Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: 20STCV09803, Date: 2022-10-05 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 20STCV09803 Hearing Date: October 5, 2022 Dept: F47
Dept. F47
Date: 10/5/22
TRIAL DATE: 1/30/23
Case #20STCV09803
MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS
Motion filed on 6/2/22.
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Jaime Garrido; Nilda Garrido;
Mavinelle Garrido and Audrey Deguzman, a minor by and through her guardian ad
litem Mavinelle Garrido
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Lilian Yamileth Ramirez
NOTICE: ok
RULING: The motion is denied in its entirety as is
Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions.
This action arises out of a motor vehicle collision that
occurred on 1/31/19 on the southbound Antelope Valley Freeway State Route
14. The vehicle driven by Defendant
Lilian Yamileth Ramirez (Defendant) struck the vehicle occupied by Plaintiffs
Jaime Garrido, Nilda Garrido, Mavinelle Garrido and Audrey DeGuzman
(Plaintiffs) while their vehicle was stopped near the center median after Plaintiffs’
vehicle had collided with the center divider.
The traffic collision report attributes fault for the collision between
Plaintiffs’ and Defendant’s vehicles to Defendant because she was traveling at
an unreasonable speed for conditions with insufficient tire tread depth. Plaintiffs allege they were injured as a
result of the collision and filed this action to recover their damages. Defendant answered the complaint and filed a
cross-complaint for apportionment of fault, declaratory relief and
indemnification against Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Jaime Garrido and Roes 1-50.
On 6/2/22,
Plaintiffs filed and served the instant motion seeking an order granting
terminating sanctions. In the
alternative, Plaintiffs move for issue or evidentiary sanctions under CCP
2023.030 against Defendant Lilian Yamileth Ramirez. Additionally, Plaintiffs request monetary
sanctions in the amount of $7,061.65 against Defendant and/or her attorneys of
record, Ford, Walker, Haggerty & Behar, for reasonable costs and attorney’s
fees incurred by Plaintiffs for bringing this motion. Defendant has opposed the motion and
requested sanction in the amount of $6,120.00
against Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ counsel for costs and fees incurred
in opposing the motion.
Plaintiffs state that the motion is based on the
following grounds:
(1) Plaintiffs sent a timely preservation of evidence
letter for Defendant’s vehicle;
(2) Plaintiffs sent multiple discovery requests asking
Defendant about her tire tread depth and who had possession of her vehicle;
(3) Defendant was uncooperative in responding to
discovery and provided objection only responses to both Supplemental Interrogatories
and Requests for Admission;
(4) By the time Defendant finally responded to
Plaintiffs’ discovery requests with verified responses, seven months later,
Defendant revealed that she sold her vehicle to a junk yard one day before
providing her objection only responses to Plaintiffs’ discovery. Plaintiffs
have since been unable to locate Defendant’s vehicle;
(5) Plaintiffs were forced to file motions to compel for
multiple discovery requests as Defendant never responded to multiple efforts to
meet and confer;
(6) Defendant is in violation of this Court’s order to
provide full and complete responses without objection to Form Interrogatory,
Set Four;
(7) Plaintiffs’ rights at trial have been prejudiced
because Plaintiffs are now unable to physically show the jury how bald
Defendant’s tires actually were on the day of the incident, severely
diminishing Plaintiffs’ ability to prove the issue of causation at trial.
Physically showing the jury the inadequate tread depth of Defendant’s tires in
person is significantly more persuasive than any witness testimony, expert testimony,
or photo; and
(8) Defendant’s failure to preserve evidence, intentional
destruction of evidence, and intentional delay in responding to Plaintiffs’
multiple discovery requests all while knowing she had sold her vehicle thus
preventing Plaintiffs from being able to obtain Defendant’s tires to show the
jury, constitutes a significant violation and misuse of the discovery process
(See Notice of Motion, unnumbered p.2:9-p.3:6).
Spoliation of evidence is “the destruction or significant
alteration of evidence or the failure to preserve evidence for another’s use in
pending or future litigation. Williams
(2008) 167 CA4th 1215, 1223. A party
moving for discovery sanctions based on the spoliation of evidence must make an
initial prima facie showing that the responding party in fact destroyed
evidence that had a substantial probability of damaging the moving party’s
ability to establish an essential element of his claim. Id. at 1227. Once the moving party meets this initial burden,
the burden shifts to the responding party to prove the failure to preserve the
evidence did not damage the moving party.
Id. Willfulness is no longer a requirement for the imposition of discovery
sanctions. See Reedy (2007) 148 CA4th 1272, 1291.
On 4/16/19, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent Defendant’s insurer
a letter requesting that “a hold be placed on this vehicle for evidence
purposes” and further demanding that the salvage process not begin on the
vehicle until further notice. (See
Khoshnou Decl. ¶4, Ex.D). The letter
goes on to request the location of the vehicle so that Plaintiffs could set a
date and time for an inspection. Id. On 8/15/21, Defendant sold her vehicle to a
junk yard. (Id. at ¶17, Ex.N).
Plaintiffs argue that “[i]f Defendant would have provided
full and complete responses to discovery, Plaintiffs would have been able to
obtain Defendant’s vehicle and preserve Defendant’s tire or tires to display to
the jury at trial.” (See Motion,
p.1:26-28) p.2:3).
Plaintiffs go on to
argue that Defendant has deprived Plaintiffs of the opportunity to
physically show the jury just how bald Defendant’s tires were, significantly
weakening Plaintiffs’ evidence on the issues of causation and liability.” (Id. at p.1:28-p.2:2).
As mentioned above, although willfulness is no longer a
requirement for the imposition of discovery sanctions, Plaintiffs argue that
Defendant’s conduct is tantamount to willful destruction of evidence of the
vehicle’s bald tires because Defendant: (1) knew there was outstanding
discovery that requested information on who had possession of Defendant’s
vehicle and Requests for Admission that the tires were bald, (2) sold her
vehicle to a junk yard the day before providing objection only responses and
(3) delayed substantively responding to discovery for seven months which
Plaintiffs’ claim prevented them from obtaining Defendant’s bald tires to use
as evidence. Both Plaintiffs and
Defendant have made efforts to try to recover the vehicle which have proved
unsuccessful. (See Koshnou Decl.
¶¶30-33; Parseghian Decl. ¶9).
However, in the motion Plaintiffs fail to mention that on
2/8/21, their counsel and expert, Kenneth A. Solomon, B.L.S., B.S., M.S.,
P.H.D., P.E., Post P.H.D., from the Institute of Risk & Safety Analyses
were present for the vehicle inspection, which lasted approximately 3 hours,
and included photographs and 3-dimensional scanning. (See Parseghian Decl. ¶¶5-7, Ex.B). In the reply, Plaintiffs do not dispute that
during the inspection, Plaintiffs’ expert conducted a detailed examination of
the tires on Defendant’s vehicle. Id. Plaintiffs also do not dispute that during
the inspection they did not request that the tires be preserved for trial purposes. Id.
Additionally, at Defendant’s deposition, Defendant provided Plaintiffs
with 23 color photographs of the vehicle, including the tires. (Parseghian Decl. ¶8, Ex.C pp. 19:14-20:16;
22:20-23:8; 78:7-13; 94:10-15; 110:9-111:15 and exhibits thereto). Further, Plaintiffs have the deposition
testimony of the officer at the scene of the accident who testified that he saw
that Defendant’s tire was bald and that Defendant told him that her tire was
bald. (Koshnou Decl. ¶2, Ex.B).
Based on the foregoing, the Court does not find that
Defendant’s selling the vehicle to a junkyard more than 2 ½ years after the
collision occurred and approximately 6 months after Plaintiffs’ inspection of
the vehicle substantially damaged Plaintiffs’ ability to establish an essential
element of their claim. See Williams,
supra at 1227. Further, the Court
does not find that Defendant’s conduct warrants the imposition of the terminating,
issue, evidentiary and/or monetary sanctions requested by Plaintiffs. The Court finds that a jury instruction
regarding the inference that may be drawn, if the jury finds that Defendant
willfully destroyed the evidence in order to prevent its being presented in the
trial is sufficient to address the issue.
See Cedars-Sinai Medical Center 18 C4th 1, 12; BAJI 2.03;
CACI 204; Evidence Code 413. Similarly,
the Court does not find that Plaintiffs’ filing of the instant motion
constitutes a misuse of the discovery process under CCP 2023.010(c) warranting
the imposition of monetary sanctions. As
such, Defendant’s request for sanctions is also denied.