Judge: Mel Red Recana, Case: 24STCV13793, Date: 2024-11-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV13793    Hearing Date: November 8, 2024    Dept: 45

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Hearing date: November 8, 2024

Moving Party: Defendant Vilma Jones

Responding Party: Plaintiff 2640 Dalton Ave 2, LLC

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

The Court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

            Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED.

Background

This is an unlawful detainer action in connection with the premises at 2640 Dalton Ave., Unit 6, Los Angeles, CA 90018 (Premises). On May 31, 2024, 2640 Dalton Ave 2, LLC, (Plaintiff) as owner of the Premises, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Vilma Jones (Defendant) and Does 1 to 10. Plaintiff alleges it served two 3-day notices to pay rent or quit to Defendant on May 13, 2024. (Complaint ¶ 9.) At the time the notices were served, the amount of rent due was $69,750. (Complaint ¶ 12.) The first notice sought $27,000 in rent for the period between May 1, 2023, to April 1, 2024 (May-April Notice). (Complaint, Exh. 2.) The second notice sought COVID-19 rental arrears of $42,750 for the periods between July 1, 2021, to September 30, 2021, and October 1, 2021, to January 31, 2023 (Covid Notice). (Complaint, Exh. 2.)

Defendant moves the Court for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that Plaintiff’s notices to pay rent or quit are both defective because they demand rent that came due more than twelve months prior to service of the notices. In opposition, Plaintiff concedes that the May-April Notice is invalid, but the Covid Notices forms a separate basis for the complaint.

Legal Standard

A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer but is made after the time for demurrer has expired. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (f).) Except as provided by statute, the rules governing demurrers apply. (Civic Partners Stockton, LLC v. Youssefi (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1012.) “Like a demurrer, the grounds for the motion [for judgment on the pleadings] must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Id. at 1013.) In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, “[a]ll allegations in the complaint and matters upon which judicial notice may be taken are assumed to be true.” (Rippon v. Bowen (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1313.) 

Code of Civil Procedure section 438 subd. (c)(1) provides a motion for judgment on the pleading may only made on one of the following grounds:  

(A) “[i]f the moving party is a plaintiff, that the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause or causes of action against the defendant and the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the complaint.  

(B) If the moving party is a defendant, that either of the following conditions exist: 

(i) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.  

(ii) The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant. 

Request for Judicial Notice

            Defendant requests that the Court takes judicial notice of the following in support of the instant motion:

1.      The Notice of Ruling filed by Defendant in the matter of Menachem Grossbaum v. [Redacted] (Case No. 24SMUD00416).

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s request for judicial notice to the extent that the document was filed with the court and is a court record, but not for the truth of the matter asserted therein. (Evid. Code § 452(d); see Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113 [“Although the existence of a document may be judicially noticeable, the truth of statements contained in the document and its proper interpretation are not subject to judicial notice if those matters are reasonably disputable.”].)

2.      The version of Los Angeles Municipal Code Section 49.99 et seq. that was in effect prior to the most recent amendments on January 27, 2023.

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s request for judicial notice to the extent that the document was filed with the Court and is a city regulation but not for the truth of the matter asserted therein. (Evid. Code § 452(c).)

3.      The Complaint for Unlawful Detainer in the matter of University Pacific Investments, LLC v. [Redacted], filed on May 18, 2022.

4.      The Complaint for Unlawful Detainer in the matter of 1721 Colby Ave., LP v. [Redacted], filed on May 27, 2022.

5.      The Complaint for Unlawful Detainer in the matter of Quaker 5, LP v. [Redacted], filed on May 17, 2024.

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s request for judicial notice to the extent that the documents were filed with the court and are court records, but not for the truth of the matter asserted therein. (Evid. Code § 452(d); see Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113.)

6.      City of Oakland Ordinance No. 13589 (March 27, 2020).

7.      City of Oakland Ordinance No. 13594 (May 19, 2020).

8.      City of Oakland Ordinance No. 13606 (July 23, 2020).

9.      City of Los Angeles Ordinance No. 187,736 (January 27, 2023).

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s request for judicial notice to the extent that the documents were filed with the court and are city regulations but not for the truth of the matter asserted therein. (Evid. Code § 452(c).)

            Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following in support of its opposition:

1.      COVID-19 Renter Protections published by the Los Angeles Housing Department, accessed at https://housing2.lacity.org/highlights/renter-protections and printed on October 16, 2024.

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice to the extent that the document was filed with the Court and constitutes an official act of the Los Angeles Housing Department but not for the truth of the matter asserted therein. (Evid. Code § 452(b).)

Meet and Confer

Per Code of Civil Procedure section 439 subd. (a), before filing a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings...” (Code Civ. Proc. § 439 subd. (a).) The moving party shall file and serve with the motion for judgment on the pleadings a declaration concerning the parties meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc. § 439 subd.(a)(3).) 

Here, Plaintiff has not provided any declaration with the motion nor any indication of a meet and confer. However, Code of Civil Procedure § 439 subd. (a)(4) provides that any determination by the Court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to grant or deny a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court will proceed to address the merits of the motion despite the insufficiency of the meet and confer.

Discussion

            Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Defendant moves the Court for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that Plaintiff’s notices to pay rent or quit are both defective because they demand rent that came due more than twelve months prior to service of the notices. In opposition, Plaintiff concedes that the May-April Notice is invalid but asserts the Covid Notice forms a separate basis for the complaint.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1161 subd. (2) a tenant of real property is guilty of unlawful detainer “[w]hen the tenant continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, without the permission of the landlord,…after default in the payment of rent, pursuant to the lease or agreement under which the property is held, and three days' notice, excluding Saturdays and Sundays and other judicial holidays.” Further, “[t]he notice may be served at any time within one year after the rent becomes due.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1161 subd. (2), see Bevill v. Zoura (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 694, 697) [“If a landlord waits over one year to sue for unpaid rent, the landlord is limited to collecting such rent in an ordinary breach of contract action, ‘with all the delays that remedy normally involves and without restitution of the demised property.’”]) This section is subject to the COVID-19 Tenant Relief Act of 2020 if the default is based on COVID-19 rental debt. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1161 subd. (2).) Under the COVID-19 Tenant Relief Act, the one-year limitation in Code of Civil Procedure section 1161 subd. (2) is tolled “during any time period that a landlord is or was prohibited by any ordinance, resolution, regulation, or administrative action adopted by a city, county, or city and county in response to the COVID-19 pandemic to protect tenants from eviction based on nonpayment of rental payments from serving a notice that demands payment of COVID-19 rental debt.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1179.05 subd. (c).)

The Los Angeles Municipal Code states that “[u]ntil January 31, 2023, no Owner shall endeavor to evict or evict a residential tenant for non-payment of rent if the tenant is unable to pay rent due to circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic.” (L.A.M.C. § 49.99.2 subd. (a).) Additionally, “[r]ental arrears accumulated between March 1, 2020, and September 30, 2021, under this subsection must be paid by August 1, 2023. Rental arrears accumulated between October 1, 2021, and January 31, 2023, under this subsection must be paid by February 1, 2024.” (L.A.M.C. § 49.99.2 subd. (a).)

Here, Defendant concedes that the May-April Notice was invalid as it sought rent due more than 12 months prior to service of the notice. It sought rent due on May 1, 2023, but was served on May 13, 2024. (Complaint, Exh. 2.) Accordingly, at issue before the Court is the validity of the Covid Notice.

Defendant argues that the Covid Notice is defective because it was served over twelve months after the rent became due. Specifically, Defendant argues that the one-year toll proscribed under the COVID-19 Tenant Relief Act does not operate to prohibit a landlord from serving the notice, only to provide an affirmative defense to tenants. (Motion, p. 6.) Therefore, Defendant argues, even if the due date was after the COVID-19 protections expired on January 31, 2023, the Covid Notice is defective.

Here, the Covid Notice was served on May 13, 2024. (Complaint ¶ 9.) It seeks $6,750 that became due on August 1, 2023, for the period between July 1, 2021, and September 30, 2021, and $36,000 which became due on February 1, 2024, for the period between October 1, 2021, and January 31, 2023. (Complaint, Exh. 2.) The dates that Plaintiff’s Covid rental arrears became due therefore fall on the dates enumerated in the Los Angeles Municipal Code. (See L.A.M.C. § 49.99.2 subd. (a).) Plaintiff therefore argues the Covid notice was timely served on May 13, 2024, which is within one year from the dates the Covid rental arrears became due.

In reply, Defendant contends that the Los Angeles Municipal Code does not govern here because state law controls when a notice to pay rent or quit may be served. State law preempts local law “if the local legislation duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication.” (Rental Housing Assn. of Northern Alameda County v. City of Oakland (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 741, 752.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1179.05 subd. (a)(2)(C) states that a local ordinance “may not permit a tenant a period of time that extends beyond August 31, 2023, to repay COVID-19 rental debt.” Therefore, because the local ordinance contradicts when Covid rental arrears become due under state law, state law preempts local law. Accordingly, the Covid Notice was not timely served.

The Court does not need to reach the question of whether landlords were prohibited from serving notices during the time of tenant protections for COVID-19 because whether or not landlords were prohibited, the Covid Notice was not timely served. Even assuming the Covid rental arrears due dates were extended from when they accumulated to the end of the Los Angeles Municipal Code prohibition period on January 31, 2023, the Covid Notice was not timely. The Covid Notice was served on May 13, 2024, which is over one year after the Los Angeles Municipal Code prohibition ended and over one year after the accumulation of the rental debt.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Covid Notice was not timely served and cannot form a valid basis for Plaintiff’s complaint. Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED.

            It is so ordered.

Dated: November 8, 2024

_______________________

MEL RED RECANA

Judge of the Superior Court