Judge: Mel Red Recana, Case: 21STCV23487, Date: 2024-09-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV23487    Hearing Date: September 25, 2024    Dept: 45

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

 

ASHLEY NICOLE COUNTEE,

 

                             Plaintiff,

 

                              vs.

AMERICAN RAG CIE, LLC, and DOES 1-20, inclusive

 

                              Defendants.

Case No.:  21STCV23487

DEPARTMENT 45

 

 

 

[TENTATIVE] RULING

 

 

 

Action Filed:  06/23/2021

Trial Date:  09/15/2025

 

Hearing date:              September 25, 2024

Moving Party:             Plaintiff Ashley Nicole Countee

Responding Party:      Defendant American Rag Cie, LLC

Motions to Quash or Modify Defendant’s Subpoenas of Employment Records of Subsequent Employers Served on Third Parties

The Court considered the moving, opposition and reply papers.

 

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Defendant’s subpoenas for the production of records served on third the following third parties: (1) Nordstrom, Inc. – Nordstrom; (2) Nordstrom, Inc. – Nordstrom Rack; (3) Beauty Systems Group, LLC. Dba Cosmoprof; and (4) The Belle (the “Prior Employer”).

 

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Defendant’s subpoenas for the production of records served on third the following third parties: (1) Buck Mason and (2) Dover Street Market LA, LLC (the “Subsequent Employee”).

Background

Two motions to quash business records subpoenas are presently before the Court. Plaintiff Ashley Nicole Countee (“Plaintiff”) moves for orders quashing service of the February 28, 2024, Deposition Subpoenas for the Production of Business Records (collectively, the “Subpoenas”) served by Defendant American Rag Cie, LLC (“Defendant”) on Plaintiff’s four prior employers, non-parties (1) Nordstrom, Inc. d/b/a Nordstrom; (2) Nordstrom, Inc., d/b/a Nordstrom Rack, (3) Beauty Systems Group, LLC d/b/a Cosmoprof; and (4) The Belle (the “Prior Employers”), and two subsequent employers, nonparties: (1) Buck Mason and (2) Dover Street Market LA, LLC (the “Subsequent Employers”), or in the alternative, limiting the scope to implicate only pay and mitigation documents to which Defendant is entitled to. (Notices of Motion, p. 2.)

Plaintiff filed the instant motion on March 22, 2024. On September 12, 2024, Defendant filed oppositions together with a response separate statement and supporting declaration. On September 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply to the opposition. In light of the similarity of the motions which are all directed at quashing depositions subpoenas seeking personnel records from Plaintiff’s employers and given the issues raised in the opposition, the Court addresses the motions collectively.

On June 23, 2021, Plaintiff Ashley Nicole Countee (“Plaintiff”) filed her Complaint against Defendants American Rag Cie, LLC, and DOES 1-20, inclusive. Specifically, the Complaint alleges the following thirteen causes of action: (1) Failure to Grant Medical Leave in Violation of the Cal. Family Rights Act (“CFRA”); (2) Failure to Reinstate in Violation of CFRA (3) Denial of Medical Leave in Violation CFRA; (4) Restraint of Medical Leave in Violation of CFRA; (5) Interference with Medical Leave in Violation of CFRA; (6) Discrimination in Violation of CFRA; (7) Retaliation in Violation of CFRA; (8) Disability Discrimination in Violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (9) Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process in Violation of FEHA; (10) Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation in Violation FEHA; (11) Retaliation in Violation of FEHA; (12) Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Retaliation in Violation of FEHA; and (13) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy.

On March 29, 2022, the stay as to binding arbitration was lifted by the Court, following the parties Stipulation to Vacate the Stay of Proceedings Ordered on August 13, 2021. (3-29-22 Minute Order.) On July 25, 2022, Defendant filed its answer, raising 31 affirmative defenses.

            On or about February 28, 2024, Defendant served Plaintiff Notice of its intent to serve Subpoenas seeking production of business records on Plaintiff’s non-party Prior Employers and Subsequent Employers by March 28, 2024. (Motions to Quash, p. 4; Declaration of Charlene Nercess (“Decl. of Nercess”) ¶ 5; Exhibit B.)  Defendant also served the Subpoenas on Plaintiff’s Prior Employers and Subsequent Employers requesting employment records, including personnel files and payroll records. (Oppositions, p. 4; Declaration of Anand Mathew (“Decl. of Mathew”), ¶ 5; Exhibit C.) Specifically, each Subpoena seeks, “All employment records relating to the employment of Ashley Countee, including but not limited to: personnel file including any records related to her application, hiring, promotion, compensation, benefits, and termination. Performance evaluations, including any records related to her job performance, attendance, punctuality, and conduct. Disciplinary records, including any records related to any investigations, warnings, suspensions, or terminations. Payroll records, including any records related to her compensation, timecards reflecting hours worked, and overtime. Training records, including any records related to any training or certifications received by Ashley Countee.” (Id.; Motions, p. 4.)

            On March 18, 2024, counsel for Plaintiff delivered a meet and confer letter to counsel for Defendant, requesting Defendant withdraw the Subpoenas to Plaintiff’s Prior Employers and Subsequent Employers, to dictate the records pursuant to a First Look Agreement. (Decl. of Mathew, ¶ 6; Exhibit D.)

            On March 20, 2024, counsel for Defendant mailed a Meet and Confer letter to Plaintiff’s counsel based on its position that the Prior Employer and Subsequent Employer business records were essential to the resolution of the case, as they relate to affirmative defenses raised in Defendant’s answer. (Decl. of Mathew, ¶ 7.) The same day, Plaintiff’s counsel directed Defense counsel to withdraw the Subpoenas. (Decl. of Mathew, ¶ 8.) The following day, Defense counsel reiterated by email to Plaintiff’s counsel that the payroll records were relevant. (Decl. of Mathew, ¶ 9.)

On March 22, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to quash or modify the Subpoenas.

 

Legal Standard

“C.C.P. §1987.1(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things… at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by [a party]…, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.”

“Any employee whose employment records are sought by a subpoena duces tecum may, prior to the date for production, bring a motion under Section 1987.1 to quash or modify the subpoena duces tecum. . . .”  (CCP § 1985.6(f)(1).)  Under Section 1987.1, the Court “may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.”  (CCP § 1987.1(a).) 

 

Discussion

Motions to Quash Production of Employment Records of Plaintiff’s Third-Party Prior Employers and Subsequent Employers

The Subpoenas are overbroad in scope. The Subpoenas are open to all records are not limited to the relevant time period or issued raised in the instant case. (Motion, p. 4.) The Subpoenas are so overbroad they seek production of documents that are not relevant to this action and/or are invasive of Plaintiffs’ right to privacy. 

The California Supreme Court “established a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy. The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. [Citation] The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.) 

Plaintiffs have a legally protected privacy interest in their complete employment and personnel records, which include protected taxpayer information.  (See Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141, 143-44; Cobb v. Superior Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 543; Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 174.)  Plaintiffs also have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy given the threatened intrusion is serious. 

Notably, Defendant seeks production of Plaintiffs’ employment records, without any limitation as to scope in content or time period. Plaintiff contends that Defendant seeks total access to “Personnel records”, which contain private information that exceeds the requirements of resolving this case. (Motions, p. 7.)

Plaintiff argues that the Subpoenas should be limited to include only Plaintiff’s subsequent employment records that are relevant to the resolution of this matters – limited only to Plaintiff’s damages and mitigation. (Motion, p. 6.) P

In opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s allegations of lost earnings present a “compelling need” for Plaintiff’s Prior Employment records because as articulated in her deposition, the information as to her start dates and compensation from Subsequent Employers was vague. (Opposition, p. 2, ¶ 1; Deposition of Pl., 61:15-65:24; Alch v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1425.) Defendant also contends that Plaintiff’s Motions place an evidentiary burden on Defendant’s Twentieth Affirmative Defense for speculative/ uncertain damages and Twenty-First Affirmative Defense for failure to mitigate. (Opposition, p. 2, ¶ 2; Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 551.)

  Plaintiff did not put her entire employment history at issue by filing the instant habitability action against Defendant. Upon review of Plaintiff’s deposition, dated February 13, 2024, the Court notes that Plaintiff stated her dates of employment, hourly rates of $16 and $20, the hours worked, and whether overtime wages, commissions, or bonuses were paid at both Subsequent Employers. (Deposition of Pl., 61:15-65:24.) As to the mitigation Affirmative Defense, Plaintiff even provided the same details of her employment with Else Lingerie – who are not the subject of the Subpoenas – after her role at Dover Street Market LA ended. (Deposition of Pl: 64:7-65:24.) Defendant fails to establish a compelling need for Plaintiffs’ employment records and/or a compelling interest that outweighs Plaintiffs’ right to privacy with respect to her comprehensive employment records.  Moreover, to the extent portions of Plaintiffs’ employment records are not protected by privacy interests, Defendant has failed to establish that the complete historical evidence of Plaintiffs’ employment and income is relevant to the claims Plaintiffs assert against Defendant such that the Subpoenas are “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  (C.C.P. §2017.010.)  

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ motions to quash the Subpoenas are granted.

 

            It is so ordered.

 

Dated: September 25, 2024

 

_______________________

MEL RED RECANA

Judge of the Superior Court