Judge: Mel Red Recana, Case: 23STCV00389, Date: 2024-09-17 Tentative Ruling
All rulings shown here are TENTATIVE ONLY, and thus oral argument WILL be heard. All Counsel are still required to attend.
Case Number: 23STCV00389 Hearing Date: September 17, 2024 Dept: 45
Hearing Date: September
17, 2024
Moving
Party: Defendants
Laservision World, Inc., and David Yang
Responding
Party: Plaintiff
Peter Choi
Motion:
Defendants’ Demurrer
and Motion to Strike
Tentative
Ruling: The
Court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply. Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED
in its entirety. The motion to strike shall be GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part. The motion to strike is granted in part as to
the wording in paragraph 36 “but in amounts in excess of the jurisdiction of
this Court.”, and paragraph E. However, the motion is denied as to the
remainder of paragraph 36, David C. Yang and all references thereto, paragraph
10, and paragraph H.
BACKGROUND
On
January 9, 2023, Peter Choi (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against his former
employer Laservision World, Inc. and David C. Yang (collectively, Defendants)
for alleged violations of California Labor Codes. Plaintiff then filed a First
Amended Complaint (FAC) on September 1, 2023 that alleged the following causes
of action:
1.
Failure to Pay For All Hours Worked
(Cal. Labor Code §1182 et seq.);
2.
Failure to Pay Overtime Wages (Cal.
Labor Code §510);
3.
Failure to Provide Itemized Wage
Statement (Cal. Labor Code §226);
4.
Waiting Time Penalties (Cal. Labor
Code § 203 et seq.);
5.
Meal Period Violations (Cal. Labor
Code 226.7);
6.
Rest Period Violations (Cal. Labor
Code § 226.7).
The FAC stems
from Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant where Plaintiff alleges Defendant
failed to provide meal breaks, rest periods, and pay for all hours work.
Plaintiff then filed suit.
The motion now
before the Court is Defendants’ demurrer and motion to strike. Plaintiff
opposes both; Defendants file a reply.
Meet and Confer
“Before filing a
demurrer…the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone
with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the
purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve
the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a); see
also Code Civ. Proc. §435.5 (imposing similar requirements for a motion to
strike).) Defendants submit the Declaration of Sung Woo Choi (Choi Decl.) which
states the parties met and conferred but were unable to reach an agreement.
Although Defendants indicate the parties conferred, the Choi Decl. does not
indicate whether the parties conferred telephonically or in-person. Therefore,
it is unclear whether the requirements of Code Civ. Proc. §§430.41(a) or 435.5
have been satisfied. However, per Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a)(4), “A
determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient
shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer.” (See Code
Civ. Proc. §435.5(a)(4), imposing similar requirements for a motion to strike.)
Accordingly, the Court now turns its attention to the demurrer and motion
to strike.
DISCUSSION
Demurrer -
Legal Standard
“[A] demurrer
tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235
Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that
appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the
pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in
ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not
subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their
contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a
complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the
truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v.
Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)
Analysis
Defendants
primary argument upon moving for demurrer is the cause of action within the FAC
are ambiguous, uncertain, and unintelligible. Defendants argue the FAC employs
a “chain letter” style of pleading wherein each claim incorporates preceding
paragraphs without providing sufficient details within the cause of action.
Defendants argue that in doing so, the causes of action are untenable. Although
the Court agrees that a detailed cause of action is preferable to the “chain
letter” style of pleading apparent within the FAC, the Court disagrees that the
six causes of action are untenable. When
considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004)
116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege
ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the
claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie
(1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) The Court concludes the FAC does just that,
and for the reasons below overrules the demurrer in its entirety.
1.
First Cause of
Action: Failure to Pay For All Hours Worked (Cal. Labor Code §1182 et seq.) and
the Second Cause of Action: Failure to Pay Overtime Wages (Cal. Labor Code
§510)
The first cause
of action alleges Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff for all hours worked while
employed. The second cause of action alleges a failure to pay overtime wages. Plaintiff
alleges he was hired on December 2, 2021 as a Customer Retention/Sales
Associate and began at an hourly rate of $20.19 per hour, which then raised to
$21.92 per hour on March 21, 2022. (FAC, ¶¶11-13.) Plaintiff alleges that he
regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per work week, alleging he worked 41
hours per work week, however Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff for said
hours. (FAC, ¶14.)
Defendants
contend this is insufficient, arguing that details surrounding such when or for
what time period Defendants allegedly did not pay Plaintiff are missing.
Defendants rely on Lavine v. Jessup (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 59, 69 (Lavine)
in contending that fact-bereft assertions are vulnerable to demurrer. However,
the Court can distinguish Lavine from the instant matter. Lavine
addressed the dismissal of a plaintiff’s demurrer after the plaintiff alleged
that an action by the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County wastefully
expended $2,225,086.61. (Lavine, supra, at 62.) As a taxpayer,
the plaintiff there filed a complaint that alleged eleven causes of action that
included breach of statutory duty, and fraud. (Id.) Lavine
addressed a separate set of causes of action from those before the Court, most notably
fraud which maintains a heightened pleading standard. Defendants present no
evidence that labor code violations contain this same heightened standard.
Moreover, the Court is charged with reading the FAC as a whole and in context,
not by piecemeal.
In doing so, the
Court also rejects Defendants’ analogy to Sass v. Cohen (2020) 10 Cal.5th
861 (Sass). Defendants argue the FAC should fail because Plaintiff
failed to state the amount of damages demanded. First, upon opposition
Plaintiff points to Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th
811 (Chen), which holds that a demurrer for uncertainty should be
overruled when the facts as to which the complaint is uncertain are
presumptively within the defendant’s knowledge. (Chen, supra, at 822.)
Here, Plaintiff contends that not only is this information within Defendant’s
knowledge, but that discovery will yield more information. Second, Sass
is inapplicable here because the Supreme Court’s discussion there surrounded
default judgments, which are not the issue here.
Plaintiff
has stated Defendants failed to pay the regular and overtime hours worked.
Plaintiff provided the hourly rate, the hours which he was not paid for but was
entitled to be paid for, and how long his employ was with Defendant. With the
liberal construction the Court employs, this is sufficient to survive demurrer.
The demurrer to the first and second cause of action is OVERRULED.
2.
Third Cause of
Action: Failure to Provide Itemized Wage Statement (Cal. Labor Code §226)
In contending
Plaintiff’s third cause of action fails, Defendants argue a Plaintiff must plead
and prove “(1) a violation of Section 226(a); (2) that is ‘knowing and
intentional’; and (3) a resulting injury.” relying on Iljas v. Ripley Entm’t
Inc. (2019) 403 F.Supp.3d 793. Defendants argue the FAC is missing the
“knowing” or “intentional” allegation as the FAC simply states Defendants
failed to keep precise records of Plaintiff’s hours and did not submit any wage
statements to Plaintiff.
As
aforementioned, the FAC will be read in context and not cause of action by
cause of action. The FAC states that all “of these claims are the result of the
intentional conduct of the Defendants” (FAC, ¶3) and that “Defendants have
knowingly and willfully refused to perform their obligations…” (FAC, ¶36.) This
is sufficient. The demurrer to the third cause of action is OVERRULED.
3.
Fourth Cause of
Action: Waiting Time Penalties (Cal. Labor Code § 203 Seq.);
Defendants
contend the fourth cause of action is inadequately plead as well. The Court
disagrees. Similar to the first and second cause of action, the FAC provides
adequate detail. The FAC states the date of termination, states the hourly rate
Plaintiff was earning, and alleges the accumulated wages upon termination of
employment were not paid. This suffices to provide enough information to place
Defendants on notice of the cause of action against them. The demurrer to the
fourth cause of action is OVERRULED.
4.
Fifth Cause of
Action: Meal Period Violations (Cal. Labor Code 226.7) and Sixth Cause of
Action: Rest Period Violations (Cal. Labor Code § 226.7).
Similarly, the
FAC alleges Defendants failed to provide both meal and rest periods. The FAC
states in addition that Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff the additional hour
of compensation for each day Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with the
required meal period. Upon demurrer, Defendants contend that although an
employer must relieve an employee of duty, they need not ensure the employee
does not work, citing Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1034.) However, the allegation is the meal
break and rest periods were never provided in the first place. Although the
cause of action contains little detail, the FAC as a whole contains sufficient
information to support the fifth and sixth causes of action. “It has been
consistently held that ‘a plaintiff is required only to set forth the essential
facts of his case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient
to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of
action’” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531,
550. Internal quotations omitted). The Court concludes Plaintiff here has done
so. The demurrer to the fifth and sixth causes of action is OVERRULED.
Motion to Strike -
Legal Standard
The court may,
upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper,
strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (CCP
§ 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading
not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or
an order of the court. (CCP § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for a motion to
strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or has
not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (CCP § 436.) The grounds for moving
to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice.
(CCP § 437.)
A motion to strike any pleading must be filed “within the time allowed
to respond to a pleading”—e.g., 30 days after service of the complaint or
cross-complaint unless extended by court order or stipulation. [CCP §
435(b)(1)]. This does not affect the court's power to strike sua sponte. Courts
are specifically authorized to strike a pleading upon a motion or at any time
in the court's discretion. (CCP § 436)
The Court notes that motions to strike punitive damages may be granted,
where the alleged facts do not support conclusions of malice, fraud or
oppression. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central Calif., Inc. (2010) 191
Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)
Analysis
In
their accompanying Motion to Strike, Defendants request the Court to strike the
following from the FAC:
1.
David C. Yang as an individual
Defendant and all references thereto;
2.
Paragraph 36, lines 21-26 of page 6
of Plaintiff’s FAC, as immaterial and irrelevant, as well as Prayer for Relief
F-G, which is redundant;
3.
Paragraph 10;
4.
Prayer for relief E for restitution
as redundant to Prayers A-D;
5.
Prayer for relief H seeking
attorney fees under Labor Code §§ 218.5 and 1194.
Upon opposition
to the Motion to Strike, Plaintiffs stipulate solely to striking their
reference to punitive damages at page 2, ¶3, line 12. However, Plaintiffs
oppose all other requests to strike.
a)
David C. Yang and Paragraph 10
Defendants
contend David C. Yang (Yang) should be struck from the pleading because the
suit against him for “corporate wrongs” is improper. However, Plaintiff upon
opposition argues under Cal. Labor Code §558.1 that “any employer or other
person acting on behalf of an employer…” who violates minimum wage hours may be
held liable. Plaintiff alleges Yang is the director, owner, and operator of
Laservision, and therefore falls under Cal.
Labor Code §558.1 as either an employer or acting on behalf of an employer. The
Court agrees, therefore, the inclusion of Yang is proper and will not be
struck.
b)
Paragraph 36
The Court agrees
that the phrase “in amounts in excess of the jurisdiction of this Court.”
should be struck simply because any amount exceeding this Court’s jurisdiction
is an amount the Court cannot grant. However, the Court will not strike the
remainder of paragraph 36. Defendant contends that part of paragraph 36 may be
intended to be used to support punitive damages, however, Plaintiff has already
stipulated to removing the reference to punitive damages at page 2, ¶3, line
12. Therefore, Defendants’ point is moot.
c)
Prayer for relief paragraph E
Upon opposition
to the Motion to Strike for the Prayer for relief, Plaintiff contends
restitution is the “amount which would put plaintiff in as good a position as
he would have been if no contract had been made and restores to plaintiff value
of what he parted with in performing the contract.” citing to People v.
Martinson (1986) 188 Cal.App.4d 894, 900. Although the Court agrees, the
request is redundant when the Prayer is read as a whole because the Prayer
already requests unpaid wages according to proof, wages for missed mean and
rest breaks according to proof and waiting time penalties. These amounts should
equate to the same restitution Plaintiff requests in paragraph E in the Prayer,
therefore, to eliminate redundancy, the Court will strike paragraph E.
d)
Paragraph H
Finally,
Defendants request the Court to strike paragraph H in the Prayer which requests
attorney’s fees. The Motion provides no argument for why they should be struck.
Both Cal. Labor Code §§218.5 and 1194 allow for attorney’s fees in any action
brought for the nonpayment of wages. Therefore, the Court denies the Motion to
Strike as to paragraph H.
Leave to Amend
Leave
to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful
amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to
amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by
amendment”].
The demurrer has
been overruled in its entirety, however, the motion to strike shall be granted
in part as to the wording in paragraph 36 “but in amounts in excess of the
jurisdiction of this Court.” and paragraph E. As there is reasonable
possibility of successful amendment to these portions that have been struck,
Plaintiff will be granted 20 days leave to amend.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED
in its entirety. The motion to strike shall be GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part. The motion to strike is granted in part as to
the wording in paragraph 36 “but in amounts in excess of the jurisdiction of
this Court.”, and paragraph E. However, the motion is denied as to the
remainder of paragraph 36, David C. Yang and all references thereto, paragraph
10, and paragraph H.
It is so ordered.
Dated: September 17, 2024
_______________________
MEL RED RECANA
Judge of the
Superior Court