Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: 19CHCV00604, Date: 2022-10-04 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 19CHCV00604 Hearing Date: October 4, 2022 Dept: F47
Dept. F47
Date: 10/4/22
TRIAL DATE: 12/5/22
Case #19CHCV00604
MOTION IN
LIMINE #1/MOTION TO DETERMINE JURY TRIAL HAS BEEN WAIVED AND ALTERNATIVELY,
TO DETERMINE
THE PHASES OF TRIAL & FOR BIFURCATION
Motion in Limine # 1 filed 8/23/22.
Motion filed 8/26/22.
MOVING PARTY: Defendants Melvin James Burrell, Regal Services
Group and Capital Executive Realty, Inc.
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Andrew Dow
RELIEF REQUESTED: An order
determining that the case proceed as a bench trial on the grounds that
Plaintiff waived his right to a jury trial pursuant to CCP 631(f)(5) and if
not, to determine the phases of the trial including the equitable causes of action which are for
the court to decide: 3rd cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty and 5th cause of action for unfair business practices pursuant
to Business and Professions Code 17200 and 17203, et al. as well as alter ego
liability.
RULING: The request to determine the case proceed
as a bench trial on the ground that Plaintiff waived his right to jury trial is
denied. The alternative request for
bifurcation/determination of the phases of trial is granted as set forth
below.
This is a real estate disclosure case. Plaintiff Andrew Dow (Plaintiff) is the
purchaser and defendants are the real estate broker/agent and related
businesses. The operative First Amended
Complaint contains causes of action for: (1) Breach of Written Agreement, (2)
Negligence – Breach of Non-Fiduciary Duties, (3) Breach of Fiduciary Duties by
Escrow Company, (4) Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Concealment and (5) Unfair
and Deceptive Business Practices (Business & Professions Code 17200,
17203).
On 8/23/22, Defendants Melvin James Burrell, Regal
Services Group and Capital Executive Realty, Inc. (Defendants) filed their
Motion in Limine #1 which seeks an order determining that the case proceed as a
bench trial on the grounds that Plaintiff waived his right to a jury trial
pursuant to CCP 631(f)(5) and if not, to determine the phases of the trial including
the equitable causes of action which are for the court to decide: 3rd
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and 5th cause of action
for unfair business practices pursuant to Business and Professions Code 17200
and 17203, et al. as well as alter ego liability. On 8/26/22, Defendants filed a regularly
noticed Motion to Determine That Jury Has Been Waived and Alternatively to
Determine the Phases of Trial and for Bifurcation (Motion). Defendants concede that the two motions are
identical. (See Motion in Limine
# 7, p.7:18-21; Motion, p.7:19-22). On
9/16/22, the Court set the hearings on the identical motions for 10/4/22. (See 9/16/22 Minute Order). Plaintiff has opposed the motion.
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s argument that the
motions must be denied because they were not timely served is moot due to the
fact that the motions have now been specially set by the Court and Plaintiff
has opposed the motions on the merits.
Additionally, the Court has considered the arguments made by Plaintiff
and Defendants the two oppositions and the two replies filed in relation to the
motion(s).
CCP 631(f)(5) provides that “[a] party waives trial by
jury…[b]y failing to timely pay the fee described in subdivision (b), unless
another party on the same side of the case has paid that fee.” CCP 631(b) provides:
At least one party demanding a jury
on each side of a civil case shall pay a nonrefundable fee of one hundred
fifty dollars ($150), unless the fee has been paid by another party on the same
side of the case. The fee shall offset the
costs to the state of providing juries in civil cases. If there are more than two parties to the
case, for purposes of this section only, all plaintiffs shall be considered one
side of the case, and all other parties shall be considered the other side of
the case. Payment of the fee by a party
on one side of the case shall not relieve parties on the other side of the case from waiver pursuant to
subdivision (f).
CCP 631(c) provides in relevant part that “[t]he fee
described in subdivision (b) shall be due on or before the date scheduled for
the initial case management conference in the action… .”
Here, the initial case management conference took place
on 12/23/19. (See 12/23/19 Minute
Order). Plaintiff did not post jury fees
until 11/25/20. (See Labrum Decl.
¶2, Ex.A attached to Opposition filed on 9/6/22). Therefore, pursuant to CCP 631(f)(5), Plaintiff
waived his right to a jury trial.
However, case law provides that if a party waives its right to a jury
trial by failing to timely post jury fees, it is an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to deny relief from such waiver where the opposing party fails to
show prejudice from granting relief. See
Mackovska (2019) 40 CA5th 1, 9-10; Boal (1985) 165 CA3d 806, 809;
Gann (1991) 231 CA3d 1698, 1703; Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowners
Association (2011) 200 CA4th 619, 638.
Based on the facts that Plaintiff has since posted jury
fees and Defendants have failed to show that they would suffer prejudice from
granting Plaintiff relief from the waiver of the right to a jury trial, the
request for an order determining that Plaintiff has waived his right to a jury
trial and that the case proceed as a bench trial is denied.
Defendants’ alternative request for bifurcation is not
clearly set forth in the notices of the motions. See CRC 3.1110(a). In the notices of the motions, Defendants
state that if the Court does not find that Plaintiff has waived his right to a
jury trial, that the court “determine the phases of the trial including of the
equitable causes of action, third cause of action for breach of duties and fifth
cause of action for Unfair Business Practices pursuant to Business and
Professions Code section 17200 and 17203 et al. as well as alter ego
allegations of liability, which are for the court to decide from remaining
causes of action for breach of contract, negligence and fraud, which are for
the jury to decide[.]” (See
Motion in Limine, p.ii:2-7; Motion, p.ii:3-8).
In the memorandums of points and authorities, Defendants
set forth different alternatives for how the trial of the case can be
bifurcated. Specifically, Defendants
state:
(See Motion in Limine #1,
p.2:16-p.3:3; Motion, p.2:19-p.3:2).
In a footnote, Defendants go on to state:
As the escrow fees paid by
plaintiff have been tendered with interest at the legal rate and there are very
limited issues relating to the escrow company, the equitable causes of action
should be a short cause trial and therefore should go first. Having the
equitable trial go first would also likely moot most or all of the motions in
limine. There is also the possibility the matter will settle or plaintiff will
waive jury after the equitable causes of action are tried to the court.
(See Motion in Limine #1,
p.2 fn.1; Motion, p.2 fn.1).
Having not mentioned it in the notices of motion,
Defendants also argue at the end of their memorandums, without citing any
supporting authority, that the Court should also order that the punitive damage
phase of the trial be bifurcated from the liability phases. (See Motion in Limine #1, p.8:13-19;
Motion, p.8:14-20).
The only argument Plaintiff offers in response to the
request for bifurcation is that it is improper pursuant to Los Angeles Superior
Court, Local Rule 3.57(c) which provides:
A motion in limine may not
be used for the purpose of seeking an order to try an issue before the trial of
another issue or issues. That motion may
only be made in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 598.
However, Local Rule 3.25(f)(2) provides:
In a direct calendar case, the
parties must file and serve any trial preparation motions and dispositive
motions, other than summary judgment motions, including motions in limine or
bifurcation motion, with timely statutory notice so as to be heard on the day
of the final status conference. Unless the court orders otherwise, lead trial
counsel must attend the final status conference. At this conference, the court
will also consider, inter alia, major evidentiary issues and special
verdict issues.
Based on the continuance of the trial date and the
specially setting of the instant motion two months before the current 12/5/22
trial date, the Court finds Plaintiff’s argument to be without merit.
Based on the foregoing, the Court will try the equitable
claims of breach of fiduciary duty and unfair business practices first. The jury trial of the statute of limitations
defense as to the breach of contract and negligence claims will then
proceed. (See 4/7/22 Minute
Order). Then, the jury trial as to the
fraud cause of action will proceed as will the jury trial as to the breach of
contract and negligence causes of action if they are not found to be time-barred. Finally, if necessary, the Court will
determine the equitable issue of alter ego liability.