Judge: Mel Red Recana, Case: 23STCV18797, Date: 2024-07-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV18797    Hearing Date: July 9, 2024    Dept: 45

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

 

Monica Gonzalez Sanchez,

 

                             Plaintiff,

 

                              vs.

Lidia Pacheco,

 

                              Defendants.

Case No.:  23STCV18797

DEPARTMENT 45

 

 

 

[TENTATIVE] RULING

 

 

 

Action Filed: 08/08/2023

[1st Amended Complaint Filed: N/A]

Trial Date: None Set

 

Hearing date:              07/09/2024

Moving Party:             Defendant Lidia Pacheco

Responding Party:      Plaintiff Maria Sanchez

Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint

            The Court considered the moving papers and the opposition. Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is SUSTAINED in its entirety. Plaintiff is granted 20 days leave to amend.

 

Background

            This case stems from a landlord-tenant dispute. Maria Sanchez (Plaintiff) alleges that Lidia Pacheco (Defendant) committed several unlawful acts while operating as landlord of 1422 E 58th Dr., Los Angeles, CA 90001 (the Premises). (Complaint, ¶6.) Plaintiff alleges that she began renting the Premises in 2004 under a previous owner Angelina Davalos (Davalos). Davalos passed away in 2017. Thereafter, Defendant became the new owner. (Id.)

            Plaintiff alleges that she has been paying a rental fee of $900.00 each month to the Defendant. Upon entering the agreement for the rental lease of the Premises, Plaintiff alleges that she asked the owner if there was anything to be aware of prior to the start of the lease, to which the owner at that time replied in the negative. Plaintiff alleges she did not discover the alleged illegality of the unit until 2023. (Id. at ¶ 7.)

            Plaintiff additionally alleges that the Premises was infested with insects, vermin, and mold at the time she entered into the lease agreement. (Id. at ¶8.) Plaintiff alleges that she notified Defendant, but nothing was done, the issue only grew worse between 2019 and 2022. (Id. at ¶10.) Issues with the plumbing also arose, and Plaintiff alleges that after giving notice, Defendant did not respond, and Plaintiff therefore conducted repairs at her own expense. (Id.) In November of 2019, Plaintiff alleges that there was no gas nor hot water for a week. (Id. at ¶10.) In June of 2023, Plaintiff alleges that she was asked to vacate the premises, with no written eviction notice. (Id. at ¶14.) Plaintiff alleges that no rental contract was ever provided. (Id.) Prior to this in 2019, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant verbally harassed her to leave. Plaintiff then filed suit. The Complaint contains the following causes of action:

1.      Violation of Civil Code § 1942.4

2.      Tortious Breach of Warranty of Habitability

3.      Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment

4.      Nuisance

5.      Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 et seq.

6.      Negligence

7.      Fraud – Intentional Misrepresentation

8.      Fraud – Concealment

9.      Landlord Harassment

10.  Constructive Eviction

11.  Retaliatory Eviction

12.  Negligent and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

13.  Violation of AB 1482 Tenant Protection Act

            The motion now before the Court is Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer; no reply was filed.     

 

Meet and Confer

            “Before filing a demurrer…the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a).) Defendant provides the Declaration of Thomas Shinton Regarding Meeting and Conferring. The Declaration states that Defendant reached out on September 7, 2023, but was unable to reach the Plaintiff. The requirements of Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a) remain unsatisfied, however, per Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a)(4), “A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer.” Therefore, the Court turns to the demurrer.

 

Discussion

Legal Standard

            “[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

 

Analysis

            Defendant demurs to the Complaint as a whole and each and every cause of action on three main grounds: (1) the pleading does not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action, (2) the pleading is uncertain and unintelligible, and (3) that several of the causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations. The Court agrees, sustains the demurrer in its entirety and grants Plaintiff 20 days leave to amend.

A.    The Complaint Fails to Properly Allege a Contract

            Each of the causes of action are based on an alleged rental contract with Defendant, however, the contract is neither provided verbatim, nor attached. (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) Moreover, the legal effect of the contract is not plead. (Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.) Although Plaintiff does not allege a breach of contract, without a verbal or written rental lease agreement, none of the causes of action can survive demurrer.

B.     The Complaint is Vague

            As to Defendant’s second contention that the Complaint is vague, the Court agrees. First, several of the causes of action plead, do not state specific facts, but rather refer back to the section labeled “Facts”. Second, the Complaint makes clear that from 2004 to 2017, the owner of the Premises was Davalos. (Complaint, ¶6.) The Complaint also makes clear that there were issues that began in 2004. For example, both the causes of action for fraud are based on representations made to Plaintiff upon entering into the alleged lease agreement in 2004, several years before Defendant took over. (Complaint, ¶7. Also see Opposition Papers, 31:7-16.)  Another example is the issue with vermin which began in 2004, and apparently was never corrected by Davalos. It is unclear as to what time periods Defendant, the current landlord, is being sought to be liable for because Defendant took over in 2017. By this time Plaintiff was well aware of several of the issues that triggered the pleaded causes of action, which leads to concerns with the applicability of the delayed discovery doctrine (explained further below).  

C.     Statute of Limitations

            Finally, Defendant asserts the defense that many of the causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff became aware of most if not all of the issues plead within the Complaint long before Defendant took over as landlord. Even the delayed discovery doctrine would provide no assistance here, as to delay the statute of limitations the accrual of a cause of action occurs when plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the injury had a wrongful cause. (Lederer v. Gursey Schneider LLP (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 508, 521.) It is clear that Plaintiff discovered the necessary elements for many of these causes of action as early as 2004 (see generally, the Complaint), but only filed a Complaint with the Court in 2023. Consequently, the demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is sustained in its entirety.   

 

Leave to Amend

            Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment”]. As there is reasonable possibility of successful amendment, the Court grants Plaintiffs 20 days leave to amend.       

 

Conclusion

            Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is SUSTAINED in its entirety. Plaintiff is granted 20 days leave to amend.

           

It is so ordered.

 

Dated: July 9, 2024

 

_______________________

MEL RED RECANA

Judge of the Superior Court