Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: BC706996, Date: 2023-03-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: BC706996 Hearing Date: March 23, 2023 Dept: 54
|
Superior
Court of California County of
Los Angeles |
|||
|
Standard General L.P., et al., |
Plaintiffs |
Case No.: |
BC706996 |
|
vs. |
|
Tentative Ruling |
|
|
Dov Charney, et al., |
Defendants. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hearing Date: March 23, 2023
Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter
Motion for Summary Adjudication
Moving Party: Plaintiffs Standard General L.P., et
al.
Responding Party: Defendants Charney, Apex RE and Art, Commerce & Manfacturing Solitions, LLC;
Charney’s Bankruptcy Trustee
T/R: PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION IS DENIED.
PLAINTIFFS TO NOTICE.
If the parties wish to submit on the tentative,
please email the courtroom at¿SMCdept54@lacourt.org¿with notice to opposing counsel (or
self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.
The Court considers the moving
papers and oppositions.
BACKGROUND
On
May 24, 2018, Plaintiffs Standard General L.P., Standard General Master Fund,
L.P., P Standard General LTD filed the operative first amended complaint
against Defendants Dov Charney, Los Angeles Apparel Inc., Art Commerce and
Manufacturing Solutions, LLC, Apex Real Estate Management LLC, Keith Fink, and
Apex Property Management Inc. Plaintiffs
assert six causes of action for actual and constructive fraudulent transfer and
seek a permanent injunction. Plaintiffs are Defendant Charney’s judgment
creditors. Plaintiffs allege that Charney has fraudulently transferred title
and interests in his residence to other Defendants, including his attorney
Defendant Fink, to avoid paying his judgment creditors.
On
November 18, 2022, the Court granted Fink’s motion for summary adjudication.
ANALYSIS
“In moving for summary judgment, a
‘plaintiff . . . has met’ his ‘burden of showing that there is no defense to a
cause of action if’ he ‘has proved each element of the cause of action entitling’
him ‘to judgment on that cause of action.’”
(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
25 Cal.4th 826, 849 (as modified (July 11, 2001).) The plaintiff “must present evidence that
would require a reasonable trier of fact to find any
underlying material fact more likely than not—otherwise, he would not be
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but would have to
present his evidence to a trier of fact.”
(Id., at 851, original
italics.)
Once the plaintiff has met that burden,
the burden shifts to the defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more
material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.
(CCP § 437c(p)(1).) “There is a triable issue of material fact
if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find
the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of
proof.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 850.)
The defendant “shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of
its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but,
instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of
material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”
(CCP § 437c(p)(1).
Plaintiffs move for
summary adjudication of the fourth cause of action for constructive fraudulent
transfer against Dov Charney and Apex Property Management, LLC. Plaintiffs
assert that Charney accidentally deeded title of the real property at issue in
this case to APM and when he intended to deed the property to Defendant Apex RE
(Apex Real Estate Management LLC).
In the moving papers,
Plaintiffs represent that APM has not appeared in this action. In opposition,
Defendants Charney, Apex RE and Art, Commerce & Manfacturing Solitions, LLC
also represent that APM has not appeared in this action. Defendants argue that
the motion must be denied under CCP § 437c(a)(1), which prohibits summary judgment
motions from being made before 60 days have elapsed since the general
appearance in the action of each party against whom the motion is directed.
Charney’s bankruptcy
trustee also has filed a declaration in response to the motion. The trustee
requests that the Court grant the motion as to APM only and not Charney.
Plaintiffs state that
the entity they seek judgment against has not appeared in this action. The
motion against an entity that has not appeared is improper under Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(a)(1). The Court’s record does
reflect that on October 22, 2018 counsel Keith A. Fink filed an answer to
Plaintiffs’ FAC on behalf of an entity called “Apex Property Management, LLC.” But
the parties do not acknowledge or explain the October 22, 2018 answer or how it
may relate to this motion. The Court cannot grant adjudication against APM
based on this record.
Nor
can the Court grant this motion against Charney. CCP § 437c(a)(1) requires that
the motion be made after 60 days have elapsed since the general appearance of “each
party against whom the motion is directed.” This language states that the
motion cannot be granted against any party unless 60 days have elapsed
since the general appearance of every party against whom the motion is
directed.
The Court DENIES
Plaintiffs’ motion.