Judge: Mel Red Recana, Case: 22STCV16568, Date: 2024-04-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV16568 Hearing Date: April 10, 2024 Dept: 45
Hearing date: April 10, 2024
Moving Parties: Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District
Responding Party: Plaintiff
R.K.
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
The Court has
considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers.
The Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
Background
Plaintiff
R.K. filed this action against Defendant on May 19, 2022. The operative First
Amended Complaint alleges causes of action for negligence and negligent hiring,
training, and supervision, based on childhood sexual abuse while under the care
of Defendant.
Legal
Standard
A motion for
judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer but is
made after the time for demurrer has expired. (CCP § 438(f).) Except as provided by statute, the rules
governing demurrers apply. (Civic Partners Stockton, LLC v. Youssefi
(2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1012.)
“Like a demurrer, the grounds for the motion [for judgment on the
pleadings] must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any
matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Id.
at 1013.) In ruling on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, “[a]ll allegations in the complaint and matters upon
which judicial notice may be taken are assumed to be true.” (Rippon
v. Bowen (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1313.)
Judicial
Notice/Evidentiary Objections
Defendant requests judicial notice of California 2008 Legislative Search,
2008 Potion of 2007-2008 Regular Session, Chapter 383, S.B. No. 640, Senate
Floor Analysis dated August 8, 2008 and Assembly Judiciary Proposed Consent
dated June 23, 2008.
Plaintiff requests judicial notice
of Assembly floor analysis AB 218 dated August 30, 2019, and various court
records consisting of rulings, minute orders, and tentative rulings.
The parties’ requests for judicial notice are GRANTED, as the Court may
take judicial notice of court and state records. (Evid. Code, § 452(c)-(d).)
However, the Court does not take judicial notice of the truth of assertions
within. (See Herrera v. Deutsche Bank
National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.)
Defendant’s objections to Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is
OVERRULED.
Discussion
Defendant
contends that the action fails because AB 218 which amended Code of Civil
Procedure section 340.1 and Government Code section 905(m) to expand the
statute of limitations and revive otherwise time barred claims for childhood
sexual abuse cases is (1) an unconstitutional gift of public funds and (2) is
an unconstitutional violation of due process.
1. Gift of Public
Funds
In 2019, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill 218 (“AB 218”), which
amended Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 by authorizing a three-year
window (beginning January 1, 2020) in which claims of childhood sexual abuse
were revived, regardless of how long ago the abuse occurred. See Code Civ.
Proc., § 340.1 (q). AB 218 also amended Government Code section 905 to
retroactively remove the timely claim requirement for claims “made pursuant to
Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages
suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault.” (See Gov. Code, § 905 (m).)
LAUSD argues that the retroactive elimination of the claim requirement
from Section 905 is effectively a prohibited gift of public funds to a
plaintiff.
The State Constitution “forbids the legislature from making any gift of
public money or other thing of value to any person,” thus the Legislature “has
no power to create a liability against the state for any such past act of
negligence upon the part of its officers.” (Chapman v. State (1894) 104
Cal. 690, 693.) More specifically, the Legislature cannot create a liability
against the State “for any past acts of negligence on the part of its officers,
agents or employees” where doing so “would, in effect, be the making of a
gift.” (Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 517.) In this context, the
term “gift” includes “‘includes all appropriations of public money for which
there is no authority or enforceable claim,’ even if there is a moral or
equitable obligation.” (Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002)
100 Cal.App.4th 431, 450, quoting Conlin v. Board of Supervisors (1893)
99 Cal. 17, 21-22 (Conlin).) “In determining whether an appropriation of
public money is to be considered a gift within the constitutional prohibition,
the primary question is whether the funds are to be used for a public or a
private purpose. If the money is for a public purpose, the appropriation is not
a gift even though private persons are benefited by the expenditure.” (County
of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942) 20 Cal.2d 870, 876-877.)
LAUSD cites a line of cases where the Supreme Court held that the
Legislature’s appropriations of public funds to specific persons were
unconstitutional. (See Bourn v. Hart (1982) 93 Cal. 321, 326-328
[legislative appropriation of $10,000 to specific individual for injuries
sustained due to public entity employer's negligence was impermissible gift
because employer could not be sued for negligence at the time of injury]; see Conlin,
supra, 99 Cal. at pp. 19-24 [legislative appropriation of payment to
specific individual for work performed on road improvements, for which the
public entity had no liability for under the subject contract, was
impermissible gift].) Plaintiff’s case is distinguishable from this line of
cases because the Legislature’s enactment of AB 218 did not authorize a
transfer of funds to specific individuals, but rather to a group of individuals
who suffered childhood sexual abuse. Further, the transfer of funds here would
not constitute a gift because the money serves the public purpose of protecting
child victims of sexual abuse and ensuring that they have the mere opportunity
to seek justice for the harm suffered.
“The rule is well established [] that if a public purpose is served by
the expenditure of public funds, article XIII, section 25, is not violated even
though there may be incidental benefits to private persons.” (Board of
Supervisors v. Dolan (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 237, 243 (Dolan)
[municipal authorization of low-interest loans to finance residential
rehabilitation in depressed residential areas was not a gift even though the
loans benefited private parties because redevelopment and prevention of slums
is valid public purpose].) The determination of what constitutes a public
purpose is primarily a matter for the Legislature, and its discretion will not
be disturbed by the courts so long as that determination has a reasonable
basis. (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 746 (Carleson).)
Here, AB 218’s legislative history demonstrates that the Legislature
enacted the bill to expand access to justice for the victims of childhood
sexual assault as a means of preventing similar abuses by future perpetrators.
Noting that there “should not be a reasonable expectation that if simply enough
time passes, there will be no accountability for these despicable past acts by
individuals and entities[,]” the authors of AB 2018 expressly intended that the
bill confront the pervasive problem of cover-ups in institutions, from schools
to sports leagues, which result in continuing victimization and the sexual
assault of additional children. (Plaintiff RJN, Exh. 12, p. 2.) AB 2018’s
authors expressly intended that the bill serve “as an effective deterrent
against individuals and entities who have chosen to protect the perpetrators of
sexual assault over the victims.” (Ibid.)
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that AB 218’s legislative history
demonstrates that the Legislature enacted AB 218 to serve the public purpose of
deterring future sexual abuse against minor children, including in schools. The
Legislature’s determination that deterring future sexual abuse against minor
students is a worthy public purpose is properly a matter for the Legislature to
decide, and this Court shall not disturb such legislative discretion so long as
the Legislature appears to have had a reasonable basis for its conclusions.
(See Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 746; see also Dittus v.
Cranston (1959) 53 Cal.2d 284, 286 [invalidity of legislation must be clear
before it can be declared unconstitutional].)
Here, it is apparent from the legislative history that a reasonable basis
exists for the Legislature’s determination that deterring childhood sexual
abuse is a public purpose, and that AB 218 was enacted to achieve that purpose.
AB 218 does not constitute an unconstitutional provision of a public gift to
private individuals, because the expenditure of public funds serves the greater
public purpose of deterring childhood sexual abuse. (See Dolan, supra,
45 Cal.App.3d at p. 243.)
2. Due Process
Defendant contends that any extension or revival of civil statutes of
limitations is barred by California Constitution pursuant to Chambers v.
Gallagher (1918) 177 Cal. 704. In Chambers, the California Supreme
Court held that a statute that removed the statute of limitations defense in
proceedings to enforce payment of inheritance taxes was unconstitutional. (Id.
at p. 708.) However, this ruling has been expressly limited by the California
Supreme Court in People v. Frazer (1999) 21 Cal.4th 737. In Frazer,
the California Supreme Court notes that “Chambers relied on the
California Constitution to hold that the state Controller could not use a new,
longer statute of limitations to collect unpaid inheritance taxes where the
underlying obligation was already time-barred when the new statute took effect.
However, in the 80 years since it was decided, Chambers has not been
used by any state court to strike down a statute like section 803(g) in a
criminal case or in any civil case not involving some form of tax dispute.
[Citations.] Indeed, several Courts of Appeal have at least implicitly
distinguished Chambers, supra, 177 Cal. 704, and upheld a civil statute
of limitations ‘reviving’ common law causes of action based on childhood sexual
abuse. [Citations.]” (Frazer, supra, 21
Cal.4th at p.775, Fn. 32.)
“To strike down [AB 218] solely on the ground the Legislature has
withdrawn repose after such an expectation has been acquired, without evidence
of actual prejudice to the defense, goes far beyond any notion of ‘fundamental
fairness’ protected by the due process clauses of the California Constitution.
It may be that a defeated expectation of repose, as one factor in a factual
showing of substantial prejudice depriving the defendant of a fair trial, could
justify a finding that [AB 218] violates state due process principles as
applied in a particular case. However, no such claim is made here.” (Frazer, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p.775,
Fn. 32.) Moreover, such a claim would be
beyond the scope of a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Additionally, the Second District Court of Appeal stated that “the
Supreme Court has determined that in a civil case, there is no constitutional
right of repose,” such that a defendant “has no constitutional right to be free
of the obligation to defend stale claims,” and because Code of Civil Procedure
section 340.1 “does not deprive a defendant of a protected liberty or property
interest encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment, it is not unconstitutional
under the due process clause.” (Deutsch v. Masonic Homes of California, Inc.
(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 748, 760.) Absent new legal authority specifically
stating that Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 is unconstitutional in any
manner, and absent any evidence showing a violation of Defendant’s
constitutional rights, the Court cannot conclude that Defendant’s
constitutional rights have been violated.
Based on the foregoing, the motion is DENIED.
It is so
ordered.
Dated:
April 10, 2024
_______________________
ROLF TREU
Judge of the
Superior Court