Judge: Mel Red Recana, Case: 21STCV24070, Date: 2024-03-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV24070 Hearing Date: March 7, 2024 Dept: 45
Hearing date: February 29, 2024
Moving Party: Defendant/Cross-Complainant
Irene Chan
Responding Party:
Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Hoi Ying
Eugenie Lai
(1) Motion to Compel Production of Documents
The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers.
Defendant’s motion to compel production of documents is MOOT.
The court DENIES Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions.
The court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions.
(2) Motion to Compel Further Responses
to Special Interrogatories (Set One and Set Two)
The court considered
the moving, opposition, reply papers and the parties’ joint statement.
The court GRANTS Defendant’s motion
to compel further responses to Special Interrogatories (Set One) Nos. 1,
16-17, 19, 25, and 28. The court orders Plaintiff to serve further responses to
Special
Interrogatories (Set One) Nos. 1, 16-17, 19, 25, and 28, within 20
days of the date of this ruling.
The court GRANTS Defendant’s motion
to compel further responses to Special Interrogatories (Set One) Nos. 49 and
51-52. The court orders Plaintiff to serve further
responses to Special
Interrogatories (Set One) Nos. 49 and 51-52, subject to
a protective order, as set forth below.
The
court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel further responses to Special
Interrogatories (Set Two) Nos. 1-9, 11-12, 23, 25-26, and 35. The court
orders Plaintiff to serve further responses to Special Interrogatories (Set Two)
No. 1-9, 11-12, 23, 25-26, and 35, within 20 days
of the date of this ruling.
The
court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel further responses to Special
Interrogatories (Set Two) Nos. 31-34, 38-44, and 45-49. The court
orders Plaintiff to serve further responses to Special Interrogatories (Set Two)
Nos. 31-34, 38-44, and 45-49, subject to a protective
order, as set forth below.
The
court DENIES Defendant’s motion to compel further responses to Special
Interrogatories (Set Two) Nos. 10, 13-22, 24, 27-30, and 36-37.
The court GRANTS Defendant’s
request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and her counsel of record in
the reduced amount of $1,860 in attorney’s fees and costs. The court orders
plaintiff Hoi Ying Eugenie Lai and her counsel of record, jointly and
severally, to pay $1,860 to defendant Irene Chan, through her counsel of record,
within 20 days of the days of the date of this ruling.
The court DENIES Plaintiff’s
request for monetary sanctions.
Background
Plaintiff Hoi
Ying Eugenie Lai filed this action on June 29, 2021. Plaintiff filed a First
Amended Complaint (FAC) on May 30, 2023 against defendant Irene Chan, alleging
causes of action for (1) Quiet Title; (2) Specific Performance; (3) Breach of
Contract; (4) Breach of Quasi-Contract/Unjust Enrichment; (5) Promissory
Estoppel; (6) Intentional Misrepresentation; (7) Negligent Misrepresentation;
and (8) Declaratory Relief.
The FAC alleges
the following: On September 3, 2019, the parties agreed to purchase real
property located at 9426 Olive Street, Temple City, California. (FAC, ¶ 6.)
Plaintiff lacked sufficient credit to obtain the financing for the subject
property on her own, so the parties agreed that: (1) Defendant would obtain a
purchase money mortgage to acquire the property on Plaintiff’s behalf; (2) each
party would provide the necessary funds for the down payment; and (3) Plaintiff
will pay half of all expenses in connection with the property and Defendant
will pay the other half. (Id. at ¶ 7, 3:1-7[1].)
The parties co-owned a bank account to pay the mortgage loan payments, but
Defendant made no contributions as agreed upon. (Id. at ¶ 7, 3:17-19.)
Due to Defendant’s failure to pay her portion of the expenses in connection
with the subject property, the parties modified their agreement to require
Defendant to transfer 100 percent ownership title to the subject property to
Plaintiff so long as Plaintiff paid off the mortgage within three years and
repaid all funds provided by Defendant for the purchase of the property. (Id.
at ¶ 7, 3:22-28.) Plaintiff performed all of her obligations in the agreement
in a timely manner. (Id. at ¶ 10.) However, Defendant failed and refused
to perform her part of the agreement to transfer her 50 percent interest in the
subject property to Plaintiff. (Id.)
Irene Chan filed
a Cross-Complaint on June 7, 2023 against Hoi Ying Eugenie and Global West Real
Estate Corporation, alleging causes of action for (1) Breach of Fiduciary Duty;
(2) Intentional Fraud; (3) Negligent Misrepresentation; (4) Elder Abuse; (5)
Financial Elder Abuse; (6) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (7)
Negligence; and (8) Unfair Competition.
Global West Real
Est Ate Corporation dba Re/Max Premier Properties filed a Cross-Complaint on November
20, 2023 against Irene Chan and Hoi Ying Eugenie, alleging causes of action for
(1) Indemnity; (2) Contribution; (3) Declaratory Relief; (4) Attorneys Fees;
and (5) Breach of Independent Contractor Agreement.
Defendant/Cross-Complainant
Irene Chan (hereinafter, “Defendant”) filed this motion to compel further responses
to Special Interrogatories (Set One and Set Two) on June 7, 2023. Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant
Hoi Ying Eugenie Lai (hereinafter, “Plaintiff”) filed an opposition on November
13, 2023. Defendant replied on November 16, 2023.
Legal Standard
Where responses to interrogatories have
been served but the requesting party believes that they are deficient because
the answers are evasive or incomplete, or, because an objection is without merit,
that party may move for an order compelling a further response. (CCP §
2030.300(a).) The motion must be made within 45 days after service of verified
responses in question, or any verified supplemental responses. (CCP § 2030.300(c).)
The motion must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration in compliance
with CCP § 2016.040. (CCP § 2030.300(b).)
Where responses to requests for production
of documents have been served but the requesting party believes that they are
deficient because the statement of compliance is incomplete, the representation
of an inability to comply is inadequate, evasive, or incomplete, or, because an
objection is without merit, that party may move for an order compelling a
further response. (CCP § 2031.310(a).) The motion must be made within 45 days
after service of verified responses in question, or any verified supplemental responses.
(CCP § 2031.310(c).) The motion must be accompanied by a meet and confer
declaration in compliance with CCP § 2016.040. (CCP § 2031.310(b).)
Discussion
Motion
to Compel Production of Documents
Merits
of the Motion
Defendant/Cross-Complainant
Irene Chan moves to compel production of documents. Namely, Defendant seeks
production of the original quitclaim deed for the subject property. Defendant argues
the original quitclaim deed is pertinent because the signature is a contested
issue in this case.
Here, Defendant indicates Plaintiff
complied with the production request after this motion was filed. (Reply,
2:19-20.) The court therefore finds this motion is MOOT.
Requests for Monetary Sanctions
As to monetary sanctions, Plaintiff contends
she should not be sanctioned because she produced a copy of the document,
initially could not find the original document, and was out of the country. Under
CCP § 2031.310(h), “the court shall impose a monetary sanction under . . .
against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a
motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one
subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other
circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”
The court finds Plaintiff
sufficiently shows she acted with substantial justification or that circumstances
make the imposition of the sanction unjust. Plaintiff attests she moved houses
around mid-2023. (Lai Decl., ¶ 3.) When Defendant demanded the original quitclaim
deed on July 26, 2023, the document was in a file in a box somewhere in
Plaintiff’s new house. (Id. at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff was in Hong Kong from
approximately July 2023 to August 2023, so she did not have time to unpack and
comply with Defendant’s request. (Id.) Plaintiff wrote a declaration authenticating
the copy of the quitclaim deed. (Id.) After Plaintiff returned from Hong
Kong in late August 2023, she unpacked and finally found the original quitclaim
deed. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Accordingly, since Plaintiff establishes she
produced a copy of the quitclaim deed, initially could not find the original,
and later produced the original when she found it, the court finds Plaintiff
sufficiently demonstrates she acted with substantial justification when she
failed to produce the original document or that circumstances make the
imposition of the sanction unjust.
The court notes Plaintiff also
requests monetary sanctions against Defendant’s counsel of record for refusing
to take the motion off calendar and for misusing discovery. The court has found
Defendant’s motion moot since Plaintiff produced the document at issue after
the motion was filed. CCP § 2031.310(h) provides for monetary sanctions against
the moving party or counsel of record if the motion was unsuccessfully made.
The court therefore finds monetary sanctions against Defendant’s counsel of
record are not proper since the motion was not unsuccessfully made.
Accordingly, the court rules as
follows:
The court DENIES Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions.
The court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions.
Motion
to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories
Merits
of the Motion
Defendant/Cross-Complainant
Irene Chan moves to compel further responses from plaintiff/cross-defendant Hoi
Ying Eugenie Lai to (1) Special Interrogatories (Set One) Nos. 1, 16, 17, 19,
25, 28, 49, and 51-52; and (2) Special Interrogatories (Set Two) Nos. 1-49.
The court continued this matter on
December 15, 2023 and ordered the parties to file a joint statement given the substantial
number of discovery requests at issue and the voluminous documents submitted.
The parties filed a joint statement on January 25, 2024. The court rules on
Defendant’s motion as follows:
a.
Special Interrogatories (Set One)
Nos. 1, 16-17, 19, 25, and 28
As
Special Interrogatories (Set One) Nos. 1, 16-17, 19,
25, and 28,
these interrogatories ask Plaintiff to state the facts or identify the
documents that relate to the Plaintiff’s allegations in the Complaint.
Defendant
contends Plaintiff’s responses are incomplete or evasive because Plaintiff does
not answer what is asked and only refers to documents produced. Defendant
argues the production was a massive, random, and incoherent document dump.
Defendant asserts Plaintiff has changed counsel multiple times and has been pro
per for some time, but Plaintiff still refused to comply even after retaining
current counsel.
Plaintiff
contends Defendant’s motion is untimely because the initial responses were served
on April 15, 2022. Plaintiff maintains that Defendant’s counsel acknowledged in
a May 15, 2022 meet-and-confer letter that his last day to file a motion was
May 28, 2022. Plaintiff asserts her discovery responses are nevertheless complete
because CCP § 2030(a)(2) allows a responding party to produce documents in lieu
of an answer. Plaintiff argue Defendant disingenuously calls Plaintiff’s
production a “document dump”; the production actually consists of approximately
275 pages of fully responsive documents.
The
court finds Defendant’s arguments have merit. As to timeliness, the court finds
Defendant sufficiently shows the motion is timely. The proof of service for
Plaintiff’s supplemental responses is provided and shows Plaintiff served her responses
on April 24, 2023. (Joint Statement, Exh. A.) Defendant filed and served this
motion on June 7, 2023, which is within the 45-day deadline. Plaintiff argues her
initial responses were served on April 15, 2022, but the 45-day deadline runs
from “the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response
. . . .” (CCP § 2030.300(c).)
As
to Plaintiff’s responses to these interrogatories, the court finds they are
mostly nonresponsive or evasive. For Special Interrogatories Nos. 16-17,
19, 25, and 28, Plaintiff only responds “Asked and answered,” then simply refers
to the document production number. Plaintiff contends she is allowed to produce
documents instead of providing facts under CCP § 2030.210(a)(2), which states
in relevant part, “[t]he party to whom interrogatories have been propounded
shall respond . . . by any of the following . . . [¶] An exercise of the party’s
option to produce writings.”
However, “it is not proper to answer
by stating, ‘See my deposition’, ‘See my pleading’, or ‘See the financial
statement’. Indeed, if a question does require the responding party to make
reference to a pleading or document, the pleading or document should be
identified and summarized so the answer is fully responsive to the question.” (Deyo
v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783-84.) Thus, Plaintiff’s responses
that merely tell Defendant to see a document production number are not complete
or are evasive.
The court also notes that Plaintiff’s
reading of the statute is incomplete and fails to account for the entirety and context
of the statute. The “option to produce writings” refers to the option set forth
in CCP § 2030.230, as indicated in §§ 2030.290 and 2030.300(a)(2). Under CCP §
2030.230, a responding party may opt to produce writings only when “an
interrogatory would necessitate the preparation or the making of a compilation,
abstract, audit, or summary of or from the documents of the party to whom the
interrogatory is directed . . . .” Under this section, the responding party
must “refer to this section and to specify the writings from which the answer
may be derived or ascertained. This specification shall be in sufficient detail
to permit the propounding party to locate and to identify, as readily as the
responding party can, the documents from which the answer may be ascertained.”
The court finds these interrogatories do not necessitate “a compilation,
abstract, audit, or summary of or from the documents of the party to whom the
interrogatory is directed.” These interrogatories are fairly typical contention
interrogatories requesting facts that support the allegations. Plaintiff does
not establish the interrogatories require the preparation or making of a
writing. Further, Plaintiff’s responses fail to refer to CCP § 2030.230 as
required by the statute.
As
to Special Interrogatory No. 1, the court finds Plaintiff’s response complies
in part but is not entirely complete. Plaintiff’s response is partially
complete because, despite referring to documents, Plaintiff also discusses
facts that are responsive to the interrogatory. However, some statements in
Plaintiff’s response to Special Interrogatory No. 1 are incomplete. Plaintiff’s
statement—“Production response 1 Bates Stamp Pages 040 thru 49 Defendant text
messages as to this arrangement”—in Special Interrogatory No. 1 is incomplete. Plaintiff
only indicates the documents are text messages without providing facts regarding
the substance of the text messages. A further response is needed for this
portion of the interrogatory response.
Also,
Plaintiff’s statement—“Production response 1 Bates Stamp 36 Declaration of Co
Purchaser Albert Choi, son of Defendant, declaration attesting to the
arrangement and agreement referenced by this question”—in Special Interrogatory
No. 1 is incomplete. Plaintiff only generally describes the document without
providing independent facts responsive to the interrogatory. A further response
is needed for this portion of the interrogatory response.
The
court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel further responses to
Special Interrogatories (Set One) Nos. 1, 16-17, 19,
25, and 28. The court orders Plaintiff to serve further responses to Special
Interrogatories (Set One) Nos. 1, 16-17, 19, 25, and 28, within 20
days of the date of this ruling.
///
b. Special Interrogatories
(Set One) Nos. 49 and 51-52
As
to Special Interrogatories (Set One) Nos. 49 and 51-52, these interrogatories
concern Plaintiff’s relationship with Defendant and her son, Albert Choi.
Defendant
contends Plaintiff only provided superficial responses that are not complete and
objected that the remaining details are protected as private. Defendant maintains
that she believes Plaintiff breached her fiduciary duty as a realtor and has a
history and pattern of exploiting her personal and romantic relationships with
her clients to engage in self-serving deals. Defendant argues the court in another
case, Wendy Wai Fong Ho, et l. v. Hoi Ying Engene Law, et al., Case No.
23STCV17632, already ruled that discovery into Plaintiff’s personal and
romantic life, as well as her financial and business dealings with third
parties are all relevant and discoverable, subject to a protective order to
address Plaintiff’s privacy concerns.
Plaintiff
contends she has a constitutionally protected interest in her sexual privacy. Plaintiff
argues that it is undisputed she dated Defendant’s son, Albert Choi. Plaintiff asserts
that there is no good cause to inquire about the details of her sexual relationship.
Plaintiff maintains the court’s ruling in Case No. 23STCV17632 is
distinguishable because Raymond Ho, whom Defendant allegedly had an extramarital
relationship, was a party in that case, where as Choi is not a party here.
“The
state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy. (Cal.
Const., art. I, §1.) Protection of informational privacy is the provision’s
central concern.” (Williams v. Superior
Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.) “[W]hen a discovery request seeks
information implicating the constitutional right of privacy, to order discovery
simply upon a showing that the Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010 test
for relevance has been met is an abuse of discretion.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 556, citations omitted.)
In
Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic
Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35-37, the California Supreme Court “established
a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy. The party asserting
a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a
threatened intrusion that is serious. . . . . The party seeking information may
raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests
disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible
alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would
diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing
considerations.” (Williams v. Superior
Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531,
552, citations omitted.) If the party asserting a privacy right fails to
satisfy all three Hill requirements, the court need not proceed to the
fourth step of balancing competing interests. (See id. at 555 [“Because
two of the three threshold Hill requirements are absent here, we need
not move on to a balancing of interests.”].)
In
Hill, the Court “explained that not
every assertion of a privacy interest under article I, section 1 must be
overcome by a ‘compelling interest.’ . . . . A ‘compelling interest’ is still
required to justify an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal
autonomy.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 556, internal
quotations omitted.) “But whenever lesser interests are at stake, the more
nuanced framework discussed above applies, with the strength of the
countervailing interest sufficient to warrant disclosure of private information
varying according to the strength of the privacy interest itself, the
seriousness of the invasion, and the availability of alternatives and
protective measures.” (Id.)
“[T]he
right of privacy extends to sexual relations [citation] and medical records
[citation].” (John B. v. Superior Court
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1198.)
In
balancing Defendant’s right to discovery and Plaintiff’s right to privacy in
her sexual relations, the court finds Defendant’s right outweighs Plaintiff’s
right here. Defendant alleges in her Cross-Complaint
that Plaintiff dated Choi, that Plaintiff exploited this relationship to take
advantage of Defendant, and that Defendant yielded to some of Plaintiff’s
requests since she was under the impression Plaintiff was going to be her
future daughter-in-law. (See Chan’s Cross-Compl., ¶¶ 7, 12, 15, 24-25.) Thus, Defendant’s interrogatories
regarding Plaintiff’s personal and business relationship with Albert Choi are
directly relevant to Defendant’s cross-claims. The court notes the
interrogatories do not ask or require Plaintiff to go into any explicit detail
of her relationship with Choi. Some parts of the interrogatories unanswered by
Plaintiff—such as how long she has known the person in question—do not require
Plaintiff to provide deeply private details Plaintiff fails to show a protective order cannot
adequately protect against any privacy issues. Accordingly, the court finds
Defendant’s motion should be granted as to these interrogatories, subject to a
protective order.
The
court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel further responses to
Special Interrogatories (Set One) Nos. 49 and 51-52.
The court orders Plaintiff to serve further responses to Special Interrogatories
(Set One) Nos. 49 and 51-52, subject to a protective order,
within 20 days of May 8, 2024, the date
of the hearing on this Plaintiff’s motion for protective order.
c. Special Interrogatories
(Set Two) Nos. 1-7
As to Special Interrogatories (Set Two)
Nos. 1-7, these interrogatories concern information relating to the management
of the subject property. The interrogatories request Plaintiff to identify and disclose
the rents for all tenants and Plaintiff’s bank accounts used to collect rent
for the subject property.
Plaintiff objects to these
interrogatories on the ground that they exceed the 35-interrogatory limit under
CCP § 2030.030(b). The court finds Plaintiff’s objection is without merit. CCP
§§ 2030.030(b)-(c) state, in relevant part, “no party shall, as a matter of
right, propound to any other party more than 35 specially prepared
interrogatories[,]” “[u]nless a declaration as described in Section 2030.050
has been made[.]” Here, Defendant’s counsel provided a declaration that
complies with CCP § 2030.050. (See Hsu Decl., ¶ 14, Exh. L [Hsu Decl. Add’l. Disc.].)
Under CCP§ 2030.040(a), the “party who attaches a supporting declaration as
described in Section 2030.050 may propound a greater number of specially
prepared interrogatories to another party[,]” “[s]ubject to the right of the
responding party to seek a protective order under Section 2030.090[.]”
(Emphasis added.) “If the responding party seeks a protective order on
the ground that the number of specially prepared interrogatories is unwarranted,
the propounding party shall have the burden of justifying the number of these
interrogatories.” (CCP § 2030.040(b), emphasis added.)
Plaintiff does not show here that
the 35-interrogatory limit is a ground to object to Defendant’s
interrogatories. The statute does not provide the 35-interrogatory limit as a
ground to object to interrogatories. Instead, the statute allows the responding
party to seek a protective order. If Plaintiff believes no good cause exists or
it is harassing for Defendant to propound a greater number of special
interrogatories, the proper procedure is to seek a protective order in
accordance with the statute.
Regardless, the interrogatories here
are directly relevant to Defendant’s cross-clams. Defendant alleges Plaintiff
made assurances she would be in charge of remodeling and managing the subject
property. (Cross-Compl., ¶ 14.) Plaintiff allegedly asked to be added on a
joint account held by Defendant and Albert Choi to better manage the subject
property’s finances. (Id.) Plaintiff allegedly collected all rental income
for the subject property and deposited it into her own individual account. (Id.)
The Cross-Complaint alleges Plaintiff has not accounted for or distributed the
profits from the rental income of the subject property, despite Defendant
repeated requests. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Thus, these interrogatories regarding
Plaintiff’s involvement in managing and collecting the rents for the subject
property are relevant to Defendant’s allegations in the Cross-Complaint.
The court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s
motion to compel further responses to Special Interrogatories (Set Two) Nos.
1-7. The court orders Plaintiff to serve further responses to Special
Interrogatories (Set Two) Nos. 1-7, within 20 days of the
date of this ruling.
d.
Special Interrogatories (Set Two)
Nos. 8-30
As to Special Interrogatories (Set
Two) Nos. 8-30, these interrogatories involve Plaintiff’s funds, relationships,
and transactions with her real estate clients.
Defendant contends these
interrogatories are relevant to her allegations because Defendant alleges
Plaintiff commingles funds, makes misrepresentations and conducts self-serving transactions
to the detriment of her real estate clients.
Plaintiff objects to these
interrogatories on the ground of privacy in her financial affairs. Plaintiff
argues her former real estate clients are not relevant to this case and that
Defendant is simply trying to harass and defame Plaintiff.
“A right of privacy exists as to a party’s
confidential financial affairs, even when the information sought is admittedly
relevant to the litigation.” (Cobb
v. Superior Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 543, 550.)
As to Interrogatories Nos. 10, 13-22,
24, and 27-30, the court finds Plaintiff’s objection has merit. Plaintiff’s real
estate business dealings with her other clients are confidential financial affairs.
Defendant fails to show how Plaintiff’s business dealings with her other real
estate clients have any relevance to this litigation or are reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. It appears Defendant argues
Plaintiff’s other business dealings demonstrate a pattern and practice. But, “evidence
of a person’s character or a trait of his or her character . . . is
inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.”
(Evid. Code § 1101(a).) Defendant does not demonstrate that these financial
affairs with other non-party individuals have a connection with the subject
property and the transactions between Plaintiff and Defendant in this case.
Thus, in balancing Defendant’s right to discovery and Plaintiff’s right to
privacy in her financial affairs, the court finds Plaintiff’s privacy rights outweighs
Defendant’s discovery rights for these interrogatories.
As to Interrogatories Nos. 8-9, 11-12,
23, and 25-26, the court finds these interrogatories may be allowed because
they either relate to the subject property or involve potential witnesses. “Central to
the discovery process
is the identification of potential witnesses.” (Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249.) Here,
the interrogatories generally asking Plaintiff about her business or personal
relationship with certain non-parties are relevant for identifying potential
witnesses. These interrogatories do not ask for sensitive business information
protected by the right of privacy.
Accordingly,
the court rules as follows:
The
court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel further responses to Special
Interrogatories (Set Two) No. 8-9, 11-12, 23, and 25-26. The court orders
Plaintiff to serve further responses to Special Interrogatories (Set Two) No. 8-9,
11-12, 23, and 25-26,
within 20 days of the date of this ruling.
The
court DENIES Defendant’s motion to compel further responses to Special
Interrogatories (Set Two) Nos. 10, 13-22, 24, and 27-30.
e.
Special Interrogatories (Set Two)
Nos. 31-34, 38-44, and 45-49
As to Special Interrogatories (Set
Two) Nos. 31-34, 38-44, and 45-49, these interrogatories concern business
entities—Genia Deluxe (Nos. 31-34), Gala Deluxe (Nos. 38-44), and Gala Property
(Nos. 45-49)—which Defendant alleges Plaintiff owns or is affiliated with to
purchase, invest, or manage Plaintiff’s properties.
Plaintiff contends she neither owns nor
is associated with Gala Deluxe or the Gala Property, which are both owned by
Raymond Ho, who is not a party in this case. Plaintiff provides the Statements
of Information establishing this. (Joint St., Exh. 5.) As to Genia Deluxe,
Plaintiff objects on the ground that she has a protected right of privacy.
As to the interrogatories involving Gala
Deluxe and Gala Property, the court finds Plaintiff fails to show her not
owning or being an officer in these companies are grounds for not answering
these interrogatories. Under CCP § 2030.220(c), “[i]f the responding party does
not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory,
that party shall so state . . . .” Thus, if Plaintiff maintains that she
neither owns nor is affiliated with these companies, then the proper response
is for Plaintiff to indicate she has no personal knowledge to answer the
interrogatories. CCP § 2030.220(b) requires interrogatories to “be answered to
the extent possible[,]” “[i]f an interrogatory cannot be answered completely[.]”
Unlike production requests, a propounding party does not need to establish good
cause for their interrogatories (see CCP §§ 2030.300(a)-(b), compare § 2031.310(b)).
Responding parties therefore do not get to answer interrogatories on their own
terms. Here, Plaintiff can still answer these interrogatories even if she
neither owns nor is affiliated with properties at issue. Hence, Plaintiff’s objections
are without merit.
As to Genia Deluxe, the
interrogatories are directly relevant to Defendant’s allegations. As discussed
above, Defendant alleges Plaintiff managed the subject property’s finances. Thus,
any company Plaintiff used to help her with such tasks would be directly
relevant to these allegations. Defendant maintains Genia Deluxe is a property
management company Plaintiff owns and uses to manage the subject property. Plaintiff does not
show a protective order cannot sufficiently protect against any privacy issues.
In balancing Plaintiff’s privacy rights and Defendant’s discovery rights, the
court finds Defendant’s right to discovery outweigh Plaintiff’s right to
privacy for these interrogatories. Hence, the court finds Defendant’s motion
should be granted as to these interrogatories, subject to a protective order.
The
court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel further responses to
Special Interrogatories (Set Two) Nos. 31-34, 38-44,
and 45-49. The court orders Plaintiff to serve further responses to Special
Interrogatories (Set Two) Nos. 31-34, 38-44, and 45-49, subject to
a protective order, within 20 days of the date of this ruling. The protective
order is that answers to objectionable interrogatories be transmitted for
attorney eyes only. Thereupon, on May 8,
the court will decide which, if any, of the answers shall be provided per code. Briefs on this issue to be filed by the
parties no later than March 29, with Reply briefs to be filed no later than
April 15. ,.
f.
Special Interrogatories (Set Two)
Nos. 35-37
As to Special Interrogatories (Set
Two) Nos. 35-37, these relate to Plaintiff’s relationship, accounts, and assets
jointly held with Raymond Ho.
Defendant contends they are relevant
because they show a history and pattern of abuse by Plaintiff to her real
estate clients. Defendant asserts Plaintiff is currently being sued by other
real estate clients in another lawsuit with identical claims against Plaintiff
as a realtor.
Plaintiff objects to these
interrogatories on the ground that they are not relevant or reasonably
calculated to lead to admissible evidence. Plaintiff contends that propensity
evidence is prohibited under the evidence code. Plaintiff argues Defendant is
improperly conducting evidence for another case.
As to Interrogatory No. 35, the
court finds this should be allowed because it is only generally asking
Plaintiff to describe her personal or business relationship with Raymond Ho. As
mentioned earlier, such information is relevant for identifying potential
witnesses.
As
to Interrogatories Nos. 36-37, the court agrees with Plaintiff. As discussed
above, financial affairs from another matter demonstrating a “pattern and
practice” are not relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence in this case. Evid. Code §
1101(a) bars character evidence. Defendant fails to show these financial
affairs with another non-party individual have any connection with the subject
property and the transactions between Plaintiff and Defendant in this case.
Accordingly,
the court rules as follows:
The
court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel further responses to Special
Interrogatories (Set Two) No. 35. The court orders Plaintiff to serve further
responses to Special Interrogatories (Set Two) No. 35, within 20 days of the
date of this ruling.
The
court DENIES Defendant’s motion to compel further responses to Special
Interrogatories (Set Two) Nos. 36-37.
Request for Monetary Sanctions
1.
Defendant’s Request
Defendant requests $4,110 in attorney’s
fees and costs as monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and her counsel of record.
Defendant’s counsel’s hourly rate is $450. (Hsu Decl., ¶ 17.) Defendant seeks
to recover nine hours and the $60 filing fee for this motion. (Id.)
The court finds Defendant’s counsel’s
hourly rate is reasonable, but the number of hours Defendant seeks to recover
is unreasonable. Defendant’s motion does not raise any issues that justify the
amount Defendant seeks to recover. Further, a substantial portion of Defendant’s
motion was denied. Defendant seeks seven hours for preparing the motion and
meet-and-confer letter and two hours to prepare the reply and attend hearing. (Hsu
Decl., ¶ 17.) The court finds it is reasonable to reduce Defendant’s
recoverable time to three hours for preparing the motion, including the
meet-and-confer letter, 0.5 hours for preparing the reply, and 0.5 hours for
attending hearing. The court finds Defendant’s request for the $60 filing fee
is reasonable. Thus, Defendant’s total reduced recoverable amount in attorney’s
fees and costs is $1,860 ([(3 hours + 0.5 hours + 0.5 hours) x $450/hour] + $60
filing fee).
The court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s
request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and her counsel of record in
the reduced amount of $1,860 in attorney’s fees and costs. The court orders
plaintiff Hoi Ying Eugenie Lai and her counsel of record, jointly and
severally, to pay $1,860 to defendant Irene Chan, through her counsel of record,
within 20 days of the days of the date of this ruling.
2.
Plaintiff’s Request
Plaintiff requests $2,534.05 in
attorney’s fees and costs as monetary sanctions against Defendant’s counsel of
record with respect to this motion.
The court has granted Defendant’s
request for monetary sanctions, substantially reducing the amount requested.
The court’s ruling accounted for Plaintiff’s opposition and the fact that a
substantial portion of Defendant’s motion was denied. Thus, the court finds
Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions should be denied.
The court therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s
request for monetary sanctions.
It
is so ordered.
Dated:
February 29, 2024
_______________________
ROLF M. TREU
Judge of the Superior
Court
[1]
The
paragraphs in the FAC are mis-numbered. The page and line references are
included to identify the correct portions of the pleadings.