Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: 22CHCV00151, Date: 2023-05-11 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 22CHCV00151 Hearing Date: May 11, 2023 Dept: F47
Dept. F47
Date: 5/11/23
TRIAL DATE: 8/7/23
Case #22CHCV00151
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT/SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
Motion filed on 12/16/22.
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Shauntel Anderson
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Lenore
M. Eastabrook and Lukus Eichmann individually, and Lukus Eichmann as
co-trustees of the Lenore M. Eastabrook Intervivos Trust Agreement, dated
January 26, 1993
NOTICE: ok
RELIEF REQUESTED: An order
granting summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication against
Plaintiffs Lenore M. Eastabrook, individually, and Lukus Eichmann as
co-trustees of the Lenore M. Eastabrook Intervivos Trust Agreement, dated
January 26, 1993.
RULING: The motion is denied.
SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action arises out of dispute regarding the ownership
of real property located at 24812 Horseshoe Lane, Newhall, California 91321
(the Property). Plaintiff Lenore M.
Eastabrook (Plaintiff), who is currently 95-years old, is the grandmother of
Ede Eichmann Anderson (Ede). Plaintiff
alleges that in or around April 2019, she, Ede and Ede’s wife, Defendant
Shauntel Anderson (Defendant) had a discussion wherein it was agreed that
Plaintiff would sell her home and invest the proceeds in the purchase of
another home (the Property) with Ede and Defendant wherein Plaintiff would live
with and be taken care of by Ede and Defendant for the rest of Plaintiff’s
life. Plaintiff contends that she was
never informed that she would not have an ownership interest in the
Property.
Thereafter, on or around 5/7/19, escrow closed on the
Property with Ede and Defendant taking title as wife and wife, as community
property. Plaintiff, Ede and Defendant
all moved into the Property. Plaintiff
alleges that she became aware that she was not on title and asked Ede and
Defendant for the “receipt” of her ownership interest in the Property. Plaintiff alleges that although Ede and
Defendant told her not to worry about it and they would take care of it, they
never did. Soon thereafter, Ede was
diagnosed with cancer and died on 5/2/20.
As a result, ownership of the Property transferred solely to
Defendant.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant ignored her repeated
requests to give Plaintiff what Plaintiff claims is her rightful ownership
interest in the Property, the relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant
became strained resulting in Plaintiff moving out of the Property. Defendant claims that Plaintiff gifted the
funds for the purchase of the Property to her and Ede as evidenced by the Gift
Letter signed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff
contends that there was nothing on what is now claimed to be the “Gift Letter”
when she signed it, that it was altered and her initials were forged.
On 3/8/22, Plaintiffs Lenore M. Eastabrook and Lukus
Eichmann individually, and Lukus Eichmann as co-trustees of the Lenore M.
Eastabrook Intervivos Trust Agreement, dated January 26, 1993 filed this action
against Defendant and all persons known or unknown, claiming any legal or
equitable right, title, estate, lien or interest in the property described in
the complaint adverse to plaintiff’s interests, or any cloud on plaintiff’s
interests thereto for: (1) Declaratory
Relief, (2) Quiet Title, (3) Fraud (Civil Code 1710), (4) Financial Elder Abuse
(Welfare & Institutions Code 15610.30), (5) Fraudulent Inducement and Undue
Influence (Probate Code 21380), (6) Double Damages (Probate Code 859) and (7)
Costs and Attorney’s Fees (Probate Code 859).
On 12/16/22, Defendant filed the instant motion seeking
an order granting summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication
against Plaintiffs Lenore M. Eastabrook, individually, and Lukus Eichmann as
co-trustees of the Lenore M. Eastabrook Intervivos Trust Agreement, dated
January 26, 1993. Plaintiffs have
opposed the motion and Defendant has filed a reply to the opposition.
ANALYSIS
Procedural Defects
Defendant’s alternative request for summary adjudication
is procedurally defective. CRC 3.1350(b)
provides:
“If made in the alternative, a
motion for summary adjudication may make reference to and depend on the same
evidence submitted in support of the summary judgment motion. If summary
adjudication is sought, whether separately or as an alternative to the motion
for summary judgment, the specific cause of action, affirmative defense,
claims for damages, or issues of duty must be stated specifically in the notice
of motion and be repeated, verbatim, in the separate statement of undisputed
material facts.” (emphasis added)
Here, the notice of motion does not set forth alternative
issues for adjudication. Rather, the
notice indicates that “Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”
for 5 reasons. (See Notice of
Motion, p.ii:5-16). The Separate
Statement filed in support of the motion then sets forth 7 issues to be
adjudicated. (See Defendant’s
Separate Statement, p.2:7-10, p.9:1-4, p.10:23-26, p.11:8-12, p.11:21-25, p.12:7-10,
p.12:19-22). As such, even if the 5
reasons set forth in the notice could be considered alternative issues for
summary adjudication, they are not repeated “verbatim” in the separate
statement through the 7 issues set forth therein.
Further confusing matters, in the memorandum of points
and authorities in support of the motion, Defendant claims that she is
“entitled to summary judgment, or summary adjudication of issues,” but then
concludes the same paragraph by stating
that “Defendant is entitled to, and respectfully requests, summary
judgment.” (See Motion,
p.2:3-10). Defendant then sets forth the
standard for summary judgment, without mentioning the alternative request for
summary adjudication. (See
Motion, p.4:25-p.5:23).
Based on the foregoing, the alternative request for
summary adjudication is denied.
Therefore, if one triable issue of material fact exists, the entire
motion must be denied. See CRC
3.1350(a)(2); 24 Hour Fitness, Inc. (1998) 66 CA4th 1199, 1215; Versa
Technologies, Inc. (1978) 78 CA3d 237, 240.
Defendant has also failed to bookmark the exhibits
attached to the “Compendium of Exhibits” filed in support of the motion. See CRC 3.1110(f)(4); (5/3/19 First
Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil).
Evidentiary Objections
Defendant’s objections (numbers 1-10) to the declaration
of Lenore M. Eastabrook are overruled.
It cannot be determined that the statements in the Eastabrook
declaration necessarily contradict her prior deposition testimony.
Defendant’s objections (numbers 11-15) to the declaration
of Lukus Eichmann are overruled.
Defendant’s objections (numbers 16-17) to the declaration
of Brian D. Walters are sustained.
However, a copy of portions of the official transcript of Defendant’s
deposition are attached as Ex.A to the declaration of Brian D. Walters filed on
5/8/23, along with copies of portions of the official transcript of Plaintiff’s
deposition attached as Ex.B.
Triable Issues of Material Fact
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the moving
party’s evidence must be strictly construed with any doubts or ambiguities
resolved in favor of the responding party.
See D’Amico (1974) 11 C3d 1, 21; Binder (1999) 75
CA4th 832, 839; Aguilar (2001) 25 C4th 826, 843; Johnson (2008)
43 C4th 56, 64; Schachter (2009) 47 C4th 610, 618; Ragland (2012)
209 CA4th 182, 199.
Triable issues of material fact exist as to whether
Plaintiff intended her contribution to the purchase of the Property was
intended to be a gift to Defendant and Ede or whether Ede along with Defendant
defrauded Plaintiff into believing that she would have an ownership interest in
the Property. (See Plaintiff’s
Additional Facts (PAF) 23). A triable
issue of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff was aware that she was
signing a “Gift Letter” regarding her contribution and/or whether Plaintiff was
aware of and/or authorized changes to such letter. (PAF 15, 22-24; Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants
Facts (PRDF) 19). Similarly, a triable
issue of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff was aware that escrow was
closing on the Property without her having any interest therein. (PAF 17-21;
PRDF 30).
A triable issue of material fact also exists with regard
to Defendant’s involvement and knowledge of any plan to defraud Plaintiff into
believing that she would have an ownership interest in the Property based on
her monetary contribution for the purchase of same. (PRDF 17; PAF 2, 8).
A triable issue also exists with regard to any purported
gift given to Defendant. Probate Code
21380 provides, in relevant part:
“(a) A provision of an instrument
making a donative transfer to any of the following persons is presumed to be
the product of fraud or undue influence:
(1) The person who drafted the
instrument.
(2) A person who transcribed the
instrument or caused it to be transcribed and who was in a fiduciary
relationship with the transferor when the instrument was transcribed.
(3) A care custodian of a
transferor who is a dependent adult, but only if the instrument was executed
during the period in which the care custodian provided services to the
transferor, or within 90 days before or after that period.
(4) A care
custodian who commenced a marriage, cohabitation, or domestic partnership with
a transferor who is a dependent adult while providing services to that
dependent adult, or within 90 days after those services were last provided to
the dependent adult, if the donative transfer occurred, or the instrument was
executed, less than six months after the marriage, cohabitation, or domestic
partnership commenced.
(5) A
person who is related by blood or affinity, within the third degree, to any
person described in paragraphs (1) to (3), inclusive.
(6) A
cohabitant or employee of any person described in paragraphs (1) to (3),
inclusive.”
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant and Ede “drafted or
caused to be drafted the Grant Deed and transaction documents related to the
acquisition of the Property, which acted to defraud Plaintiffs of their
rightful interest in the Property.”
(Complaint ¶64). Defendant has
failed to establish that Probate Code
21382 provides a complete defense to the claim against Defendant because Ede
was Plaintiff’s granddaughter and Plaintiff “cohabitated” with both Ede and
Defendant at the time. See Probate
Code 21382(a). A “cohabitant” means “two
unrelated adult persons living together for a substantial period of time,
resulting in some permanency of relationship. Factors that may determine
whether persons are cohabiting include, but are not limited to, (1) sexual
relations between the parties while sharing the same living quarters, (2)
sharing of income or expenses, (3) joint use or ownership of property, (4)
whether the parties hold themselves out as spouses,
(5) the continuity of the relationship, and (6) the length of the relationship.” See Penal Code 13700(b); Probate Code
21364. A triable issue exists as to
whether Plaintiff and Defendant qualified as cohabitants.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the motion is denied in its
entirety.