Judge: Mel Red Recana, Case: 22STCV25330, Date: 2024-10-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV25330 Hearing Date: October 9, 2024 Dept: 45
Hearing date: October 9, 2024
Moving Party: Plaintiff Joseph Allen (“Plaintiff”)
Responding Party: Defendant
County of Los Angeles (“Defendant”)
Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Production of
Business Records and Request for Monetary Sanctions
The Court has
considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers.
The motion is GRANTED
IN PART.
Background
This
is an action arising from wrongful actions taken against Plaintiff Joseph Allen
(“Plaintiff”) during his employment as a firefighter.
On
August 5, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants County of Los
Angeles (“Defendant”), County of Los Angeles Fire Department, and DOES 1
through 20, inclusive (collectively, “Defendants”).
On
October 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)
against Defendants alleging causes of action for: (1) discrimination (disparate
treatment) in violation of Gov. Code §§ 12940 et seq.; (2)
discrimination (disparate treatment) in violation of Gov. Code §§ 12940 et
seq.; (3) harassment in violation of Gov. Code §§ 12940 et seq.; (4)
failure to prevent discrimination and harassment in violation of Gov. Code §§
12940(k); (5) failure to provide reasonable accommodations in violation of Gov.
Code §§ 12940 et seq.; and (6) failure to engage in a good faith
interactive process in violation of Gov. Code §§ 12940 et seq.
The
FAC alleges in part that: On or about July 5, 2021, Defendants hired Plaintiff
as a probationary employee to work as a Fire Fighter. (FAC, ¶ 18.) At all times
during his employment, Plaintiff’s performance was satisfactory. (FAC, ¶ 19.)
Plaintiff’s essential job duties consisted of responding to fire alarms,
medical emergencies, urban rescue, and fire prevention. (FAC, ¶ 20.) Plaintiff
has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). (FAC,
¶ 21.) Plaintiff alleges that he was required to work long 24-hour shifts on
consecutive days, with little to no time off between consecutive shifts. (FAC,
¶ 23.) Plaintiff was unable to get more than five hours of sleep per night
during his shifts. (FAC, ¶ 25.)
On
or around April 14, 2022, Plaintiff was randomly drug tested as was required of
probationary firefighters. (FAC, ¶ 29.) Plaintiff’s drug test came back
positive for methamphetamines, and he explained that he had never taken
methamphetamine but was taking amphetamines, which is a prescription
medication. (FAC, ¶ 30.) For people taking amphetamines for ADHD, there is a
high likelihood of drug test results coming back as false positive for the
illegal substance of methamphetamine. (FAC, ¶ 31.) On or about April 20, 2022,
Plaintiff informed his supervisors of his test result, his disability, and his
prescription medication. (FAC, ¶ 32.) Plaintiff informed his supervisors that
he believed his test result was erroneous. (FAC, ¶ 32.) The urine sample
Plaintiff initially gave was re-tested and, on May 4, 2022, Defendants informed
Plaintiff that the result of the retest indicated that he was positive for
“amphetamines-methamphetamines.” (FAC, ¶ 34.) Plaintiff was discharged from his
employment on or about May 17, 2022. (FAC, ¶ 36.) Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants’ drug testing policy had a discriminatory impact on those with
disabilities and/or medical conditions, specifically those with ADHD taking
amphetamines to treat ADHD. (FAC, ¶ 37.)
As
for damages, Plaintiff alleges that he “suffered and will continue to suffer
general and special damages, including severe and profound pain and emotional
distress, anxiety, depression, headaches, tension, and other physical ailments,
as well as medical expenses, expenses for psychological counseling and
treatment, and past and future lost wages and benefits” due to Defendants’
actions. (FAC, ¶ 44.) Plaintiff is claiming general damages for emotional and
mental distress. (FAC, ¶ 46.)
On
December 27, 2022, Defendant, who indicates that it was erroneously also sued
as County of Los Angeles Fire Department, filed its answer to the FAC.
On
June 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed and served the instant Motion to Quash
Defendant’s Deposition Subpoenas for Production of Employment Records and
Request for Monetary Sanctions. Plaintiff seeks “an order quashing the subpoena
for the production of business records that Defendant County of Los Angeles
served on San Francisco Fire Department via personal service on May 10, 2024.”
(Not. of Mot. at p. 1:26-28.)
On
September 18, 2024, Defendant filed and served an opposition brief.
On
September 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply brief.
Legal
Standard
“If
a subpoena requires . . . the production of . . . documents . . . before a
court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition,
the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person . . . may make an order
quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it
upon those terms and conditions as the court shall declare, including
protective orders.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).)
In
California, discovery statutes “must be construed liberally in favor of
disclosure unless the request is clearly improper.” (Williams v. Superior
Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541.) “Under the discovery statutes,
information is discoverable if it is unprivileged and is either relevant to the
subject matter of the action or reasonably calculated to reveal admissible
evidence.” (John B. v. Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1186.)
“Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or
of any other party to the action.” (Ibid.) “When discovery requests
are grossly overbroad on their face, and hence do not appear reasonably related
to a legitimate discovery need, a reasonable inference can be drawn of an
intent to harass and improperly burden.” (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998)
67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.)
Discussion
a.
The Lack of a Separate Statement
Initially, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s
motion must be denied because Plaintiff did not file a separate statement with
the motion to quash.
“[A]ny
motion involving the content of a discovery request or the responses to such a
request must be accompanied by a separate statement.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
Rule 3.1345(a).) A motion “[t]o compel or to quash the production of documents
or tangible things at a deposition” requires a separate statement. (Cal. Rules
of Court, Rule 3.1345(a)(5).)
The
Court rejects Defendant’s argument that the motion is procedurally improper. Plaintiff
is seeking to quash a deposition subpoena for the production of business
records. Plaintiff is not seeking to quash the production of documents or
tangible things at a deposition. Thus, the Court finds that California Rules of
Court, Rule 3.1345(a)(5) is inapplicable to the motion. Plaintiff was not
required to file a separate statement with the motion.
Therefore,
the Court finds that Plaintiff’s motion to quash is not procedurally improper
and the Court will consider the motion on its merits.
b.
The Scope of the Subpoena at Issue
Plaintiff
seeks to quash the deposition subpoena for production of business records that
Defendant served on the San Francisco Fire Department via personal service on
May 10, 2024. (See Not. of Mot. at p. 1:26-28.) According to Plaintiff’s
counsel, Nathalie Meza Contreras (“Contreras”), on May 10, 2024, Defendant
served a revised deposition subpoena (the “Subpoena”) to the San Francisco Fire
Department (“SFFD”) for Plaintiff’s employment records. (Contreras Decl., ¶ 9;
Ex. C.) On May 24, 2024, Plaintiff served
Defendant with his objections to the May 10, 2024 subpoena with corresponding
legal authorities. (Contreras Decl., ¶ 10; Ex. D.)
The
Subpoena seeks the following business records from the SFFD:
“ALL DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING THOSE STORED
ELECTRONICALLY OR DIGITALLY, OF ALL JOB APPLICATION(S); COMPLETED PERSONAL
HISTORY STATEMENT(S); COMPLETED MEDICAL HISTORY STATEMENT(S); COMMUNICATIONS
(INCLUDING INTSTANT MESSAGES, MEMORANDA, EMAILS AND LETTERS) REGARDING:
1) ATTENTION-DEFICIT/HYPERACTIVITY DISORDER
(ADHD), DISABILITY AND/OR MEDICAL CONDITION,
2) LOS ANGELES COUNTY
FIRE DEPARTMENT,
3) REQUEST(S) FOR ACCOMODATION AND
ACCOMODATIONS PROVIDED, IF ANY;
FROM JANUARY 1, 2023 THROUGH PRESENT, RELATED
TO JOSEPH ALLEN’S EMPLOYMENT.”
(Contreras Decl., ¶ 9; Ex. C.)
“The state
Constitution expressly grants Californians a right to privacy.” (Williams v.
Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.) A party has a right to privacy
in their personnel records. (Life Technologies Corp. v. Superior Court (2011)
197 Cal.App.4th 640, 652.) Privacy concerns, however, are not absolute and they
must be balanced against other important interests. (Hill v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 37.) “The right to
privacy . . . is not absolute.” (Grafilo v. Wolfsohn (2019)
33 Cal.App.5th 1024, 1034.)
“Potential invasions of privacy are ordinarily evaluated by balancing the
privacy interest at stake and the seriousness of the threatened invasion with
the strength of legitimate and important countervailing interests.” (Ibid.)
“On occasion [a party’s] privacy interests may give way to the opponent’s right
to a fair trial. Thus, courts must balance the right of civil litigants to
discovery relevant facts against the privacy interests of persons subject to
discovery.” (John B. v. Superior Court, supra, 38 Cal.4th
1177, 1199.) “[A]n implicit wavier of a party’s constitutional rights encompasses only discovery directly relevant
to the plaintiff’s claims and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.” (Lantz v. Superior Court (1994)
28 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1854, citation omitted, emphasis in original.) “[E]ven
when discovery of private information is found directly relevant to the issues
of ongoing litigation, it will not be automatically allowed; there must be a
‘careful balancing’ of the ‘compelling public need’ for discovery against the
‘fundamental right of privacy.’” (Ibid.)
Here, Defendant is
seeking documents from Plaintiff’s subsequent employer, which is the SFFD.
While the Court acknowledges that Plaintiff is claiming emotional distress
damages, loss of past and future earnings, and other damages, the Court fails
to see how the Plaintiff’s job application, completed personal history
statement, competed medical history statement, and communications regarding
ADHD, disability, and/or a medical condition disclosed to a subsequent employer
are relevant to disputing Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant. Defendant
argues that the records are necessary to verify Plaintiff’s claims regarding
his disability and accommodation request, to determine whether Plaintiff’s
claims of discrimination and failure to accommodate have merit, and to assess
the consistency and credibility of Plaintiff’s claims. (Opp’n at p.5:4-11.) However,
the Court fails to see how obtaining information from a subsequent employer regarding ADHD, disability, or other medical
condition of Plaintiff is directly relevant to challenging Plaintiff’s
allegations. The Court ascertains as to why Defendant did not seek Plaintiff’s
medical records from his healthcare provider(s) or depose Plaintiff as to his
medical conditions. Moreover, Plaintiff is not alleging that his ADHD, medical
condition, or other disability caused his purported damages. Plaintiff clearly
alleges that the actions of Defendant caused his damages. (FAC, ¶ 44.)
As to Defendant’s
request for all documents regarding Defendant from Plaintiff’s subsequent
employer, the Court fails to see the direct relevance of such a request. Here,
Plaintiff’s subsequent employment with the SFFD is not alleged in the FAC and
only the alleged wrongs of Defendant are at issue in this action.
Next, the Court does
not see the direct relevance of all documents regarding Plaintiff requesting a
reasonable accommodation from the SFFD or whether the SFFD provided Plaintiff
with any accommodations as having any bearing on whether Defendant provided
Plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation.
In sum, the Court
fails to see the direct relevance of the categories of documents sought. The
Court does not find that the documents sought are directly relevant to
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant.
Critically, Defendant
has not shown a compelling need for the discovery sought in the Subpoena. (El Dorado Savings & Loan Assn.
v. Superior Court (1987)
190 Cal.App.3d 342, 346.) The Court cannot compel discovery until Defendant
shows a compelling need for the information sought. (Ibid.) “In law and motion practice, factual evidence is
supplied to the court by way of declarations.” (Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 224.)
The fact that
Plaintiff testified at deposition that he was going to inform the SFFD about
his prescription for Adderall (Goldsmith Decl., ¶ 4; Ex. 2 at p. 184:1-9), does
not show a compelling need for discovery of the information sought in the
Subpoena. Moreover, the declaration of Michele M. Goldsmith submitted in
support of the opposition does not state any facts showing a compelling need
for the information sought. Neither in the opposition brief nor in Defendant’s
counsel’s declaration has Defendant indicated “that the information [sought by
the Subpoena] cannot reasonably be obtained through depositions or from
nonconfidential sources.” (Harding
Lawson Associates v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 7, 10.)
The Court GRANTS
Plaintiff’s request to quash Defendant’s May 10, 2024 subpoena issued to the
SFFD.
d. Monetary
Sanctions
In the caption of the notice of motion,
Plaintiff requests monetary sanctions in the
amount of $4,129.15. (See Not. of Mot. at p.
1:17-18.) The notice of motion, however, does not set forth against whom
monetary sanctions are sought. “A request for sanction shall, in the notice of
motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is
sought . . . .” (Sole Energy Co. v. Hodges (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th
199, 207.)
Plaintiff’s
request for monetary sanctions is procedurally deficient as Plaintiff does not
state against whom monetary sanctions are sought in the notice of motion. The
Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions in its
entirety.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s
motion to quash is GRANTED IN PART.
The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request
to quash the subpoena for the production of business records served on the San
Francisco Fire Department by Defendant on May 10, 2024.
The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request
for monetary sanctions in its entirety.
It is so
ordered.
Dated:
October 9, 2024
_______________________
MEL RED RECANA
Judge of the
Superior Court