Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 24STCV26172, Date: 2025-03-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV26172 Hearing Date: March 10, 2025 Dept: 54
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Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles |
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Tarek Khuzam, et al., |
Plaintiffs, |
Case No.: |
24STCV26172 |
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vs. |
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Tentative Ruling |
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Hyundai Motor America, |
Defendant. |
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Hearing Date: March 10, 2025
Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter
Motion to Compel Arbitration
Moving Party: Defendant Hyundai Motor America
Responding Party: Plaintiffs Tarek Khuzam and Merla
Khuzam
T/R: DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL
ARBITRATION IS DENIED.
DEFENDANT TO NOTICE.
If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the
courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing
counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.
The Court considers the moving
papers, opposition, and reply.
BACKGROUND
This is a lemon law action arising out
of Plaintiffs’ purchase of a 2021 Hyundai Palisade manufactured and distributed by
Defendant Hyundai Motor America.
ANALYSIS
“On petition of a party to an
arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to
arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate a
controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to
arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the
controversy exists….” (CCP §
1281.2.) The right to compel arbitration
exists unless the court finds that the right has been waived by a party’s
conduct, other grounds exist for revocation of the agreement, or where a
pending court action arising out of the same transaction creates the
possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (CCP § 1281.2(a)-(c).) “The party seeking arbitration bears the
burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party
opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as
unconscionability.” (Pinnacle Museum
Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223,
236.)
A. Existence of Arbitration Agreement
Defendant moves to compel arbitration
based on the arbitration provision in the Owner’s Handbook
& Warranty Information, and on the arbitration provision in the Connected
Services Agreement executed by Plaintiffs when they signed up for Hyundai’s
Bluelink services. The warranty provides, “If you purchased or leased your
Hyundai vehicle in the State of California, you and we each agree that any
claim or disputes between us (including between you and any of our affiliated
companies) related to or arising out of your vehicle purchase, use of your
vehicle, the vehicle warranty, representations in the warranty, or the duties
contemplated under the warranty, including without limitation claims related to
the failure to conform a vehicle to warranty, failure to repurchase or replace
your vehicle, or claims for a refund or partial refund of your vehicle's
purchase price (excluding personal injury claims), but excluding claims brought
under the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act, shall be resolved by binding arbitration
at either your or our election, even if the claim is initially filed in a court
of law.” (Decl. Ameripour, Exh. 3.)
The CSA provides, “Hyundai and you agree to arbitrate any and all
disputes and claims between us arising out of or relating to this Agreement,
Connected Services, Connected Services Systems, Service Plans, your Vehicle,
use of the sites, or products, services, or programs you purchase, enroll in or
seek product/service support for, whether you are a Visitor or Customer, via
the sites or through mobile application, except any disputes or claims which
under governing law are not subject to arbitration, to the maximum extent
permitted by applicable law.” (Decl. Rao, Exh. 2.)
In opposition, Plaintiffs assert that the arbitration provision in the
warranty is not a contract and therefore not an agreement to arbitrate.
Plaintiffs represent that the manual and warranty were not provided to them
before purchase, and they never signed any arbitration agreement. Plaintiffs also
argue that the CSA does not apply here because their claims do not arise from
the CSA.
In reply, Defendant argues that the express warranty is itself a
contract. Defendant reasons that under the doctrine of equitable estoppel
Plaintiffs cannot both sue for breach of the warranty “contract” and deny that
they have assented to the warranty “contract’s” terms.
The Court finds that Defendant has failed to show a mutual agreement to
arbitrate the claims at issue in this action. Plaintiffs did not execute an
arbitration agreement when purchasing the vehicle, and Defendant presents no
evidence showing that Plaintiffs were presented with or aware of the
arbitration provision at the time of purchase.
Neither party provides California authority that addresses whether an
arbitration provision in a warranty is enforceable under contract principles. Plaintiffs
present one federal case, Norcia v. Samsung Telecommunications Am., LLC,
845 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 2017), in which the Ninth Circuit found that the
arbitration provision in a warranty booklet concerning the sale of a cell phone
did not constitute a binding, contractual arbitration agreement. The Court,
after extensive discussion of California common law contract formation
principles and warranty law, found that the warranties lacked the requisite
express acceptance of an offer to create a contract. The Court also noted that
warranties place obligations only on the seller as the maker of the warranty. They
do not place obligations on the buyer.
Defendant asserts that Norcia does not apply here because the
plaintiffs in Norcia did not sue for breach of warranty; they sued for violations
of the CLRA and UCL. Norcia speculates in a footnote that the plaintiffs
may have been required to arbitrate breach of warranty claims had they brought
them, but Norcia does not hold that a warranty is itself a mutually
binding contract or that contractual equitable estoppel principles apply to
warranties.
The Court also finds that the claims at issue in this action do not
arise from the CSA.
Defendant has failed to establish the existence of an agreement to
arbitrate. Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is DENIED.