Judge: Mel Red Recana, Case: 24STCV12647, Date: 2024-11-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV12647    Hearing Date: November 20, 2024    Dept: 45

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

 

KUEI SHEN,

 

                             Plaintiff,

 

                              vs.

 

EVER PROSPEROUS REALTY INC., et al.,

 

                              Defendants.

Case No.:  24STCV12647

DEPARTMENT 45

 

 

 

[TENTATIVE] RULING

 

 

 

Action Filed:  05/17/2024

Trial Date:  N/A

 

Hearing date:              November 20, 2024

Moving Party:             Defendant Nikolay N. Katanov

Responding Party:       None

 

Motion to Quash Service of Summons

The Court considered the moving papers.

            The Court CONTINUES the hearing on the Motion to Quash Service of Summons filed by Defendant Nikolay N. Katanov to ___________ at ______ a.m. in Department 45 of the Stanley Mosk Courthouse.  Defendant is ordered to properly serve Plaintiff with the moving papers at least 16 court days before the next scheduled hearing and file proof of service with the Court.  Failure to do so will result in the Motion being placed off calendar or denied.

 

Background

            On May 17, 2024, Plaintiff Kuei Shen (“Plaintiff”), in propria persona, filed an action against Defendants Ever Prosperous Realty Inc., Paul Blair Hazan, Isaac Louz, Ibrahim Louz, Rachmon A. Louz aka Louz Rachmon, Victor S. Hazan, Laura A. Hazan, Brian David Squibb aka alter ego of Proventure Capital, Proventure Capital, LLC, Optimum Bank, Nikolay N. Katanov aka alter ego of Bridge View, JP Morgan Chase Bank National Association, Ed Castillo, Vin Cascio, and Does 1 through 20, for the following ten different causes of action:

(1)   Financial elder abuse;

(2)   Fraud by intentional misrepresentation;

(3)   Fraud by false promise (promissory fraud);

(4)   Conversion;

(5)   Intentional infliction of emotional distress;

(6)   Violation of Rico Act;

(7)   Conspiracy to violate Rico Act;

(8)   Civil conspiracy;

(9)   Negligence;

(10)           Negligence respondeat superior (vicarious liability).

The Complaint alleges that around July 13, 2022, Defendant Paul Hazan telephoned Plaintiff, an elderly man over the age of 65, and represented that he was a Loan Broker specializing in assisting elderly individuals obtain business lines of credit and money loans.  Defendant Hazan then added Defendants Isaac Louz, Ibrahim Louz, and Victor Hazan to the call, who promised to assist Plaintiff obtain a $100,000 loan.  Defendants deceived Plaintiff into providing personal and financial information, including his social security number and Business Tax I.D. Number.  Between July 2022 and June 2023, Defendants continued to use undue influence and fraud to deceive Plaintiff into paying fees and forwarding additional personal information, including to Defendants Proventure Capital and Bridge View Advance.  They also withdrew funds from Plaintiff’s accounts without his consent on numerous occasions.  As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff was harmed and is seeking monetary damages in the amount of $75,001 and punitive damages in the amount of $10,000,000.

            On October 3, 2024, Defendant Nikolay N. Katanov filed the instant Motion to Quash Service of Summons (“Motion”).  No opposition was filed.  On November 14, 2024, Defendant filed a Notice of Non-Opposition to the Motion.

 

Legal Standard

“A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow” may move “to quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 418.10, subd. (a)(1)).  A defendant has 30 days after the service of the summons to file a responsive pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 412.20, subd. (a)(3).)

“The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment constrains a State’s authority to bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts.  [Citation.] [A] nonresident generally must have ‘certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” ’ ”  (Walden v. Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. 277, 283.)  Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific.  For general jurisdiction, a defendant’s forum contacts must be “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [the defendant] essentially at home in the forum State.”  (Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 139.)  The paradigm of general jurisdiction for a corporation is its state of incorporation or principal place of business.  (Id. at p. 137.)

Specific or case-linked jurisdiction “‘focuses on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’’”  (Walden, supra, 571 U.S. at 283-284.)  In particular, “the defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State.”  (Id. at 284.)  There are three requirements for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant:

First, the defendant must have purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits or purposefully directed activities at forum residents.  Second, the controversy must relate to or arise out of the defendant’s forum-related activities.  Third, the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”

(David L. v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 359, 366.)  The plaintiff has the initial burden to establish the first two requirements.  Only after doing so does the burden shift to the defendant to show that exercising jurisdiction would be unreas onable.  (Id. at 367.) The plaintiff must do more than merely allege jurisdictional facts. “‘It must present evidence sufficient to justify a finding that California may properly exercise jurisdiction over the defendant.’”  (Zehia v. Superior Court (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 543, 552.)

“‘[P]urposeful availment occurs where a nonresident defendant ‘‘purposefully direct[s]’ ‘[its] activities at residents of the forum” [citation], “‘purposefully derive[s] benefit’ from” its activities in the forum [citation], “create[s] a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum” [citation], “‘deliberately’ has engaged in significant activities within” the forum [citation], or “has created ‘continuing obligations’ between [itself] and residents of the forum” [citation]. By limiting the scope of a forum’s jurisdiction in this manner, the “‘purposeful availment’ requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts … .” [Citation.]  Instead, the defendant will be subject to personal jurisdiction only if “‘it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the state.’” [Citations.]’”  (HealthMarkets, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1168.)

In Walden, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized two important principles underlying the jurisdictional inquiry: “First, the relationship must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum State. [Citation.] Due process limits on the State’s adjudicative authority principally protect the liberty of the nonresident defendant – not the convenience of plaintiffs or third parties.”  (Walden, supra, 571 U.S. at 284.)  “Second, our ‘minimum contacts’ analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.”  (Id. at 285.)  “[T]he plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum. Rather, it is the defendant’s conduct that must form the necessary connection with the forum State that is the basis for its jurisdiction over him.”  (Id.)  Therefore, “mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum.”  (Id. at 290.)  “The proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.”  (Id.)

 

Discussion

Defendant Nikolay N. Katanov (“Katanov”) specially appears to quash service of summons on the basis that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him.

Defendant Katanov declares that he currently resides in the State of New York and has been residing there for over 30 years.  (Katanov Decl., ¶ 2.)  He has never resided, conducted any personal or business activities, vacationed, or owned or leased any property in the State of California.  (Id. at ¶¶ 3-4.)  On August 3, 2024, he was personally served with the instant lawsuit in his home in New York City.  (Id. at ¶ 5.)  The Complaint alleges that he is the alter ego of a business called “Bridge View,” however, he is not familiar with this company.  (Id. at ¶ 6.)  His son Jonathan is affiliated with a company called Bridgeview Advance, Inc. and is the agent for service of process for this company, which has used Defendant Katanov’s home address for service of process.  (Ibid.)  Katanov does not own any shares in the company, has never been employed by the company, or been an officer, director, or agent of the company.  (Ibid.)  Katanov denies ever speaking to Plaintiff or engaging in a conspiracy to defraud Plaintiff with the other Defendants.  (Id. at ¶¶ 7-9.)

Defendant has also submitted the declaration of Joshua Naz, who declares that he is the CEO of Bridgeview Advance, Inc. and Jonathan Katanov is his business partner.  (Naz Decl., ¶ 2.)  Naz reviewed the Complaint and states that he is not familiar with the company “Bridge View.”  (Id. at ¶ 3.)  Upon conducting an online search, he discovered another company “Bridge View Advance, LLC.”  (Id. at ¶ 4.)  Naz states that when he first registered his company in the State of New York, he designated Nikolay Katanov’s address home address as the address for service of process because Jonathan Katanov resided at the address.  (Id. at ¶ 5.)  However, Nikolay Katanov has never owned any shares in the company, has never been employed by the company, or been an officer, director, or agent of the company.  (Ibid.)  Naz also states that he does not know any of the other named Defendants and has never conspired with any of them to defraud Plaintiff.  (Id. at ¶ 6.)  Moreover, Naz believes that Plaintiff intended to sue and serve “Bridge View Advance, LLC” instead of “Bridgeview Advance, Inc.”  (Id. at ¶ 7.)

Defense counsel states that he has attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff via telephone several times; however, Plaintiff has not contacted him.  (Gilchrest Decl., ¶ 4.)

Defendant Katanov argues that the Court does not have general or specific personal jurisdiction over him because he “does not have the substantial, continuous, and systemic contacts with California” and has not “purposefully directed any activities towards California.”  (Motion, pp. 6-7.)

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that Defendant Katanov has not properly served Plaintiff with the moving papers.  The Proof of Service filed with the Motion indicates that Plaintiff was served with the moving papers by electronic service on October 3, 2024.  (Motion, pp. 10-11.)

Electronic service is authorized with conditions, such as express consent or court order.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1010.6; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.251(a).)  According to Rules of Court, rule 2.251, documents may be served by electronic service by express consent or, if electronic service is required by local rules or court order, then self-represented parties are to be served by non-electronic methods, unless they affirmatively consent to electronic service.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.251(b), 2.251(c)(3)(B)).  A self-represented party may expressly consent to be served by electronic service by:

(i)                 Serving a notice on all parties and filing the notice with the court.

(ii)              Manifesting affirmative consent through electronic means with the court or the court’s electronic filing service provider, and concurrently providing the party’s electronic address with that consent for the purpose of receiving electronic service. The act of electronic filing shall not be construed as express consent.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 1010.6, subd. (c).)  Here, there is no evidence that self-represented Plaintiff has consented to electronic service and no opposition has been filed.

For the reasons discussed herein, the Court CONTINUES the hearing on the Motion to Quash Service of Summons filed by Defendant Nikolay N. Katanov to ___________ at ______ a.m. in Department 45 of the Stanley Mosk Courthouse.  Defendant is ordered to properly serve Plaintiff with the moving papers at least 16 court days before the next scheduled hearing and file proof of service with the Court.  Failure to do so will result in the Motion being placed off calendar or denied.

            It is so ordered.

 

Dated: November 20, 2024

 

_______________________

MEL RED RECANA

Judge of the Superior Court