Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

RYAN PHILIP WORTHMAN,

Plaintiff,

vs.

THE LOVESAC COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 24STCV13236

DEPARTMENT 45

[TENTATIVE] RULING

Complaint Filed: 05/28/24

Trial Date: N/A

Hearing date: August 20, 2024

Moving Party: Defendant The Lovesac Company

Responding Party: Plaintiff Ryan Philip Worthman

Demurrer to Complaint

The court has considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

The hearing on the demurrer filed by Defendant The Lovesac Company is CONTINUED to Friday, September 20, 2024 at 8:30 AM in this department so that the parties can engage in sufficient meet and confer discussions. Defendant The Lovesac Company has not satisfied the meet and confer requirement pursuant to CCP § 430.41.

Background

This is an action arising from alleged harassment that Plaintiff Ryan Philip Worthman (“Plaintiff”) incurred while working for Defendant The Lovesac Company (“TLC”). On May 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants TLC and Nicole Baldwin (“Baldwin”) (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging causes of action for: (1) Hostile Work Environment Harassment; (2) Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention; and (3) Constructive Discharge in Violation of Public Policy.

On July 1, 2024, Defendant TLC filed and served the instant demurrer to the complaint. Defendant TLC demurs to the first, second, and third causes of action on the grounds that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

On July 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the demurrer to which Defendant TLC replied on July 24, 2024.

On July 31, 2024, the Court, on its own motion, continued the hearing on the demurrer from July 31, 2024 to August 20, 2024. (07/31/24 Minute Order.) Notice of the continuance was waived. (07/31/24 Minute Order.)

Legal Standard

“A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law.” (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.) “[T]he court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded.” (Ibid.) In testing the sufficiency of the complaint, the court must assume the truth of (1) the properly pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) In assessing a demurrer, a court can consider facts in exhibits attached to the complaint. (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.) Accordingly, “[w]hether the plaintiff will be able to prove the pleaded facts is irrelevant to ruling upon the demurrer.” (Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 609-10.) A general demurrer may be taken to a complaint where “[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).) Although courts construe pleadings liberally, sufficient facts must be alleged to support the allegations plead to survive a demurrer. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians' Serv. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.)

Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The burden is on the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.)

Meet and Confer

Before filing a demurrer, the moving party must meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) “Any determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(4).)

Counsel for Defendant TLC, Kelsey LaGaly (“LaGaly”), provides a declaration in support of the demurrer. Ms. LaGaly states that the parties met and conferred at least five days before Defendant TLC filed a demurrer to the complaint. (LaGaly Decl., ¶ 2.) According to counsel, “on June 13, 2024, [she] sent a letter to Plaintiff’s counsel outlining the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s Complaint. On June 19, 2024, counsel for Plaintiff responded stating that he did not believe the Complaint contains any deficiencies and that Plaintiff will neither dismiss nor amend the complaint.” (LaGaly Decl., ¶ 2.) The parties did not reach an agreement resolving the matters raised by the demurrer. (LaGaly Decl., ¶ 2.)

The Court finds that the meet and confer requirement has not been met as counsel did not meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference. This department strictly enforces the meet and confer requirement prior to ruling on a demurrer. Meeting and conferring via a letter does not satisfy the meet and confer requirement under CCP § 430.41.

Due to the insufficient meet and confer, the Court will not assess the merits of the demurrer at this time. The Court therefore CONTINUES the hearing on the demurrer to Friday, September 20, 2024 at 8:30 AM in this department. The Court orders the parties to meet and confer in compliance with CCP § 430.41. Defendant TLC is ordered to file a declaration satisfying the meet and confer requirement at least five court days before the continued hearing date.

It is so ordered.

Dated: August 20, 2024

_______________________

MEL RED RECANA

Judge of the Superior Court