Judge: Mel Red Recana, Case: 23STCV20370, Date: 2024-11-14 Tentative Ruling

All rulings shown here are TENTATIVE ONLY, and thus oral argument WILL be heard. All Counsel are still required to attend.

Case Number: 23STCV20370    Hearing Date: November 14, 2024    Dept: 45

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Hearing date:                          11/14/2024

Moving Party:                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA (Defendant)      

Responding Party:                  JEFFREY SWAN (Plaintiff)

Motion Type Demurrer without Motion to Strike

The court has considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply.  

The demurrer is sustained with leave to amend. Plaintiff has thirty days to file an amended complaint. Defendant to give notice.

Background

            On August 8, 2023, Plaintiff Jeffrey Sawn (Plaintiff) filed suit against Defendant the State of California (Defendant). Plaintiff then filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC).

            Plaintiff alleges that he is an inmate house at a California State Prison located in Lancaster. In January 2023, Plaintiff “complained of  severe and unrelenting leg pain for which medical care was urgently necessary, but he was ignored and refused, and no medical attention was summoned. . .”(FAC, ¶6.) Due to the lack of timely medical attention, Plaintiff’s leg was amputated.

Plaintiff alleges one cause of action for failure to summon medical attention pursuant to Government Code section 845.6. Defendant demurrers on two grounds (i) that the claim is insufficiently plead, and (ii) that Defendant is immune from liability under Government Code section 856.4 (Section 856.4).

Legal Standard

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against them. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 714, 721.)  When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (See Schultz v. Harney (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1622, as modified on denial of reh’g (Sept. 29, 1994).) The court “take[s] as true all properly pleaded material facts, but not conclusions of fact or law asserted in the complaint.” (Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 916.) “The allegations of the pleading demurred to must be regarded as true.” (South Shore Land Co. v. Peterson (1964) 266 Cal.App.2d 725, 732.) A “demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction of instruments pleaded, or facts impossible in law.” (Ibid. [internal citations omitted].)

Discussion

             Meet and Confer

Before filing a demurrer, the moving party must meet and confer in person, by video conference, or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41.) “Any determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(4).)

Here, counsel for Defendant, Gurpreet Sandhu (Counsel), declares that on October 26, 2023, Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter outlining the issues for demurrer. (Sandhu Decl., ¶2). The letter includes an invitation to provide Defendant with times for a meet and confer phone call. Counsel declares Plaintiff did not respond. This is sufficient under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision b which states the declaration may included that the non-moving party “failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring part. . .”

Sufficiency of the Allegations

            Government Code section 845.6 (Section 845.6) provides that “a public employee, and the public entity where the employee is acting within the scope of his employment, is liable if the employee knows or has reason to know the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care.” (Gov. Code, §845.6.)

            California courts have construed the provision to create limited liability “when: (1) the public employee knows or has reason to know of the need, (2) of immediate medical care, and (3) fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care.” (Castaneda v. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1070 [internal quotations, brackets and emphasis omitted].)

            Here, Plaintiff has alleged legal conclusions without sufficient foundational facts to support the claim. Plaintiff alleges he complained of severe and unrelenting pain, that medical care was urgently necessary, and that no medical attention was timely given. This allegation alone, does not demonstrate how it was clear that he required immediate medical care. In other words, Plaintiff has not alleged how the public employees knew or had reason to know that he needed immediate medical care based on his single complaint of severe and unrelenting pain. A claim under Section 845.6 hinges on the need for immediate medical care which was “serious and obvious”. (Watson. v. State of California (1993) 212 Cal.App.4th 836, 845 [“Liability under section 845.6 is limited to serious and obvious medical conditions requiring immediate care]; see also Kinney v. County of Contra Costa (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 761 [deciding after trial that a “jail prisoner’s request of an attendant for something for a headache cannot reasonably be deemed notice ‘that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care.’ ”].) The FAC requires further details to sufficiently appraise Defendant of the basis of the claim.

            Defendant also argues that the claim is insufficiently alleged because it is akin to a claim for negligent provision of care. (See e.g., Castaneda, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1070 [stating that Section 845.6 does not provide liability for “certain employee’s malpractice in providing that care.”]; Nelson v. State of California (1982) 139 Cal.App.3d 72, [affirming sustaining demurrer to Section 845.6 claim for failure to properly treat diabetes].)  However, the court does not find the claim, as presently alleged, one of negligent treatment. Plaintiff alleges that he experienced an acute event which required immediate medical attention; he does not allege that Defendant failed to properly treat his leg once he received medical attention. The demurrer is not sustained on this ground.

Nevertheless, the demurrer is sustained with leave to amend for failure to allege sufficient facts to support a claim under Section 845.6.

Government Immunity

            Finally, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claim is barred under Section 856.4. Section 856.4 provides that “neither a public entity nor a public employee acting in the scope of his employment is liable for an injury resulting from the failure to admit a person to a public medical facility.”

This section is inapplicable to the present complaint where Plaintiff has not based his claim on the failure to admit him to a hospital but on the decision to deny him immediate necessary medical attention. Defendant relies in part on Plaintiff’s Government Claim form in which he states, “[t]he state prison did not adequately diagnose or send claimant out of its facility for proper and timely treatment urgently required.” (FAC, Exh 1. at p. 1.) First, in the referenced language, Plaintiff is still basing the claim on a failure to furnish immediate care. Second, while the claim form may have alleged some conduct for which Defendant would not be liable under Nelson (i.e., negligence in providing care), Plaintiff’s theory which derived from the facts alleged in the claim form and the complaint is still valid against Defendant. Section 856.4 is inapplicable.

The demurrer is not sustained on this ground.

Conclusions

            Given the liberal standards in permitting amendment, the demurrer is sustained with leave to amend. Plaintiff has thirty days to file an amended complaint. Defendant to give notice.

Dated: November 14, 2024

_______________________

MEL RED RECANA

         Judge of the Superior Court