Judge Melvin D. Sandvig, Case 20STCV29179 2022-12-21 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: 20STCV29179, Date: 2022-12-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV29179 Hearing Date: December 21, 2022 Dept: F47

Dept. F47

Date: 12/21/22

Case #20STCV29179

SUMMARY JUDGMENT/SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

Motion filed on 8/19/22.

MOVING PARTY: Defendant County of Los Angeles

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Brittany Domenick

NOTICE: ok

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication in favor of Defendant County of Los Angeles and against Plaintiff Brittany Domenick.

RULING: The unopposed request for summary judgment is granted.

This action arises out of an incident that occurred on 6/22/20 at approximately 8:50 p.m. on San Francisquito Canyon Road in Santa Clarita, California. While on horseback and trying to cross San Francisquito Canyon Road, Plaintiff Brittany Domenick (Plaintiff) was struck by a vehicle driven by Defendant Frank M. Loya, who has already settled with Plaintiff. Plaintiff has sued Defendant County of Los Angeles (the County) claiming that there was a dangerous condition on San Francisquito Road (public property) (5^th cause of action) of which the County failed to warn (6^th cause of action).

On 8/19/22, the County filed and served the instant motion seeking an order granting summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication in favor of the County and against Plaintiff. On 12/13/22, Plaintiff filed and served a Statement of Non-Opposition to the County’s motion.

The Legislature has defined a dangerous condition of public property as a condition of property that creates a substantial, as opposed to a minor, trivial or insignificant, risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used. See Government Code 830(a), (b); Thimon (2020) 44 CA5th 745, 754-755; Sambrano (2001) 94 CA4th 225, 239. A government entity has a duty to protect the public against such dangerous conditions by repairing, remedying or correcting them, providing safeguards against them, or warning of them. See Government Code 830(b); Thimon, supra; Sambrano, supra. A plaintiff has the burden of proving that the condition is one which creates a hazard to persons who foreseeably use the property with due care. Biscotti (2007) 158 CA4th 554, 555; Sambrano, supra at 239.

As noted above, Plaintiff has not opposed the motion which presents evidence that there were no similar collisions within seven and a half years of the collision which is the subject of this action. (See Separate Statement (SS) 10-11, 14-17, 19-20). As such, Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of establishing that the condition is one which creates a hazard to persons who foreseeably use the property with due care.

Even if a dangerous condition exists on public property, a public entity is not liable for injuries caused by it unless the public entity was negligent. Martinez (2021) 71 CA5th 508, 518. The unrefuted evidence shows that the County was not negligent. First, the County had installed a nearby designated equestrian crossing with painted pavement markings and road signs to mark the crossing to motorists 0.2 miles north of Rosewood Equestrian, which Plaintiff could have used on 6/22/20 to cross San Francisquito Canyon Road. (SS 6). Second, the County’s 5/29/20 inspection, prior to Plaintiff’s collision, and Plaintiff’s deposition testimony show that there was no overgrown vegetation, debris, or obstruction on the shoulders of San Francisquito Canyon Road, which would have prevented Plaintiff from accessing the crossing. (SS 7, 13). Third, the County performed monthly inspections since at least August 2016 and through June 2020 of the area which did not show any condition impacting safety or traffic. (SS 12-16, 20-21). Fourth, the evidence shows that the County appropriately handled Defendant Timothy Curcio’s 3/13/19 email which requested the installation of a painted crosswalk with delineation devices across San Francisquito Road at his equestrian boarding facility. (SS 17). The evidence shows that the County immediately responded to Mr. Curcio and acknowledged receipt of his email. (SS 17-18). The County redirected Mr. Curcio’s email to its Department of Public Works Traffic and Safety Management unit, which is responsible for handling such complaints and requests, and initiated an investigation on 3/20/19. (SS 19). Thereafter, the County continued its monthly inspections of San Francisquito Canyon Road, which did not reveal any safety or traffic issue. (SS 12-13). The County also conducted a speed test on 8/29/19, which showed that vehicles on San Francisquito Canyon Road were not traveling at excessive speeds, but were within 1.4 miles per hour of the speed limit. (SS 20). Fifth, at no time prior to Plaintiff’s collision did the County receive any complaint about an equestrian crossing on San Francisquito Canyon Road other than Mr. Curcio’s March 2019 email. (SS 19).

Even if a dangerous condition was established, the County may not be liable based on statutory immunity. See Rodriguez (2018) 21 CA5th 947, 954; Hampton (2015) 62 C4th 340, 348. Government Code 830.4 provides that “[a] condition is not a dangerous condition…merely because of the failure to provide regulatory traffic control signals, stop signs, yield right-of-way signs, or speed restriction signs, as described by the Vehicle Code, or distinctive roadway markings as described in Section 21460 of the Vehicle Code.” As such, a public entity cannot be held liable for creating a dangerous condition merely because it did not install traffic control devices. See Brenner (2003) 113 CA4th 434, 439; Allyson (1997) 53 CA4th 1304, 1320-1322; Mixon (2012) 207 CA4th 124, 135, 140; Cerna (2008) 161 CA4th 1340, 1352.

As noted above, the evidence shows that: (1) There had been no motor vehicle versus equestrian collisions prior to Plaintiff’s collision (SS 10-11); (2) Motor vehicles were traveling below or within two miles per hour of the speed limit (SS 15-16, 20); (3) Plaintiff had the option of using a nearby designated equestrian crossing 0.2 miles away to cross San Francisquito Canyon Road, but voluntarily chose not to (SS 7-8); (4) When Plaintiff elected to cross where there was no designated crossing, Plaintiff was aware that vehicles would be traveling at 55 miles per hour (SS 5). Based on the foregoing, the lack of an equestrian crossing or horse crossing signs does constitute a dangerous condition.

Finally, the County cannot be held liable for injuries caused solely by third parties. See City of San Diego (2006) 137 CA4th 21, 29; Mixon, supra at 131, 136; Thimon, supra at 754. Here, the evidence shows that Plaintiff collided with Defendant Loya, who has already settled with Plaintiff. (SS 4, 9; Yap Decl., Ex.A).