Judge: Mel Red Recana, Case: 23STCV02648, Date: 2024-03-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV02648 Hearing Date: March 6, 2024 Dept: 45
Hearing
date: March 6, 2024
Moving
Party: Defendants Archdiocese of Los
Angeles Education & Welfare Corporation, et al.
Responding
Party: Plaintiff Robert Santisteven
Special
Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP)
The Court
considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply.
The
special motion is GRANTED in part as to the first, third, and fourth
causes of action with 30 days leave to amend and DENIED in part as to
the second cause of action.
Background
On
February 7, 2023, Plaintiff Robert Santisteven (“Plaintiff”) filed the
operative Complaint against Defendants Archdiocese of Los Angeles Education
& Welfare Corporation; St. Pius X – St. Matthias Academy (“Defendants”);
and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive for: (1) Defamation by Libel; (2) Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress; (3) False Light Invasion of Privacy; and (4)
Public Disclosure of Private Facts.
On
April 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to the Complaint naming The Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles as DOE 1.
On
May 18, 2023, Defendants filed this instant Special Motion to Strike
(Anti-SLAPP). On February 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On February
28, 2024, Defendants filed a reply.
Legal
Standard
Pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure Section 425.16, subdivision (b), “[a] cause of action
against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the
person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution
or California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject
to a special motion to strike unless the court determines that the plaintiff
has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on
the claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b).)
Such
a motion involves a two-step analysis, in which the court must first determine
whether a movant “has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of
action is one arising from protected activity ...” (Taus v. Loftus
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 712 (quoting Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause,
Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67).) If the court so finds, it must then
examine whether the respondent has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on
the claim. (Taus, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 712.) In determining whether
the respondent has carried this burden, the trial court considers “the
pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which
the liability or defense is based.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(2);
see Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291.)
Evidentiary
Objections
Plaintiff’s Objections
In support of his opposition, Plaintiff objects to the declarations of
Christian De Larkin and Veronica Zozaya. The Court rules on the objections as
follows:
OVERRULED: 1-12
SUSTAINED: None.
Defendant’s Objections
In support of their motion, Defendants object to portions of the
declaration of Robert Santisteven. The
Court rules on the objections as follows:
OVERRULED: 8
SUSTAINED: 1; 2 as to ¶ 4, lns. 16-20; 3 as to ¶ 5, lns. 5-9; 4 as to ¶
6, lns. 12-14; and 7.
Discussion
Timeliness
Pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure Section 425.16, subdivision (f), “The special motion may be filed within 60 days of the service of the
complaint or, in the court's discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems
proper.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (f).)
The Court finds that Defendants’ present Anti-SLAPP motion is timely. Defendants
filed notice of acknowledgement of receipt of the summons and complaint on
April 18, 2023. This instant Anti-SLAPP motion was filed on May 18, 2023, which
is thirty (30) days after the notice of acknowledgment. Accordingly,
Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP motion will be considered on the merits.
Special
Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP)
Defendants
move for an order striking and dismissing all claims made by Plaintiff pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16, Anti-SLAPP statute. Defendants argue
(1) all causes of action asserted by Plaintiff arise from protected activity
and (2) that Plaintiff cannot show a probability of prevailing on his claims.
Defendants contend the entire Complaint arises from Defendants’ statements
following the termination of Plaintiff for inappropriate conduct in violation
of Defendants’ school policies, which was a matter of public interest and
squarely protected by Code of Civil Procedure Section 425, subdivision (e)(4).
Defendants further contend their statements were made in the furtherance of its
right to free speech under the California Constitution and First Amendment
goals pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 425, subdivision (a).
Moreover, Defendants argue the conduct alleged in the Complaint falls within
the absolute privileges set forth under Civil Code Sections 47, subdivision (b)
and (c). Lastly, Defendants’ argue Plaintiff cannot set forth sufficient
evidence to demonstrate a prima facie case for his causes of action.
Protected
Activity
An act in
furtherance of a person's right to petition or free speech under the United
States Constitution or California Constitution includes “(1) any written or
oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written
or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any
other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement
or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection
with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of
the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional
right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
interest.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e).)
a.
Statements Made Regarding the
Reason for Plaintiff’s Termination
As an initial
matter, Defendants assert each of Plaintiff’s four cases of action rely upon
the same allegation, i.e., Defendants’ publication of a statement that “Mr.
Santisteven had engaged in inappropriate conduct while coaching the girls’
basketball team during a practice session.” (Compl., ¶ 13.) Defendants argue
their publicized statements concerning the termination of Plaintiff were
related to a “public issue or an issue of public interest” because there was an
obvious and significant public interest by parents, students, and colleagues at
schools regarding the conduct of its instructors. Furthermore, Defendants
contend given Plaintiff’s extensive history with PMA and the public nature of
the incident, Defendants’ communications were made in connection with an issue
of public interest. Defendants also contend the reason for a seasoned teacher
and coach’s departure from PMA, is a matter of great import to the school
community as well as the community at large.
In
opposition, Plaintiff argues Defendants’ have failed to meet their burden of
proof on all causes of action because Defendants’ conduct at issue is not
protected under the First Amendment. Specifically, Plaintiff contends a false
and unprivileged oral communication attributing to a person untrue specific
misdeeds or certain unfavorable characteristics or qualities, or uttering
certain other derogatory statements regarding a person constitutes “slander.”
Plaintiff further contends there was no controversy or dispute at the time of
his termination. Plaintiff also argues there is no matter of public interest
cited in the moving papers because Defendants cannot create a “after the fact”
ongoing controversy of public interest with wholly irrelevant and objectionable
evidence.
In
reply, Defendants argue the declarations submitted in support of this instant
motion make clear that the November 9, 2021 incident involving Plaintiff arose
from a complaint made by a student’s parent, involving an issue that occurred
in front of the entire basketball team, other students, parents, and coaches.
Defendants further argue the incident had been widely discussed amongst school
personnel and students because it occurred during a team practice with other
students and staff present. As such, Defendants argue these contextual factors
establish that there was an ongoing controversy as to Plaintiff’s behavior and
his subsequent termination.
Here,
the Complaint generally alleges that Defendants printed “In November 2021, PMA
received complaints that Mr. Santisteven had engaged in inappropriate conduct
while coaching the girls' basketball team during a practice session. After investigating,
PMA and the Department of Catholic Schools concluded that the allegations in
the complaint were substantiated, and Mr. Santisteven's conduct violated PMA's
expectations of its coaches. Consequently, his employment was terminated” in a
widely disseminated publication entitled Weekly Update during the period
of February 14, 2022 through February 18, 2022. (Compl., ¶ 15, Ex. B.) This
allegation is incorporated by reference into each of Plaintiff’s causes of
action in the Complaint.
The
first cause of action for defamation by libel incorporates the above described
general allegation. (Id. at ¶ 16.) The Complaint further alleges before
the publication of the Statement, Plaintiff was a respected member of
the teaching and coaching profession. (Id. at ¶ 17.) The Complaint
further alleges Defendants engaged in a campaign to damage Plaintiff’s
reputation and interfere with his ability to use his skills in the teaching and
coaching profession. (Id. at ¶ 18.) The Complaint also alleges
Defendants shared demonstrably false information with members of the Academy
community and beyond with the intent of implying and portraying Plaintiff as an
abuser of children and/or adolescents. (Id.) The Complaint also alleges
Defendants knew or had reason to know the Statement was false, published
without Plaintiff’s consent, the Statement was false, the Statement
was understood the dozens and hundreds of individuals who read or heard it to
mean that Plaintiff is incapable of performing his job due to his purported
“inappropriate conduct,” and was libelous because they tend to injure Plaintiff
in his professions, trade, and business. (Id. at ¶¶ 19-24.)
The second cause
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress incorporated the
above described general allegation (Id. at ¶ 38) and is based on the
allegations that Defendants’ conduct constitute outrageous conduct, were not
privileged, done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the probability of
causing Plaintiff to incur emotional distress, and caused Plaintiff to suffer
emotional distress. (Id. at ¶¶ 39-41.)
The third cause
of action for false light invasion of privacy incorporated the above-described
general allegation (Id. at ¶ 43) and is based on the allegations that
Defendants Statement and publication left the inescapable impression and
conclusion that Plaintiff’s employment was terminated due to the false
implication, insinuation, suggestion and Statement he was a child and/or
adolescent abuser, which unreasonably places him in a false light and violates
his right of privacy. (Id. at ¶ 46.)
The fourth cause
of action for public disclosure of private facts incorporated the
above-described general allegation (Id. at ¶ 68) and is based on
allegation that by making and publishing the Statement alleged,
Defendants made an unauthorized disclosure concerning Plaintiff. (Id. at
¶ 71.)
“The mere fact that a plaintiff has filed an action after a defendant
has engaged in some protected activity does not mean that the plaintiff's
action arose from that activity. The anti-SLAPP statute cannot be read to mean
that any claim asserted in an action which arguably was filed in retaliation
for the exercise of speech or petition rights falls under section 425.16,
whether or not the claim is based on conduct in exercise of those rights."
Gallimore v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. (2002), 102 Cal.App.4th
1388, 1398 (internal citations and quotations omitted).)
This
is not the case here. Defendants have made a threshold showing that Plaintiff’s
causes of action arise directly out of Defendants’ conduct of publishing the Statement
regarding Plaintiff’s termination, which is was an exercise of their
constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an
issue of public interest, thus protected speech or activity. Thus, the Court
now turns to whether Plaintiff has a reasonable probability of prevailing on
the claims in the Complaint.
Probability
of Prevailing on the Claim
On the second
component of the analysis, courts employ a “summary-judgment-like” procedure,
“accepting as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff and evaluating the
defendant’s evidence only to determine whether the defendant has defeated the
plaintiff’s evidence as a matter of law.” (Gerbosi
v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 435, 444.)
In other words, the court does not assess credibility, and the plaintiff is not
required to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard. The court accepts
as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff, who need only establish that
his or her claim has “minimal merit” to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP. (Soukup,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at 291.)
Defendants
argue defamation is a favored claim to be resolved by a special motion to
strike. However, Defendants contend their statement regarding Plaintiff’s job
performance cannot support a defamation claim because it was made in the
ordinary course and practice of PMA and in response to an overwhelming number
of parents, students, and staff inquiries regarding the reason for Plaintiff’s
departure. Defendants further contend Plaintiff’s defamation claim is barred by
Civil Code Section 47 subdivisions (b) and (c). Defendants argue statements to
the school community, sharing the results of the investigation, are protected
communications made in the course of that proceeding. Moreover, Defendants
argue the statement made by PMA to the school community concerning Plaintiff’s
misconduct while coaching the girls basketball team is of common interest
between PMA and its faculty students, and parents in regard to the education
and protection of PMA students and the governance of the school. Defendants
also contend the conduct at issue involving a singular publication made in
PMA’s weekly update to its students, faculty, and parents regarding Plaintiff’s
grounds for termination was not extreme or outrageous and was not even
negligent. Defendants then assert Plaintiff’s second cause of action is based
on the same conduct underlying his defamation cause of action, so it should be
stricken if the Court finds that the defamation cause of action should be
stricken. Defendants also assert the third cause of action is duplicative of
the defamation cause of action, thus fails the same reasons. Finally,
Defendants argue Plaintiff’s cause of action for public disclosure of private
facts is not legally sufficient because (1) no intimate or disparaging details
of Plaintiff’s private life were ever shared and (2) the inappropriate physical
contact with a student occurred in public. As such, Defendants argue they are
entitled to attorneys’ fees should this motion be granted.
In
opposition, Plaintiff argues his Complaint has complied with each element
required for alleging a cause of action for defamation. Plaintiff further
argues he was provided with a Release indicating and confirming no
defamatory, libelous, or slanderous statements were to be made by either party
and the only information to be provided concerning Plaintiff’s severance
employment after 40 years of service was to disclose only Plaintiff’s
employment dates, position held and final wage earned. (Santisteven Decl., ¶ 8,
Ex. A.) Moreover, Plaintiff contends Defendants proceeded to publicize the
purported basis for his termination using the very words he objected to, which
constitutes conduct giving rise intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Additionally, Plaintiff asserts he has allege facts that meet the requirements
for the false light invasion of privacy cause of action. For the public
disclosure cause of action Plaintiff merely cites to Payton v. City of Santa
Clara (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 152. As to the Civil Code Section 47 arguments,
Plaintiff asserts there was no proceeding authorized by or authorized in any
fashion whatsoever and there is no admissible evidence which suggests there was
any interest at all as to Plaintiff’s employment termination given the fact
that school parents and students had been advised Plaintiff was no longer
employed by Defendants as of December 30, 2021.
In
reply, Defendants argue Plaintiff does not cannot argue that the use of the
term “inappropriate” was false, rather, he argues that the word alludes to
sexual misconduct. Furthermore, Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to present
sufficient evidence to overcome the applicable Civil Code Section 47 privilege
because Plaintiff submits no evidence that the communication in question was
motivated by malice or ill will. Defendants also argue Plaintiff’s lack of
consent to the release of the statement by PMA does not make the statement defamatory
or give rise to an intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. In
addition, Defendants assert reiterates that Plaintiff’s false light invasion of
privacy claim fails for the same reasons his defamation claim fails. Lastly,
Defendants contend Payton v. City of Santa Clara is distinguishable from
this case at bar because the “inappropriate” conduct committed by Plaintiff was
done so publicly in front of other students, staff, and parents.
Here,
Plaintiff advances his own declaration and attached Release Agreement to
prove he has a probability of prevailing on the merits of all causes of action
alleged in the Complaint. (Santisteven Decl., ¶ 8, Ex. A.) The language of the Release
Agreement supports Plaintiff’s allegations that when asked about
Plaintiff’s termination, Defendants were supposed to only state Plaintiff’s
dates of employment, the position he held, and the final wage earned.
Furthermore, the copy of the Release Agreement showcases that is was not
signed nor initialed by Plaintiff as alleged in the Complaint, such that
Plaintiff did not consent to the Statement that was published in the Weekly
Update. Plaintiff also declares that he told Mr. De Larkin and Mrs. Zozaya
that he would not accept or agree to the language in proposed statement in the Release
Agreement. The evidence proffered by Plaintiff demonstrate a probability of
prevailing on the merits of the intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim. However, the evidence proffered to support the cause of action for
defamation apart from the Complaint were sustained as they make references to a
sexual abuse scandal that is not properly before the Court through judicial
notice or otherwise and not relevant to this instant case as the Statement
alleged makes no direct reference to conduct that is sexual in nature. As such,
Plaintiff has submitted no evidence to support the false light invasion of
privacy and public disclosure of private facts claim. Thus, Plaintiff has not
established his causes of action for defamation by libel, false light invasion
of privacy, and public disclosure of private facts have minimal merit to avoid
being stricken as a SLAPP.
Therefore,
the special motion is GRANTED in part as to the first, third, and fourth
causes of action with 30 days leave to amend and DENIED in part as to
the second cause of action.
It
is so ordered.
Dated: March 6, 2024
_______________________
ROLF M. TREU
Judge of the
Superior Court