Judge: Mel Red Recana, Case: 20STCV25717, Date: 2024-05-02 Tentative Ruling
All rulings shown here are TENTATIVE ONLY, and thus oral argument WILL be heard. All Counsel are still required to attend.
Case Number: 20STCV25717 Hearing Date: May 2, 2024 Dept: 45
Hearing Date: May
2, 2024
Moving Party: Defendant Superior Court of California, County of Los
Angeles
Responding Party: Plaintiff
Williams Briand
(1)
Demurrer to First Amended Complaint
The
court considered the moving, opposition, reply, and sur-reply papers.
The
court SUSTAINS defendant Superior Court of California, County of Los
Angeles’s demurrer to First Amended Complaint, with 20 days leave to amend.
Moving Party: Defendants The State Bar of California, Craig Eugene
Holden, and Robert A. Hawley
Responding Party: None
(1) Demurrer to First Amended Complaint
The
court considered the moving and opposition papers. No reply was received.
The
court SUSTAINS defendants The State Bar of California, Craig Eugene
Holden, and Robert A. Hawley’s demurrer to First Amended Complaint, with 20
days leave to amend.
Background
Plaintiff
Williams Briand filed this action on July 7, 2020. Plaintiff filed a First Amended
Complaint (FAC) on August 2, 2021, alleging 21 causes of action.
Defendant
Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles filed a demurrer to the FAC
on December 16, 2022. Plaintiff filed an opposition on August 3, 2023.
Defendant replied on August 8, 2023. Plaintiff filed a “Notice for Leave to
File a Surreply” on October 11, 2023, which includes sur-reply papers.
Defendants The
State Bar of California, Craig Eugene Holden, and Robert A. Hawley filed a
demurrer to the FAC on December 21, 2022. Plaintiff filed an opposition on
October 5, 2023. No reply was received.
The court
continued this matter on October 18, 2023 in order to consider Plaintiff’s
opposition and “Notice for Leave to File a Surreply” with respect to Defendants
The State Bar of California, Craig Eugene Holden, and Robert A. Hawley’s
demurrer.
Legal
Standard
When
considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in
context. (Taylor v. City of Los
Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.)
“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic
matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of
the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The
only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands,
unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
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Request
for Judicial Notice
Defendant
Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles requests that the court
take judicial notice of the following in support of its demurrer:
1. Order dated
September 21, 2022, Mr. BW v. Dell ‘Amore Limousine,
Inc.,
Los Angeles Superior
Court case no. 19STCV12599. (“Exhibit 1.”)
The court GRANTS Defendant’s request for judicial notice. (Evid. Code §
452(d).)
Discussion
Meet and Confer
CCP § 430.41(a) states, in relevant part:
“Before filing a demurrer . . . the demurring party shall meet and confer in
person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to
demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached
that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.”
CCP § 430.41(a)(2) states, in relevant
part: “The parties shall meet and confer at least five days before the date the
responsive pleading is due. If the parties are not able to meet and confer at
least five days prior to the date the responsive pleading is due, the demurring
party shall be granted an automatic 30-day extension of time within which to
file a responsive pleading, by filing and serving, on or before the date on
which a demurrer would be due, a declaration stating under penalty of perjury that
a good faith attempt to meet and confer was made and explaining the reasons why
the parties could not meet and confer.”
CCP § 430.41(a)(3) provides: “The
demurring party shall file and serve with the demurrer a declaration stating
either of the following: (A) The means by which the demurring party met and
conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer, and that
the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the
demurrer. (B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer failed
to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or otherwise
failed to meet and confer in good faith.”
Counsel for defendants The
State Bar of California, Craig Eugene Holden, and Robert A. Hawley submit a
form declaration attesting Plaintiff failed to respond to his request to meet
and confer or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith. (Duran Decl.,
¶ 2b.)
Counsel
for defendant Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles submits a
declaration attesting that she mailed correspondence to Plaintiff on November
10, 2022 identifying the deficiencies in the FAC and setting forth legal
authority for the demurrer. (Overton Decl., ¶ 2, Exh. 1.) Defendant’s counsel
declares she was unable to contact Plaintiff by telephone or email because such
contact information was not listed on his pleadings. (Id.) Defendant’s
counsel attests that she asked in the letter Plaintiff to contact her by
telephone to meet and confer and that she included both her work and cell phone
numbers in the correspondence. (Id.) Defendant’s counsel declares Plaintiff
did not contact her by telephone or at all. (Id. at ¶ 3.)
The
court finds these facts are sufficient to show each defendant complied with the
meet-and-confer requirements of CCP § 430.41. As to defendants The
State Bar of California, Craig Eugene Holden, and Robert A. Hawley, they
submitted a properly completed form declaration establishing that Plaintiff did
not respond to their meet-and-confer request or otherwise meet and confer in
good faith.
As
to defendant Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, it shows that
it made efforts to reach Plaintiff by his mailing address, the only contact
information Plaintiff provided. Defendant’s counsel establishes she left her
telephone numbers so the parties can meet and confer by telephone, as required
under the statute. Despite these good faith efforts, Plaintiff did not response
at all.
Based
on the foregoing, the court proceeds to rule on the merits of the demurrers.
Defendant
Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles’s Demurrer
Defendant
Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, demurs to each of the 21
causes of action of the FAC on the ground it fails to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action and it is uncertain. (CCP §§ 430.10(e), (f).)
Violation of Page Limits
Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1113(d)
states, in relevant part: “Except in a summary judgment or summary adjudication
motion, no opening or responding memorandum may exceed 15 pages.”
Here, Plaintiff submitted a 25-page
opposition. This substantially violates the page limits under Cal. Rules of
Court, Rule 3.1113(d). Thus, the court exercises its discretion to not consider
any pages in the opposition beyond the fifteenth page.
Request to File a Sur-Reply
Plaintiff requests for leave to file
a sur-reply in response to the reply filed by defendant Superior
Court of California, County of Los Angeles. The sur-reply is attached to
Plaintiff’s request papers.
The
court grants Plaintiff’s request. Plaintiff’s sur-reply is considered in this
ruling.
Government Claims Presentation
Requirement (Re Each Cause of Action)
Defendant contends Plaintiff’s
causes of action do not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
because Plaintiff’s allegations fail to establish he complied with the
requirements of the Government Claims Act.
In opposition, Plaintiff contends he
filed a claim with Defendant but was never notified of the outcome. Plaintiff
provides a copy of Defendant’s written rejection letter. Plaintiff maintains
that he was imprisoned at the time and cites Gov. Code § 945.3 to support his
argument.
In reply, Defendant argues
Plaintiff’s copy of the written rejection letter does not establish his action
was timely because Plaintiff filed his lawsuit on July 7, 2020, which was
substantially beyond the limitations period. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff
was supposed to file his action no later than six months after rejection of his
claim under Gov. Code § 945.6. Defendant maintains Plaintiff was still required
to comply with Gov. Code § 945.6 even if he never received the notice of
rejection of claim.
Under Gov. Code § 945.6, “any suit brought
against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to
be presented . . . must be commenced: . . . [¶] (1) If written notice is given
in accordance with Section 913, not later than six months after the date such
notice is personally delivered or deposited in the mail. [¶] (2) If written
notice is not given in accordance with Section 913, within two years from the
accrual of the cause of action. If the period within which the public entity is
required to act is extended pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 912.4, the
period of such extension is not part of the time limited for the commencement
of the action under this paragraph.”
Here, Plaintiff’s copy of
Defendant’s letter rejecting Plaintiff’s claim shows notice was given in
accordance with Gov. Code § 913, with the applicable warning language required
by the statute. (Opposition, Exh. 2.) The letter is accompanied by a proof of
service establishing that Defendant served the letter on Plaintiff on July 9,
2018. (Id.) The address listed for Plaintiff on the proof of service is
the same address Plaintiff lists for his pleadings in this action. (Id.)
Given Plaintiff filed this action on July 7, 2020, Plaintiff’s lawsuit was
brought well beyond the six-month limitations period. While Plaintiff maintains
he did not receive the written rejection letter, the authority above shows Plaintiff
was obligated to inquire as to the status of the claim.
Plaintiff mentions he was imprisoned
at the time he presented the claim to Defendant. However, Plaintiff cites Gov.
Code § 945.3 which does not appear to support his argument in any way. Gov.
Code § 945.3 states:
No person charged
by indictment, information, complaint, or other accusatory pleading charging a
criminal offense may bring a civil action for money or damages against a
peace officer or the public entity employing a peace officer based upon
conduct of the peace officer relating to the offense for which the accused is
charged, including an act or omission in investigating or reporting the offense
or arresting or detaining the accused, while the charges against the accused
are pending before a superior court.
Any applicable
statute of limitations for filing and prosecuting these actions shall be tolled
during the period that the charges are pending before a superior court.
For the purposes
of this section, charges pending before a superior court do not include appeals
or criminal proceedings diverted pursuant to Chapter 2.5 (commencing with
Section 1000), Chapter 2.6 (commencing with Section 1000.6), Chapter 2.7
(commencing with Section 1001), Chapter 2.8 (commencing with Section 1001.20),
or Chapter 2.9 (commencing with Section 1001.50) of Title 6 of Part 2 of the
Penal Code.
Nothing in this
section shall prohibit the filing of a claim with the board of a public entity,
and this section shall not extend the time within which a claim is required to
be presented pursuant to Section 911.2.
(Emphasis
added.)
Here, the plain language of the
statute shows it only applies to actions against a peace officer or a public
entity employing a peace officer. Plaintiff does not establish Defendant is
either of the parties that are the subject of the statute. While Plaintiff
maintains he was imprisoned at the time, neither Plaintiff nor his allegations otherwise
show how this fact renders his claims timely.
Uncertain and the Requisite
Specificity for Pleading (Each Cause of Action)
Defendant argues Plaintiff’s causes
of action are subject to demurrer for uncertainty under CCP § 430.10(f) because
they are ambiguous or unintelligible and they do not allege any facts against
Defendant. Defendant also asserts Plaintiff’s causes of action fail to state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because they are not pled with
the requisite specificity for statutory causes of action.
“[D]emurrers for
uncertainty are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so
incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc.
(2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848, fn. 3, quoting Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208
Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.) “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed,
even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can
be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)
In addition, “the
rule is that where an action is founded on a statutory right or a right
deducible wholly from statute, the plaintiff must, by his complaint, bring
himself squarely and clearly within the terms or provisions of the statute upon
which he relies or must rely to state a cause of action.” (Green v. Grimes-Stassforth Stationery Co. (1940) 39 Cal.App.2d 52,
56.)
The court finds Defendant’s
arguments have merit. Plaintiff has 21 causes of action. None of the causes of
action are discussed in the FAC. Instead, the FAC contains a series of
haphazard facts and streams of thoughts. There is no reasonable clarity as to
what the bases are for Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant. The pleadings are
generally incomprehensible such that a defendant cannot reasonably respond. For
the same foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s causes of action are not pled with the
requisite specificity for statutory causes of action.
The court notes Plaintiff’s
sur-reply disputing Defendant’s assertions of Plaintiff’s status as a vexatious
litigant. Given it has not been shown that such matters are dispositive of any
of the issues discussed herein, the court does not find this factor to be
determinative in this ruling.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the court SUSTAINS
Defendant’s demurrer to each of the 21 causes of action because it
fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and it is
uncertain. (CCP §§ 430.10(e), (f).) The court grants Plaintiff 20 days leave to
amend.
Defendants The
State Bar of California, Craig Eugene Holden, and Robert A. Hawley’s Demurrer
Defendants The
State Bar of California, Craig Eugene Holden, and Robert A. Hawley demur to
each of the 21 causes of action of the FAC on the grounds the court has no
jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading and
it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (CCP §§
430.10(a), (e).)
Violation of Page Limits
Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1113(d)
states, in relevant part: “Except in a summary judgment or summary adjudication
motion, no opening or responding memorandum may exceed 15 pages.”
Here, Plaintiff submitted a 25-page
opposition. This substantially violates the page limits under Cal. Rules of
Court, Rule 3.1113(d). Thus, the court exercises its discretion to not consider
any pages in the opposition beyond the fifteenth page.
Government Claims Presentation Requirement
(Re Each Cause of Action)
Defendants contend each cause of
action does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because
Plaintiff’s allegations fail to establish he complied with the requirements of
the Government Claims Act.
Plaintiff contends he filed a claim with
Defendant but was never notified of the outcome. Plaintiff provides a written
rejection letter. Plaintiff maintains that he was imprisoned at the time and
cites Gov. Code § 945.3 to support his argument.
Under Gov. Code
§ 911.2(a), “[a] claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to
person or to personal property or growing crops shall be presented as provided
in Article 2 (commencing with Section 915) not later than six months after the
accrual of the cause of action.” Gov. Code § 945.4 states, in relevant
part, “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a
cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented . . . until a
written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been
acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board
. . . .”
“Thus, under these statutes, failure to
timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff
from filing a lawsuit against that entity.” (State of California v. Superior
Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239.) “[F]ailure to allege facts
demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement
subjects a claim against a public entity to a demurrer for failure to state a
cause of action.” (Id.)
Here, it does not appear the FAC contains
any allegations establishing Plaintiff ever presented a written claim to
Defendants. The FAC alleges that Plaintiff filed “a Claim with . . . The State
Bar of California,” but this was against “the Court Appointed Attorney.” (FAC,
¶ 27.) This does not appear to be a proper written claim in compliance with the
Government Claims Act.
Plaintiff provides a written rejection
letter, but this is the same letter sent by defendant Superior
Court of California, County of Los Angeles, not defendant The State Bar of
California. (Opposition, Exh. 2.) Plaintiff makes the same argument discussed
above that he
was imprisoned at the time and cites Gov. Code § 945.3 to support his argument.
The same discussion above applies here and is incorporated herein. Thus, the
court finds Plaintiff’s causes of action are subject to demurrer due to
insufficient allegations or judicially noticeable facts demonstrating Plaintiff
satisfied the Government Claims Act.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over
Attorney Discipline Matters (Re Each Cause of Action)
Defendants also argue Plaintiff’s
causes of action are subject to demurrer under CCP § 430.10(a) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because the power to discipline attorneys in
California is within the exclusive power of the California Supreme Court.
Defendants assert the State Bar functions as the Supreme Court’s administrative
arm and has the authority to conduct disciplinary proceedings.
“[I]n 1951, the State Bar Act was
amended to exclude superior courts and appellate courts from exercising such
jurisdiction, leaving the Supreme Court as the sole judicial entity with
jurisdiction over attorney discipline. [Citations.] Thus, in California, the
inherent judicial power of the superior court does not extend to attorney
disciplinary actions. That power is exclusively held by the Supreme Court and
the State Bar, acting as its administrative arm.” (Sheller v. Superior Court
(2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1697, 1710.)
Here, it is unclear what the bases
are for Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants. But, the FAC alleges Plaintiff
filed a claim with the State Bar “against the Court Appointed Attorney.” (FAC,
¶ 27.) Thus, on the face of the FAC, it appears Plaintiff may be concerned
about certain attorney disciplinary matters. However, Defendants show such
matters are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the California Supreme Court.
Plaintiff does not address this issue and, therefore, fails to show the court
has subject matter jurisdiction over his claims against Defendants. Thus, the
court finds Plaintiff’s causes of action are subject to demurrer for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
Immunity (Re Each Cause of Action)
Defendants assert Plaintiff’s causes
of action fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
because Defendants are immune from suit as public entity and employees.
Under Gov. Code § 815(a), “[a]
public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an
act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.”
Thus, Defendants make a prima facie showing that Plaintiff’s claims are barred
against Defendants since they are a public entity or public employee. Plaintiff
does not address this issue and, therefore, fails to show Defendants are not
immune to the claims asserted against them in the FAC.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the court SUSTAINS
Defendants’ demurrer to each of the 21 causes of action because the court has
no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading
and it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (CCP §§
430.10(a), (e).)
Plaintiff
requests for leave to amend. The court grants Plaintiff 20 days leave to amend
to address the deficiencies discussed above.
It is so
ordered.
Dated:
May 2, 2024
_______________________
MEL RED RECANA
Judge of the
Superior Court