Judge: Mel Red Recana, Case: 21STCV13940, Date: 2024-04-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV13940    Hearing Date: April 9, 2024    Dept: 45

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Hearing date:              April 9, 2024

Moving Party:             Plaintiff Hudson Private Corp.

Responding Party:      Defendants Upsense Media Capital Pty, Ltd and RJ Bucaria aka                                                 Richard J. Bucaria

(1) Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFPs (Set One)

(2) Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFPs (Set Two)

(3) Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories (Set One)

The Court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply, as well as the parties’ Joint Statement.

            Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFPs (Set One) is GRANTED as to RFP Nos. 28-34 and DENIED as to RFP Nos. 1-27. 

            Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFPs (Set Two) is GRANTED as to RFP Nos. 39-53, 55-58 and DENIED as to RFP Nos. 54 and 59. 

            Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories (Set One) is GRANTED as to 1-9, 10 (as limited to persons located in California), 12-14 and 17-20 and DENIED as to 11, 15, 16, 21 and 22. 

            Defendant Bucaria is ordered to serve further responses within 20 days.  Bucaria’s further responses should remove all objections. 

            Plaintiff’s requests for sanctions are DENIED. 

Background

            On March 21, 2020, Plaintiff Hudson Private Corp. (“Hudson”) entered into a Revenue Participation Agreement (the “Agreement”) with Defendant Upsense Media Capital Pty, Ltd. (“Upsense”) pursuant to which Hudson would provide Upsense with $2.5 million to purchase an equity interest in the motion picture entitled, “1917” (the “Picture”).  Hudson alleges it was entitled to receive (i) 100% of the amounts payable to Upsense under Upsense’s investment agreement in the movie with MSP Film Fund (“Upsense/MSP Fund Agreement”) until Hudson received $3.5 million and (ii) after receipt of the $3.5 million by Hudson, a continuing 1.8% interest in the amounts due to Upsense under the Upsense/MSP Fund Agreement.  The amounts due Hudson would be paid directly to Hudson from a designated escrow account.

            Hudson alleges Upsense has failed to pay it any of the amounts due under the Agreement and has failed to provide any accounting of Hudson’s $2.5 million in investment, the amounts received by Upsense from or the amounts due Hudson.  Hudson alleges Upsense has already received distributions from the MSP Fund, but it has failed to pay 100% of those payments to Hudson. 

            On April 12, 2021, Hudson filed this action against Upsense and its alleged principal, Defendant RJ Bucaria aka Richard J. Bucaria.  Hudson alleges Upsense is the alter ego of Bucaria.  Hudson alleges (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) fraud—intentional misrepresentation and false promise; (4) fraud—negligent misrepresentation; (5) conversion; (6) unjust enrichment; (7) money had and received; and (8) accounting. 

            On July 16, 2021, Bucaria filed a Motion to Quash Service of Summons.  Bucaria’s Motion to Quash was originally set for hearing on December 1, 2021.  Bucaria’s Motion to Quash has still not been heard and is set for hearing on April 17, 2024, a little over two years after the original scheduled hearing date hearing date. 

            On July 30, 2021, the Court continued the motion to quash so that Hudson could conduct jurisdictional discovery.  On September 15, 2023, Hudson filed three motions to compel further responses to RFPs (Set One), RFPs (Set Two) and Special Interrogatories (Set One).  On November 27, 2023, Defendants filed oppositions to the motions to compel further responses to RFPs (Set One) and RFPs (Set Two).  On November 28, 2023, Defendants filed an opposition to the motion to compel further response to Special Interrogatories (Set One).  On December 1, 2023, Hudson filed replies to Defendants’ oppositions. 

Legal Standard

            Requests for Production of Documents

CCP § 2031.310

(a) On receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply:

            (1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete.

            (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.

            (3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.

(b) A motion under subdivision (a) shall comply with each of the following:

            (1) The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.

            (2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.

            (3) In lieu of a separate statement required under the California Rules of Court, the court may allow the moving party to submit a concise outline of the discovery request and each response in dispute.

(c) Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the demanding party waives any right to compel a further response to the demand.

… (h) Except as provided in subdivision (j), the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.

            Where a party is seeking to compel further responses to requests for document production, the burden is on the moving party to show both relevance to the subject matter and specific facts justifying discovery. (CCP §2031.310(b)(1); Kirkland v. Supr. Ct. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98 (“Once good cause was shown, the burden shifted to Kirkland to justify his objection”); Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.) Once good cause is established by the moving party, the burden then shifts to the responding party to justify any objections made to document disclosure. (Hartbrodt v. Burke (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 168, 172-174.)

            Special Interrogatories

CCP §2030.300

(a) On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply:

            (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete.

            (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate.

            (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.

(b)(1) A motion under subdivision (a) shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.

(2) In lieu of a separate statement required under the California Rules of Court, the court may allow the moving party to submit a concise outline of the discovery request and each response in dispute.

(c) Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the interrogatories.

(d) The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.

(e) If a party then fails to obey an order compelling further response to interrogatories, the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010). In lieu of, or in addition to, that sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010).

            If a timely motion to compel has been filed, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure to fully answer the interrogatories and RFAs. (Coy v. Sup.Ct. (Wolcher) (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220–221; Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Sup.Ct. (Stendell) (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) 

            Jurisdictional Discovery

            “The plaintiff has the right to conduct discovery with regard to the issue of jurisdiction to develop the facts necessary to sustain this burden.”  (Mihlon v. Superior Court (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 703, 710.)  However, continuance of a motion to quash to conduct jurisdictional discovery may be denied if there is no showing that discovery would likely produce evidence of additional “contacts.”  (Beckman v. Thompson (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 481, 486–487.)  A plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery is properly denied where the plaintiff fails to identify what specific discovery they would pursue if granted a continuance and the plaintiff fails to establish that additional discovery is likely to lead to production of evidence of facts establishing jurisdiction.  (Preciado v. Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation (2023) 87 Cal.App.5^th 964, 973-974 (affirming trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery in absence of identification of specific discovery plaintiff would pursue.)  Any discovery must be limited to the issue of personal jurisdiction.  (Burdick v. Supr. Ct. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4^th 8, 30.)

Discussion

            Plaintiff is entitled to jurisdictional discovery on theory of alter ego and specific jurisdiction

            Based on Plaintiff’s complaint, its opposition (“Opposition to Ex Parte”) to Defendants’ Ex Parte to Advance Hearing Date on Motion to Quash and the instant Motion to Compel Further Responses (“Ex Parte”), Plaintiff’s theory of personal jurisdiction over Bucaria is based on his status as an alter ego of Upsense.  Plaintiff alleges personal jurisdiction based on Paragraph 10(c) of the Agreement, which states the “Parties hereby consent to the jurisdiction of the state and federal courts located in the County of Los Angeles in the State of California as to any matter arising out of or relating to this Agreement.”  (Complaint, ¶9, Ex. 1, ¶10(c).)  The “parties” to the Agreement are Hudson and Upsense.  (Complaint, ¶8.)  Plaintiff alleges Bucaria is liable under the Agreement because Upsense is his alter ego.  (Complaint, ¶¶2, 4-7.) 

            Plaintiff never filed a substantive opposition to the Motion to Quash, only to the Ex Parte.  In Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Ex Parte, Plaintiff argued that Bucaria was liable on the Agreement based on alter ego.  (Opposition to Ex Parte, 2:1-9.)  The Court’s minute order of July 30, 2021 does not provide any details regarding the basis for its order allowing for jurisdictional discovery, only stating, “[c]ounsel is allowed to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery.”  (Hudson’s RJN, Ex. E.)  Plaintiff’s counsel also states in her declarations ISO of the Motions to Compel Further Responses that Plaintiff asserts Bucaria is liable for Upsense’s obligations and actions based on alter ego.  (Mekhael Decs. ISO Motions to Compel Further, ¶14.) 

            Thus, based on Plaintiff’s complaint, its Opposition to the Ex Parte and its Motions to Compel Further, Plaintiff is entitled to limited jurisdictional discovery on the only theory of personal jurisdiction articulated by Plaintiff in this proceeding—contractual consent to personal jurisdiction based on alter ego.  Plaintiff is therefore entitled to discovery relevant to the elements of alter ego:  “(1) such a unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and its equitable owner that no separation actually exists, and (2) an inequitable result if the acts in question are treated as those of the corporation alone.”  (Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4^th 399, 417.”

            In addition, Bucaria’s Motion to Quash and his declaration in support thereof raise issues as to specific jurisdiction.  “When determining whether specific jurisdiction exists, courts consider the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if: (1) the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits; (2) the controversy is related to or arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum; and (3) the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’”  (Jayone Foods, Inc. v. Aekyung Industrial Co. Ltd. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 543, 553 (citing Pavlovich v. Supr. Ct. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 268); Farina v. SAVWCL III, LLC (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 286, 294.)

            Plaintiff is a New York corporation.  (Complaint, ¶1.)  Defendant Bucaria is a New York resident.  (Complaint, ¶3.)  Defendant Upsense, Bucaria’s alleged alter ego, is an Australian corporation.  (Complaint, ¶2.)  There are no facts presented that would establish any relationship of the parties’ or their transaction to California other than their mutual agreement to consent to jurisdiction in California. 

            However, Bucaria attested to multiple facts in support of his Motion to Quash and his contention neither specific or general jurisdiction applied to him.  For example, Bucaria testifies that in July 2019, he went to California on a one week trip for both “social and business reasons.”  (Bucaria Dec. ISO MTQ, ¶5.)  Bucaria testifies that the trip was entirely unrelated to Upsense.  (Id.)  Bucaria testifies that Upsense is owned in part by an entity known as Prolific.  (Id. at ¶7.)  Bucaria also submitted a declaration in support of the Ex Parte.  Plaintiff is entitled to conduct discovery into the facts contained raised in Bucaria’s Motion to Quash and Ex Parte to the extent they relate to specific jurisdiction. 

            Plaintiff has never presented any argument or facts indicating that additional discovery could establish grounds for general jurisdiction over Bucaria.  “A state court may exercise general jurisdiction only when a defendant is ‘essentially at home’ in the State.  General jurisdiction…extends to any and all claims brought against a defendant.  Those claims need not relate to the forum State or the defendant's activity  here; they may concern events and conduct anywhere in the world. But that breadth imposes a correlative limit: Only a select set of affiliations with a forum will expose a defendant to such sweeping jurisdiction.  In what the Supreme Court has called the ‘paradigm’ case, an individual is subject to general jurisdiction in her place of domicile.  And the ‘equivalent’ forums for a corporation are its place of incorporation and principal place of business.”  (Preciado v. Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 964, 976.) 

            According to Bucaria’s declaration in support of his Motion to Quash, he (1) resides in New York and has lived there his entire life except for 4 years for college in Massachusetts and Connecticut and (2) he does not reside in California.  (Bucaria Dec. ISO of Motion to Quash filed July 16, 2021, ¶¶1-2.)  In response, Plaintiff has never argued or maintained New York was not Bucaria’s domicile.  In support of Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel Further, Plaintiff does not offer any facts that would indicate any basis for general jurisdiction.  Plaintiff has therefore failed to demonstrate that jurisdictional discovery would yield any information that would establish the very narrow requirements for general jurisdiction as to Bucaria as an individual.  Plaintiff therefore has no right to general jurisdiction discovery. 

            In evaluating Plaintiff’s three Motions to Compel Further, the court will apply these findings.  Plaintiff is entitled to propound discovery pertaining to alter ego and the facts relevant to specific jurisdiction set forth in Bucaria’s Motion to Quash and the Ex Parte. 

            Elements of Alter Ego

            “To succeed on their alter ego claim, plaintiffs must be able to show: (1) such a unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and its equitable owner that no separation actually exists, and (2) an inequitable result if the acts in question are treated as those of the corporation alone.”  (Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 417.)

            “Several factors are to be considered in applying the doctrine; among them are: commingling of funds and other assets…the treatment by an individual of the assets of the corporation as his own…sole ownership of all of the stock in a corporation by one individual or the members of a family; the failure to adequately capitalize a corporation; the total absence of corporate assets, and undercapitalization; the use of a corporation as a mere shell, instrumentality or conduit for a single venture or the business of an individual or another corporation…the disregard of legal formalities and the failure to maintain arm's length relationships among related entities…the diversion of assets from a corporation by or to a stockholder or other person or entity, to the detriment of creditors…the contracting with another with intent to avoid performance by use of a corporate entity as a shield against personal liability, or the use of a corporation as a subterfuge of illegal transactions…This long list of factors is not exhaustive. The enumerated factors may be considered among others under the particular circumstances of each case.”  (Id. at 417–418.)

            “Critically, no single factor is determinative, and instead a court must examine all the circumstances to determine whether to apply the doctrine.  There is no litmus test to determine when the corporate veil will be pierced; rather the result will depend on the circumstances of each particular case.  Because it is founded on equitable principles, application of the alter ego is not made to depend upon prior decisions involving factual situations which appear to be similar.  It is the general rule that the conditions under which a corporate entity may be disregarded vary according to the circumstances of each case.”  (JPV I L.P. v. Koetting (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 172, 195.)  The “alter EGO inquiry may, in appropriate circumstances, focus narrowly on certain inequitable uses of the corporate from for specific purposes.”  (Id.)

            In determining whether to apply alter ego, the court must consider “all the circumstances relevant to the alter ego inquiry.”  (Id. at 196.)  This includes arbitral findings that are entitled to collateral estoppel effect.  (Id.)   

            Alter ego does not require a showing that the use of the corporate form was a “sham, in bad faith, or intended to defraud.”  (Id. at 199.)  “[C]ourts may ignore the corporate entity under the alter ego doctrine “when the corporate form is used to perpetrate a fraud, circumvent a statute, or accomplish some other wrongful or inequitable purpose.”  (Id.)  The mere fact that a corporate entity is a “real business with real purpose and assets and not a sham corporate entity formed for the purpose of committing a fraud or other misdeeds” does not preclude application of alter ego.  Such a “narrow formulation of the doctrine based on the purposes of the corporate entity’s formation” is a “misunderstanding of the applicable law.”  (Id.) 

            The “inequitable result” prong of alter ego requires a “finding that the facts are such that adherence to the fiction of the separate existence of the corporation would sanction a fraud or promote injustice.  The test for this requirement is that if the acts are treated as those of the corporation alone, it will produce an unjust or inequitable result.  An inequitable result does not require a wrongful intent.”  (Id. at 200.)  While inability to collect alone does not satisfy the inequitable result prong, “inability to collect combined with other factors indicating inequitable uses of the corporate form, may justify the unjust result element for alter ego liability.”  (Id.)

            “The conditions under which the corporate entity may be disregarded vary according to the circumstances in each case and the matter is particularly within the province of the trial court.”  (Misik v. D'Arco (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1071–1072.)  “Whether a party is liable under an alter ego theory is a question of fact.”  (Leek, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at 418.) 

            Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFP (Set One) Nos. 1-38—DENIED as to 1-28, 35-38 and GRANTED as to 28-34

            Plaintiff propounded RFPs (Set One) on June 10, 2021, before the Motion to Quash was filed on July 16, 2021 and before the Court granted leave to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery on July 23, 2021.  As such, Plaintiff’s RFPs (Set One) were not tailored to the jurisdictional issues raised for which the Court allowed limited discovery. 
            Applying the foregoing principles and having reviewed the RFPs, Plaintiff’s motion to compel is denied as to RFP Nos. 1-28, 35, 36 and 38.  These RFPs pertain to the underlying substantive dispute between Upsense and Plaintiff, not whether Upsense is the alter ego of Bucaria or elements of specific jurisdiction.  Moreover, Bucaria agreed in his supplemental responses to RFP Nos. 10-12, 29, 30, 34 and 35 that he would produce documents regarding personal payments he received subject to a protective order. 

            As to RFP No. 37, Plaintiff asks that Bucaria produce all “tax returns from January 2017 to the present, including all back-up and source documents from which said tax returns were prepared.”  (Separate Statement in Support of MTCF to RFPs (set one), RFP No. 37.)    “The California Supreme Court has held that Revenue and Taxation Code section 19282, which prohibits disclosure of tax returns, implicitly creates a privilege against the disclosure of income tax returns. (Webb v. Standard Oil Co. (1957) 49 Cal.2d 509, 513, 319 P.2d 621.) The privilege may be waived by an intentional relinquishment of it. (Schnabel v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 721.) In addition, it is inapplicable where the gravamen of the lawsuit is inconsistent with claiming the privilege, or where a public policy greater than the purpose of the privilege is involved.”  (Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 479.)  The privilege against forced disclosure of tax returns extends to individuals, banks and corporations.  (Schnabel v. Supr. Ct. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 720.)  Submission of one’s tax returns to a bank as part of a loan application does not qualify as the intentional relinquishment of the tax return privilege.  (Fortunato v. Supr. Ct. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 479 (reversing trial court’s order denying plaintiff’s motion for protective order as to deposition subpoena on plaintiff’s bank seeking tax returns; tax returns were protected by tax return privilege and privacy right and submission to bank in connection with loan application was not intentional waiver).) 

            Bucaria objected to RFP No. 37 based on “attorney client privilege, the work product doctrine, joint defense or common interest privilege, or any other constitutional, statutory, common law, or regulatory protection, immunity, or proscription from disclosure.”  Bucaria’s objection is sustained to the RFP No. 37 based on the privilege against disclosure of tax returns.

            RFP Nos. 28-34 are within the scope of permitted jurisdictional discovery.  These RFPs are relevant to the alter ego analysis. 

            Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFPs (Set One) is GRANTED as to RFP Nos. 28-34 and DENIED as to RFP Nos. 1-27. 

            Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFP Nos. 39-59—GRANT as to 39-58 and DENY  as to 59

            Applying the foregoing principles, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFPs (set two) is granted as to RFP Nos. 39-53, 55-58.  Based on a review of these RFPs (set two), they seek information relevant to specific jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction based on the Agreement and alter ego.  Defendant’s objections to RFP Nos. 39-53, 55-58 are overruled.

            A number of the RFPs (set two) seek information regarding Prolific, the entity identified by Bucaria in his declaration as the entity that owns a portion of Upsense.  Defendant argues Prolific is not a named party and any information regarding it is irrelevant to the theory of alter ego liability alleged against Bucaria.  However, the scope of discovery is broad and Bucaria’s declaration in support of the Motion to Quash put Prolific’s status at issue.  Plaintiff alleges Upsense is Bucaria’s alter ego, which does not preclude Plaintiff from establishing alter ego through multiple shells for the purpose of opposing Bucaria’s Motion to Quash. 

            Plaintiff fails to establish good cause to compel further response to RFP No. 54, which seeks all documents evidencing Defendant Bucaria’s business relationship with “Subpoenaed Parties.”  These “subpoenaed parties” were referenced in Bucaria’s July 29, 2021 Declaration ISO of the Ex Parte.  (7/29/21 Bucaria Dec., ¶2.) [MISLABELED IN ECOURT AS “DECLARATION OF MARK SPILLANE IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE.]   However, Bucaria referenced these “subpoenaed parties” as evidence that the discovery burden Plaintiff’s were imposing on third parties despite the unsettled dispute over personal jurisdiction, as well as the negative effect the discovery on these third parties was having on his reputation.  (Id. at ¶6.)  Bucaria’s reference to the subpoenaed parties had nothing to do with the substantive issues raised by his Motion to Quash or issues relating to personal jurisdiction.  Bucaria’s July 29, 2021 declaration did not “put at issue” his relationship with the subpoenaed parties for purposes of the substance of the Motion to Quash. 

            To the extent Plaintiff is claiming some of these Subpoenaed Parties are located in California, the RFP is still overbroad.  Plaintiff did not limit the RFP to the California entities, nor did Plaintiff limited the requested documents to those relating to the transaction at issue, “1917” or the instant dispute. 

            Plaintiff fails to establish good cause for further response to RFP No. 54.  As such, the motion to compel is denied as to RFP No. 54. 

            Plaintiff fails to establish good cause as to RFP No. 59, which seeks all documents relating to Bucaria’s ownership of real or personal property in California.  Specific jurisdiction requires that Bucaria have availed himself of California’s benefits and that the controversy is related to or arises out of the Bucaria’s contacts with the forum.  Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a connection between any real or personal property owned by Bucaria in California and the controversy alleged in the complaint.  Moreover, Bucaria provided a substantive response that corroborates his declaration testimony in support of the Motion to Quash—he does not own, nor has he ever owned, real or personal property in California. 

            For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFPs (Set Two) is GRANTED as to RFP Nos. 39-53, 55-58 and DENIED as to RFP Nos. 54 and 59. 

            Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories (Set One)1-35—GRANT as to 1-9, 10 (as limited to persons located in California),12-14 and 17-20 and DENY as to 11, 15, 16, 21 and 22

            Applying the foregoing principles and based on a review of the Special Interrogatories (Set One) and Bucaria’s responses, the Court finds that Special Interrogatories (Set One) Nos. 1-9, 10 (as limited to persons located in California),12-14 and 17-20 seek information relevant to the limited issues of personal jurisdiction based on alter ego and specific jurisdiction.  The motion is granted as to these special interrogatories.

            Special Interrogatory No. 11 is duplicative of RFP No. 12 to the extent it is relevant to the Motion to Quash. 

            Special Interrogatory No. 15 is overbroad, because it seeks information regarding Bucaria’s business relationships with “subpoenaed parties,”  who Plaintiff concedes are not all California residents. 

            Special Interrogatory No. 16 was sufficiently responded to by Bucaria. 

            Special Interrogatory Nos. 21 and 22 are follow up interrogatories to Special Interrogatory No. 20 that are unnecessary and go beyond the scope of limited jurisdictional discovery allowed by the Court. 

            Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories (Set One) is GRANTED as to 1-9, 10 (as limited to persons located in California), 12-14 and 17-20 and DENIED as to 11, 15, 16, 21 and 22. 

            Sanctions

            Plaintiff requested sanctions in the amount of (1) $4,475 in connection with the Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFPs (Set One); (2) $4,750 in connection with the Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFPs (Set One); (3) $5,025 in connection with the Motion to Compel Further Response to Special Interrogatories (Set One).  The requests for sanctions were based on an hourly rate of $550/hr.

            Plaintiff did not prevail entirely on the motions.  Defendant Bucaria certainly had substantial justification to oppose the motions.  A number of Plaintiff’s discovery requests were patently outside of the scope of limited jurisdictional discovery contemplated by the court.  For this reason, Plaintiffs’ requests for sanctions is DENIED.

Conclusion

            Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFPs (Set One) is GRANTED as to RFP Nos. 28-34 and DENIED as to RFP Nos. 1-27. 

            Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFPs (Set Two) is GRANTED as to RFP Nos. 39-53, 55-58 and DENIED as to RFP Nos. 54 and 59. 

            Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories (Set One) is GRANTED as to 1-9, 10 (as limited to persons located in California), 12-14 and 17-20 and DENIED as to 11, 15, 16, 21 and 22. 

            Defendant Bucaria is ordered to serve further responses within 20 days.  Bucaria’s further responses shall remove all objections. 

            Plaintiff’s requests for sanctions are DENIED. 

            It is so ordered.

Dated: April 9, 2024

_______________________

Rolf M. Treu

Judge of the Superior Court