Judge: Mel Red Recana, Case: 21STCV26074, Date: 2024-07-02 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV26074 Hearing Date: July 2, 2024 Dept: 45
Hearing
date: July 2, 2024
Moving
Party: Defendant Answer Financial, Inc.
Responding
Party: Plaintiff Eliza Suruchlian
Demurrer
to Complaint
The Court
considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply.
The
demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to
amend.
Background
On
July 14, 2021, Plaintiff Eliza Suruchlian (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint
against Defendants Answer Financial, Inc., Answer Financial, The Allstate,
Sharday Bailey (“Defendants”), and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive for: (1) Disability
Discrimination in Violation of Gov. Code § 12940(a); (2) Failure to Provide
Reasonable Accommodation in Violation of Gov. Code § 12940(m); (3) Failure to
Engage in the Interactive Process in Violation of Gov. Code § 12940(n); (4) Retaliation
in Violation of Gov. Code § 12940(h); (5) Failure to Prevent Discrimination and
Retaliation in Violation of Gov. Code § 12940(k); (6) Violation of Gov. Code §
12945.2(a) of the California Family Rights Act; (7) Retaliation for
Taking/Requesting CFRA in Violation of Gov. Code § 12945.1(l); (8) Wrongful
Termination in Violation of Public Policy; and (9) Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress.
On
August 30, 2023, Defendant Answer Financial, Inc. (“AFI”) filed the instant Demurrer
to the Complaint. On June 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On June 25,
2024, Defendant AFI filed a reply.
Legal
Standard
“The primary function of a pleading is to give the other party notice so
that it may prepare its case [citation], and a defect in a pleading that
otherwise properly notifies a party cannot be said to affect substantial
rights.” (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 240.)¿
“A¿demurrer¿tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a
complaint.” (Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A.¿(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719,
725.) The Court looks to whether “the complaint alleges facts sufficient to
state a cause of action or discloses a complete defense.” (Id.) The
Court does not “read passages from a complaint in isolation; in reviewing a
ruling on a demurrer, we read the complaint ‘as a whole and its parts in their
context.’ [Citation.]” (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214
Cal.App.4th 780, 804.) The Court “assume[s] the truth of the properly pleaded
factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly
pleaded and matters of which judicial notice has been taken.” (Harris, supra,
56 Cal.4th p. 240.) “The court does not, however, assume the truth of
contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.]” (Durell v. Sharp
Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)¿¿¿
¿ A general demurrer may be brought
under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e) if insufficient
facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted or under section
430.10, subdivision (a), where the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of
the cause of action alleged in the pleading. All other grounds listed in
Section 430.10, including uncertainty under subdivision (f), are special
demurrers. Special demurrers are not allowed in limited jurisdiction courts.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 92, subd. (c).)¿¿¿
¿ Leave to amend must be allowed where
there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v.
Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to
show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.)¿¿
Discussion
Meet and Confer
Prior to filing
a demurrer, the demurring party is required to meet and confer with the party
who filed the pleading demurred to for the purposes of determining whether an
agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would
resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41.)¿¿¿
Here, Defendant
AFI advances the declaration of its counsel of record, Jonathan M. Brenner,
attesting to the meet and confer efforts made in regard to the issues raised in
the demurrer. Brenner declares on July 7, 2023, he spoke with Plaintiff’s
counsel telephonically about potential filing of the demurrer. (Brenner Decl.,
¶2.) On July 25, 2023, Brenner sent a meet and confer letter via email
identifying the specific cause of action and legal support for the basis of the
deficiencies subject to demurrer discussed during the prior phone call. (Id.
at ¶3, Ex. 1.) A few days later, Brenner state she filed a declaration for an
automatic 30-day extension to file the demurrer because the parties had not yet
met and conferred on the issue raised in the letter. (Id. at ¶4.) As of
the date of the declaration, Brenner has not received a response from
Plaintiff’s counsels of record. (Id. at ¶5.)
Therefore, the
Court finds that Defendant AFI sufficiently attempted meet and confer prior to
filing the instant demurrer.
Ninth
Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Defendant AFI demurs to the ninth
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) on
the grounds that Plaintiff fails to set forth facts sufficient to state a claim
for IIED against it. Specifically, Defendant AFI contends Plaintiff fails to
allege any extreme and outrageous conduct at all, only asserting conduct
constituting management and business decisions.
“The elements of a cause of action for IIED are as follows: (1)
defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct (conduct so extreme as to
exceed all bounds of decency in a civilized community) with the intent to
cause, or with reckless disregard to the probability of causing, emotional
distress; and (2) as a result, plaintiff suffered extreme or severe emotional
distress.” (Berry v. Frazier (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1258, 1273.)
Moreover, “‘[i]t must be conduct directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence
of the plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.’ [Citation.]” (Id.)
In Janken v.
GM Hughes Electronics (1996)
46 Cal.App.4th 55, the court held “[m]anaging personnel is not outrageous
conduct beyond the bounds of human decency, but rather conduct essential to the
welfare and prosperity of society.” (Janken
v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996)
46 Cal.App.4th 55, 80.) As such, “[a] simple pleading of personnel management
activity is insufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, even if improper motivation is alleged. If personnel
management decisions are improperly motivated, the remedy is a suit against the
employer for discrimination.” (Id.)
Here, the Complaint fails to state sufficient facts to support an IIED
claim against Defendant AFI. First, the Complaint makes the following factual
allegations common to all causes of action: Plaintiff was employed by
Defendants from December 8, 2014 through November 10, 2020. (Compl., ¶1.)
Plaintiff developed disabilities during her employment with Defendants and
sought reasonable accommodations. (Compl., ¶¶25-26.) On or around November 2, 2020,
Plaintiff’s doctor placed her on modified activity for the whole month of
November before placing her on leave from November 10, 2020 through November
16, 2020. (Compl., ¶¶28-29.) Plaintiff notified Defendants and provided them
with her doctor’s notes concerning her need for modified activity and medical
leave but Defendants refused to accommodate her. (Compl., ¶30.) Defendants
terminated her employment on or around November 10, 2020 because of her
disabilities, request for reasonable accommodations, for exercising her rights
under California Family Rights Act, and requesting/taking needed medical leave.
(Compl., ¶¶31-32.)
As to the IIED claim, Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ conduct were
outrageous, directed at her, and done in her presence. (Compl., ¶¶141-142,
145-146.) Plaintiff also alleges Defendants’ intended to cause her emotional
distress and/or acted with reckless disregard of the probability that Plaintiff
would suffer emotional distress when they engaged in their outrageous conduct.
(Compl., ¶¶143, 145.)
Reading the demurrer as a whole and taking the factual allegations as
true: Plaintiff seeks damages for personnel managerial activities committed by
Defendants. The controlling California case law has found that allegations of
personnel managerial activities cannot sustain a cause of action for IIED.
Furthermore, even the unpublished cases cited by Plaintiff do not support her
contention that her claim for IIED sufficiently pled in the Complaint. For
example, in Dagley
v. Target Corp., Inc. (C.D.
Cal., Mar. 31, 2009, No. CV 09-1330VBFAGRX), the court held that “if a
plaintiff ‘alleges conduct other than that inherent in terminating an employee’,
such as violating a ‘fundamental interest of the employee ... in a deceptive
manner that results in the plaintiff being denied rights granted to other
employees’, then a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is
possible against a supervisor.” (Dagley
v. Target Corp., Inc. (C.D.
Cal., Mar. 31, 2009, No. CV 09-1330VBFAGRX) 2009 WL 910558, at *3.) The
Complaint makes no allegations that Defendants’ conduct was done in a deceptive
manner. Although Plaintiff requests leave to amend, if the Court is inclined to
sustain the demurrer, she fails to demonstrate how the Complaint might be
amended to cure the defect presented by the IIED claim.
Therefore, the demurrer to the ninth cause of action is SUSTAINED without
leave to amend.
It
is so ordered.
Dated: July 2, 2024
_______________________
MEL RED RECANA
Judge of the
Superior Court