Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 24STCV08663, Date: 2025-05-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV08663    Hearing Date: May 30, 2025    Dept: 54

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

Jourdan Whitehead,

 

 

 

Plaintiff,

 

Case No.:

 

 

24STCV08663

 

vs.

 

 

Tentative Ruling

 

 

T3 Micro, Inc.,

 

 

 

Defendants.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hearing Date: May 30, 2025

Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter

Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Adjudication

Moving Party: Plaintiff Jourdan Whitehead

Responding Party: Defendant T3 Micro, Inc.

 

T/R:     CROSS-COMPLAINANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION IS DENIED.

 

CROSS-COMPLAINANT TO NOTICE

 

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

 

BACKGROUND

 

On April 5, 2024, Plaintiff Jourdan Whitehead filed a complaint against Defendant T3 Micro, Inc., asserting causes of action for nonpayment of wages and waiting time penalties. Plaintiff alleges she was hired as a print model for a photoshoot with Defendant and Defendant failed to timely pay Plaintiff's wages.

 

EVIDENCE OBJECTIONS

“In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion.” (CCP § 437c(q).) Plaintiff’s objections to the declaration of Ashoo Jain are OVERRULED.

 

ANALYSIS

 

“In moving for summary judgment, a ‘plaintiff . . . has met’ his ‘burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if’ he ‘has proved each element of the cause of action entitling’ him ‘to judgment on that cause of action.’”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849 (as modified (July 11, 2001).)  The plaintiff “must present evidence that would require a reasonable trier of fact to find any underlying material fact more likely than not—otherwise, he would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but would have to present his evidence to a trier of fact.”  (Id., at 851, original italics.)

 

Once the plaintiff has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.  (CCP § 437c(p)(1).)  “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 850.)  The defendant “shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (CCP § 437c(p)(1).)

 

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the complaint for violation of Labor Code § 203.

 

Labor Code § 203(a) provides: If an employer willfully fails to pay, without abatement or reduction, in accordance with Sections 201, 201.3, 201.5, 201.6, 201.8, 201.9, 202, and 205.5, any wages of an employee who is discharged or who quits, the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an action therefor is commenced; but the wages shall not continue for more than 30 days.

 

The elements of a claim for late-wage-payment penalties under Labor Code section 203 include: (1) the existence of an employment relationship, (2) the termination or discharge of the employee, and (3) the employer’s failure to timely pay the employees final wages following discharge. (Lab. Code § 203(a).) The amount of penalties awardable on a claim for penalties under Section 203 is determined by (1) the amount of the employee’s daily wage and (2) the number of days after the wage-payment deadline by which the wage payment was late.

 

Lab. Code, § 201.6 states that a “print shoot employee is entitled to receive payment of the wages earned and unpaid at the time of termination by the next regular payday.” The statute defines “print shoot employee” as “an individual hired for a period of limited duration to render services relating to or supporting a still image shoot, including film or digital photography, for use in print, digital, or internet media.”

 

Plaintiff presents evidence showing that she was hired by Defendant T3 as a “print shoot employee” to model for a photoshoot and Defendant failed to timely pay Plaintiff. In opposition, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was not an employee of Defendant and that all transactions related to the photoshoot were done through Plaintiff’s modeling agency. Defendant also presents evidence that any failure to timely pay was not “willful,” because Defendant believed that Plaintiff was an independent contractor and not an “employee,” and Defendant timely paid Plaintiff’s modeling agency’s invoice. (See Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1201 [A good faith belief that no wages are due is a complete defense to a waiting time penalty claim and “will preclude imposition of waiting time penalties under Section 203.”] This is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to failure to timely pay wages.

 

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 





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