201.8, 201.9, 202, and 205.5, any wages of an employee who is discharged
or who quits, the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from the
due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an action therefor is
commenced; but the wages shall not continue for more than 30 days.
The elements of a claim for late-wage-payment penalties under Labor Code
section 203 include: (1) the existence of an employment relationship, (2) the
termination or discharge of the employee, and (3) the employer’s failure to
timely pay the employees final wages following discharge. (Lab. Code § 203(a).)
The amount of penalties awardable on a claim for penalties under Section 203 is
determined by (1) the amount of the employee’s daily wage and (2) the number of
days after the wage-payment deadline by which the wage payment was late.
Lab. Code, § 201.6 states that a “print shoot employee is entitled to
receive payment of the wages earned and unpaid at the time of termination by
the next regular payday.” The statute defines “print shoot employee” as “an
individual hired for a period of limited duration to render services relating
to or supporting a still image shoot, including film or digital photography,
for use in print, digital, or internet media.”
Plaintiff presents evidence showing that she was hired by Defendant T3
as a “print shoot employee” to model for a photoshoot and Defendant failed to timely
pay Plaintiff. In opposition, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was not an
employee of Defendant and that all transactions related to the photoshoot were
done through Plaintiff’s modeling agency. Defendant also presents evidence that
any failure to timely pay was not “willful,” because Defendant believed that Plaintiff
was an independent contractor and not an “employee,” and Defendant timely paid
Plaintiff’s modeling agency’s invoice. (See Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008)
163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1201 [A good faith belief that no wages are due is a
complete defense to a waiting time penalty claim and “will preclude imposition
of waiting time penalties under Section 203.”] This is sufficient to create a
triable issue of fact as to failure to timely pay wages.
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.