Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: 21STCV02112, Date: 2024-10-29 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 21STCV02112 Hearing Date: October 29, 2024 Dept: F47
Dept. F47
Date: 10/28/24
TRIAL DATE: 3/24/25
Case #21STCV02112
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT/SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
Motion filed on 6/17/24.
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Lear Corporation
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Susan
Gunaian and Ararat Issayan
NOTICE: ok
Issue 1:
Plaintiffs cannot establish a defect in design/manufacture existed and/or
caused the subject collision and/or Plaintiffs’ claimed damages to occur.
Issue 2:
Plaintiffs cannot establish negligence on the part of Lear that caused the
subject collision and/or Plaintiffs’ claimed damages to occur.
Issue 3:
Plaintiffs cannot establish a failure to warn on the part of Lear that caused
the subject collision and/or Plaintiffs’ claimed damages to occur.
RULING: The request for summary judgment is
granted.
SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action arises out of a motor vehicle accident that
occurred on 10/11/19 when the 2018 Chevrolet Equinox driven by Plaintiff Susan
Gunaian (Gunaian) was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Defendant Alma
Hernandez-Sanchez on the I-5 Freeway in Los Angeles, California. (Complaint ¶¶3, 10, 20; Separate Statement
(SS) 2). Plaintiff Aarat Issayan
(Issayan) is Gunaian’s spouse and asserts a claim for loss of consortium. (Complaint ¶14). Plaintiffs allege that Gunaian suffered
catastrophic and permanently disabling injuries as a result of the accident. (Id. at ¶12).
On 1/19/21, Plaintiffs filed this action against General
Motors LLC (General Motors); Allen Gwynn Chevrolet, Inc.; Hernandez-Sanchez and
Does 1-100 for: (1) Strict Products Liability and (2) Negligence. On 8/29/22, Plaintiffs filed an Amendment to
Complaint naming Lear Corporation (Lear) in place of Doe 1. Plaintiffs’ claims are based on design
defect, manufacturing defect and failure to warn. (SS 3).
On 6/17/24, Lear filed the instant motion seeking an order
granting summary judgment in favor of Lear and against Gunaian and Issayan
(collectively, Plaintiffs).
Alternatively, Lear moves for summary adjudication of the following
issues:
Issue 1: Plaintiffs cannot establish a defect in
design/manufacture existed and/or caused the subject collision and/or
Plaintiffs’ claimed damages to occur.
Issue 2: Plaintiffs cannot establish negligence on
the part of Lear that caused the subject collision and/or Plaintiffs’ claimed
damages to occur.
Issue 3: Plaintiffs cannot establish a failure to
warn on the part of Lear that caused the subject collision and/or Plaintiffs’
claimed damages to occur.
Plaintiffs have not opposed or otherwise responded to the
motion.
ANALYSIS
A defendant may move for summary judgment/summary
adjudication if it is contended that the cause of action has not merit. See CCP 437c(a)(1); CCP 437c(f)(1). A defendant has met its burden of showing
that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more
elements of the cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a
complete defense to the cause of action.
See CCP 437c(o), (p)(2).
Once the defendant has met its initial burden, the burden shift to the
plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause
of action or a defense thereto. CCP
437c(p)(2).
1st cause of action – Strict Products
Liability
Strict products liability may be imposed for: (1)
manufacturing defects, (2) design defects and (3) warning defects. See Daly (1978) 20 C3d 725, 733
citing Anderson (1991) 53 C3d 987, 995.
In order to be held liable under a strict products liability theory, the
plaintiff’s injury must have been caused by a defect in the defendant’s
product. Daly, supra; See
also Taylor (2009) 171 CA4th 564, 576-577; Sindell (1980) 26
C3d 588, 597-598.
A manufacturer’s liability is limited to the risks
created by an actual defect in its own product.
O’Neil (2012) 54 C4th 335, 347-348. A manufacturer of a component part is not
liable when another manufacturer’s product used in conjunction with its product
is the alleged cause of injury. Id.
at 362.
Plaintiffs’ discovery responses establish that they are
claiming the Equinox had defects in:
(1) the occupant restraint system and
(2) the seat occupied by Gunaian. (SS
5-8). Plaintiffs further contend that
Lear supplied the purportedly defective occupant restraint system and the
seat. (SS 11-12). However, the unrefuted evidence establishes
that Lear had no involvement with the occupant restraint system (seat belt and air
bag systems) or the driver’s seat itself.
The Equinox was made by General Motors and the seat was made by a defendant
other than Lear. Lear only manufactured
tracks for the front seats of the Equinox pursuant to General Motors’ design
and specifications. (SS 13-16).
A product has a manufacturing defect if it differs from
the manufacturer’s intended result or from other identical units of the same
product line – i.e., a product is defective if it does not conform to the
manufacture’s design. See Garrett
(2013) 214 CA4th 173, 190.
Plaintiffs have not alleged any defect in the design or
manufacture of the seat tracks and there is no evidence of any such
defects. The design and specifications
for the seat tracks were provided to Lear by General Motors and Lear was
obligated to manufacture the tracks according to General Motors’ design and
specifications. As the completed product
manufacturer, General Motors, not Lear, incorporated the seat tracks into the
Equinox. (SS 15-16). Further, an inspection of the Equinox after
the accident confirmed that the seat tracks conformed to the General Motors’
design and did not have any defect. (SS
17).
A manufacturer does not have a duty to warn of hazards
arising solely from other manufacturer’s products. O’Neil, supra at 351. Here, there is no evidence of any hazard
inherent in the seat tracks which caused Gunaian’s injury and/or required a
warning.
The evidence further shows that after the accident the
seat tracks were fully secured to the floor of the vehicle and in their
intended positions such that there was no failure of the seat tracks. (SS 14).
As such, there is no evidence that the seat tracks caused or contributed
to Gunaian’s injury.
2nd cause of action – Negligence
Plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action incorporates all
of the prior allegations. (SS 4). As noted above, Plaintiffs do not allege the
seat tracks were defective and the evidence does not support such a finding. (SS 11-12, 14-17). There is also no evidence that the seat
tracks caused Gunaian’s injury. (SS
14). The negligence claim fails for the
same reasons the strict liability claim fails.
See Lambert (1998) 67 CA4th 1179, 1185.
CONCLUSION
The request for summary judgment is granted.