Judge: Mel Red Recana, Case: 24STCV07685, Date: 2024-08-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV07685    Hearing Date: August 29, 2024    Dept: 45

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

 

JESSICA ANAYA, an individual,

 

                                Plaintiff,

 

v.

 

AFFORDABLE PET CARE GROUP OF LOS ANGELES, a California nonprofit corporation; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,

 

                               Defendants.

Case No.: 24STCV07685

DEPARTMENT 45

 

 

 

[TENTATIVE] RULING

 

 

 

Action Filed: 03/27/2024 

[1st Amended Complaint Filed: N/A]

Trial Date: None Set 

 

Hearing Date:              August 29, 2024

Moving Party:             Defendant Affordable Pet Care Group Los Angeles

Responding Party:      Plaintiff Jessica Anaya

Motion:                      Defendant’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint

Tentative Ruling: The Court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply. The motion is DENIED.

 

Background

            On March 27, 2024, Jesica Anaya (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against her former employer Affordable Pet Care Group of Los Angeles (APCG or Defendant) for several violations of California Labor Codes, the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), and wrongful termination. The Complaint alleges twelve causes of action surrounding Plaintiff’s time while working for Defendant in which she alleges she was not provided her mandatory rest periods, she was not paid full wages nor overtime, and that she was terminated because of her pregnancy.

            The motion now before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint (the Motion). Plaintiff opposes the Motion; Defendant files a reply. 

Meet and Confer

“Before filing a motion to strike…the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.” (Code Civ. Proc. §435.5.) Attached to their moving papers, Defendant files the Declaration of Victor Balladares which states the parties conferred on July 1, 2024 but were unable to come to an agreement. Nonetheless, the requirements of Code Civ. Proc. §435.5 have been satisfied. The Court now turns its attention to the Motion.

 

Discussion

Legal Standard

The court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (CCP § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (CCP § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (CCP § 437.)

A motion to strike any pleading must be filed “within the time allowed to respond to a pleading”—e.g., 30 days after service of the complaint or cross-complaint unless extended by court order or stipulation. [CCP § 435(b)(1)]. This does not affect the court's power to strike sua sponte. Courts are specifically authorized to strike a pleading upon a motion or at any time in the court's discretion. (CCP § 436)

The Court notes that motions to strike punitive damages may be granted, where the alleged facts do not support conclusions of malice, fraud or oppression. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central Calif., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)

 

Analysis

            Defendant’s primary argument upon filing their moving papers, is that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to support a request for punitive damages under Civ. Code §3294, and the allegations as is do not meet the statute’s heightened pleading standard. Plaintiff argues the contrary, contending the Complaint contains sufficient information to support a requests for punitive damages and to meet the heightened pleading standard.

            In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges she was terminated because of her pregnancy, in violation of Govt. Code §§12940 et seq (FEHA). Plaintiff was hired as a receptionist by Defendant on November 13, 2021. (Compl., ¶16.) In early 2022, Plaintiff began undergoing in vitro fertilization (IVF) in hopes of getting pregnant. (Compl., ¶23.) Plaintiff informed the owner of APCG – Dr. Victor Ramirez (Dr. Ramirez) – that she may need to leave her shifts early for treatment. Dr. Ramirez stated that as long as notice to the office manager or supervisor was given, this should not be a problem. (Id.) On April 1, 2022, Plaintiff was sick, reported the illness to her supervisor, and was permitted to go home early. (Compl., ¶24.) The following Monday, Dr. Ramirez notified Plaintiff her final check was ready for pick up. When asked about whether Plaintiff was terminated, Dr. Ramirez stated that Plaintiff left work on April 1, 2022 without permission. When both Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s supervisor informed Dr. Ramirez Plaintiff was given permission to leave, Dr. Ramirez gave a warning that Plaintiff would be terminated if she left early again. (Id.)

            After discovering the IVF treatments were successful and that she became pregnant in April of 2022, Plaintiff informed Dr. Ramirez. (Compl., ¶25.) However, Plaintiff states that in response, Dr. Ramirez began to criticize her work and that on May 15, 2022 she was terminated. (Id. at ¶¶25-26.)

            Plaintiff contends that these facts, being terminated shortly after notifying the owner of APCG that she was pregnant, supports a claim for punitive damages. The Court agrees.

            Civ. Code  §3294

Civ. Code §3294 governs punitive damages and provides the following: “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code §3294(a).) Civ. Code §3294(c)(1) provides the following definitions shall apply to this section:

 

(1)   “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

 

(2)   “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.

 

(3)   “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

            With regard to Defendant’s argument that the allegations do not meet the heightened pleading requirement, the Court disagrees. Plaintiff makes clear that she was terminated, and alleges the cause was not proper, but based on her pregnancy which she informed Dr. Ramirez of directly. (Compl., ¶25.) Terminating an employee based on a protected category such as sex and/or pregnancy is a direct violation of Govt. Code § 12940.

To meet the standard set under Civ. Code §3294, the act alleged must fall under the definition of “malice”, “oppression”, or “fraud”. Terminating an employee because of their pregnancy falls under the definition of malice. The Court of Appeal affirmed such a finding in Sasco Electric v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 532 (“Sasco”). In Sasco the employer challenged a decision made by the Fair Employment and Housing Commission finding the employer committed pregnancy discrimination in violation of FEHA. In doing so the Fair Employment and Housing Commission also found clear and convincing evidence of oppression and malice by the employer. (Id. at 541.) After review of the facts, the Court found the employers given reasons of terminating the employee based on staff reduction nothing more than pretext and found there to be substantial evidence of malice. (Id. at 536.)

            At the pleadings stage, the Court does not seek evidence but determines whether the pleadings are sufficient to withstand the instant Motion to Strike. Here, the Court concludes they are and denies the Motion.    

Conclusion

            Accordingly, Defendant Affordable Pet Care Group of Los Angeles’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff Jessica Anaya’s Complaint is DENIED.

 

 

 

It is so ordered.

 

Dated: August 29, 2024

 

_______________________

MEL RED RECANA

Judge of the Superior Court