Judge Mel Red Recana, Case Number: 22STCV04600, Date: 2024-04-03 Tentative Ruling

The court GRANTS Counsel Kodani’s motion to be relieved as counsel on condition that Counsel Kodani submits a revised proposed order providing all future hearing date information, including the date, time, and place. Counsel Kodani shall be relieved as counsel of record effective upon the filing of the proof of service of the signed order on Plaintiff Richard Rubio.

The court GRANTS Counsel Gilg’s motion to be relieved as counsel on condition that Counsel Gilg submits a revised proposed order providing all future hearing date information, including the date, time, and place. Counsel Gilg shall be relieved as counsel of record effective upon the filing of the proof of service of the signed order on Plaintiff Richard Rubio.

Timothy J. Kodani (“Counsel Kodani”) and William E. Gilg (“Counsel Gilg”) each move to be relieved as counsel of record for plaintiff Richard G. Rubio (“Plaintiff”).[1]

The court has discretion to allow an attorney to withdraw, and such a motion should be granted, provided that there is no prejudice to the client and it does not disrupt the orderly process of justice. (See Ramirez v. Sturdevant (1994) 21 Cal. App. 4th 904, 915; People v. Prince (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 398.)

CRC, Rule 3.1362 (Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel) requires (1) notice of motion and motion to be directed to the client (made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel—Civil form (MC-051)); (2) a declaration stating in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under CCP § 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under CCP § 284(1) (made on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel—Civil form (MC-052)); (3) service of the notice of motion and motion and declaration on all other parties who have appeared in the case; and (4) the proposed order relieving counsel (prepared on the Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel—Civil form (MC-053)).

Here, Counsel Kodani and Counsel Gilg complied with CRC, Rule 3.1362 for their motions for Plaintiff. The motion papers, supporting declarations, and proposed orders were served on Plaintiff at his current address, and proofs of service of each document were filed with the court. Prof. Conduct, Rule 1.16(b)(10) provides that a permissive request for withdrawal may be properly granted where an attorney believes that the tribunal will find good cause for withdrawal. In the attorney declarations (Form MC-052), Counsel Kodani and Counsel Gilg indicate Counsel Kodani is unable to communicate with Plaintiff because irreconcilable differences have arisen between them. (Kodani Decl., ¶ 2; Gilg Decl., ¶ 2.) Counsel Gilg indicates that he is associated counsel with primary duties of research and writing. (Gilg Decl., ¶ 2.) This is a proper basis for withdrawal.

Further, trial is still several months away on March 10, 2025. There is no reason to believe that Counsel Kodani’s and Counsel Gilg’s withdrawal will prejudice Plaintiff. The court does note, however, that the proposed orders filed with the court do not provide the time or place for the pending trial. (Proposed Orders, ¶ 9(b).) Nevertheless, this can easily be remedied by submitting corrected proposed orders.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS Counsel Kodani’s motion to be relieved as counsel on condition that Counsel Kodani submits a revised proposed order providing all future hearing date information, including the date, time, and place. Counsel Kodani shall be relieved as counsel of record effective upon the filing of the proof of service of the signed order on Plaintiff Richard Rubio.

The court also GRANTS Counsel Gilg’s motion to be relieved as counsel on condition that Counsel Gilg submits a revised proposed order providing all future hearing date information, including the date, time, and place. Counsel Gilg shall be relieved as counsel of record effective upon the filing of the proof of service of the signed order on Plaintiff Richard Rubio.

[1] Plaintiff’s name as reflected in the operative complaint is “Richard Rubio” rather than “Richard G. Rubio.” (See Compl., ¶ 1.) The court understands Counsel Kodani and Counsel Gilg are referring to the same person, but admonishes Counsel Kodani and Counsel Gilg to avoid such discrepancies going forward.

RICHARD RUBIO ; Plaintiff, vs. WEI HAN YOUNG , et al.; Defendants.	Case No. 22STCV04600

	Department 45


	[Tentative] RULING


	Action Filed: 02/07/22
	Trial Date: 03/10/25