Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: 22CHCV00235, Date: 2024-03-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22CHCV00235 Hearing Date: March 6, 2024 Dept: F47
Dept. F47
Date: 3/6/24
Case #22CHCV00235
MOTION TO
ENFORCE SETTLEMENT
Motion filed on 2/6/24.
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Hazelliz
Calove and Helen Hernandez Salvador, Trustees of the Minervina Santos Living
Trust and Minervina Santos (now deceased)
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Freddie Nazario
NOTICE: ok
RELIEF REQUESTED: An order
enforcing the terms of the Settlement Agreement between Plaintiffs and
Defendant.
RULING: The motion is granted as set forth below.
SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On 4/7/22, Plaintiffs Hazelliz Calove and Helen Hernandez
Salvador, Trustees of the Minervina Santos Living Trust and Minervina Santos
(now deceased) (Plaintiffs) filed this action against Defendant Freddie
Nazario, and others, for: (1) Partition of Real Property, (2) Cancellation of
Deeds and (3) Reformation of Deeds.
At the 9/7/23 Mandatory Settlement Conference, the
parties settled the case and a Settlement Terms After Settlement Conference/Settlement
Agreement was signed and filed. The
Settlement Agreement provides, in relevant part:
“Parties to agree to list the
property located at 22333 Itasca Street, Chatsworth 91311 with real estate
agent Stephanie Vitacco. Parties further
agree to share the costs of the sale & escrow as sellers. The parties agree to sare [sic] the proceed
[sic] of the sale in an equal amount 50% to Freddie Nazario & 50% to the
Santos Living Trust.”
(See Settlement
Terms After Settlement Conference filed 9/7/23, p.3; Salvador Decl., Ex.1).
The parties also agreed that Defendant was to prepare
releases to be signed by all parties and the Court would retain jurisdiction
under CCP 664.6 to enforce the settlement terms. (Id., pp.1-2).
The property has been listed for sale; however,
Plaintiffs contend that Defendant is frustrating the purpose of the Settlement
Agreement by refusing to show the property to prospective buyers and their
agents since 12/1/23. (Salvador Decl.
¶3, Ex.3, 4). Instead, Defendant has
offered to buy Plaintiffs’ interest in the property for what Plaintiffs’ view
as a “lowball” offer. (Salvador Decl.,
Ex.2; Marshall Decl., Ex.3-5). Additionally, Plaintiffs contend that
Defendant has failed to prepare mutual releases as provided in the Settlement
Agreement. (Salvador Decl. ¶5).
On 2/6/24, Plaintiffs filed and served the instant motion
seeking an order enforcing the terms of the Settlement Agreement between
Plaintiffs and Defendant. Specifically,
Plaintiffs seek an order:
“1. declaring that Defendant’s
conduct and omissions, including without limitation (a) his avowed refusal to
allow the Subject Property, having been listed for sale, to be shown to
prospective buyers and their agents; and (b) his failure to prepare and circulate
mutual releases as expressly required by the Settlement, constitute breaches of
the Settlement;
3.
compelling Defendant forthwith, on pain of contempt, to draft and circulate to
Plaintiffs a proposed mutual release document(s) as required by the Settlement.”
(See Motion, p.2:11-21).
The motion was originally set for hearing on
9/19/24. On 2/9/24, pursuant to
Plaintiffs’ ex parte application, the Court rescheduled the hearing date for
3/6/24. On 2/26/24, Defendant filed and
served a late response to the motion and on the same date Plaintiffs filed a
reply. Since Plaintiffs did not claim
any prejudice due to the late filing and service of the response/opposition,
the Court considered the late filed response/opposition. See CRC 3.1300(d).
ANALYSIS
CCP 664.6 provides, in relevant part:
“(a) If parties to pending
litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the
presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case,
or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms
of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain
jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in
full of the terms of the settlement.”
In response to the motion, Defendant states that prior to
12/1/23 there were multiple showings of the property which resulted in multiple
purchase offers from $765,000 to $860,000.
(Marshall Decl., Ex.1-2).
Defendant contends that he is willing to match or better
any third party offer to purchase the property; however, Plaintiffs have stated
that they want a higher price if Defendant is the purchaser. (Marshall Decl. ¶4).
Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ request to show the
property on 90 minutes advance notice is unreasonable and indicates that he is
willing “to allow showings on 24 hours advance notice, and with reasonable
cooperation by the broker and salesperson in agreeing to mutually convenient
times and satisfactory arrangements for maintaining security of the
Property.” (See Response, p.5:20-23).
Defendant also indicates that his counsel is willing to
prepare and circulate a settlement agreement, including appropriate
releases. However, Defendants contends
that all issues were not resolved by the Settlement Agreement already signed by
the parties (i.e., whether to accept a particular purchase price, seller
credits, who pays for various costs of sale, and other terms of sale). Defendant then indicates that his counsel is
willing to work with Plaintiffs’ new counsel to “try to work with Plaintiffs’ new
counsel to arrive at a mutually agreeable full and final settlement agreement,
provided that all issues on a sale of the property are addressed…
.” (See Response, p.6:7-9). Finally, Defendant indicates that he is
willing to participate in a further settlement conference to resolve the
outstanding issues.
The Court finds that Defendant is improperly attempting
to re-write the terms of the Settlement Agreement by implying that there is not
already a full and final binding settlement agreement between the parties.
The Settlement Terms After Settlement Conference
specifically provides that it is “a full and final settlement” with each side
to bear their own attorney’s fees and costs, with releases to be prepared by
Defendant and signed by all parties and the parties to execute mutual releases
pursuant to Civil Code 1542. (See
Settlement Terms After Settlement Conference filed
9/7/23, pp.1-2; Salvador Decl., Ex.1).
There is nothing in the settlement agreement which
provides that the parties were to later agree on a particular purchase price,
seller credits, who pays for various costs, etc. Based on the actual terms of the Settlement
Agreement, as set forth above, it seems that the only logical conclusion is
that the parties intended that they would accept the purchase offer from a
third party which would yield both Plaintiffs and Defendant the maximum profit
as they specifically agreed to share the costs of the sale and escrow as
sellers and the proceeds of the sale 50-50.
(See Settlement Terms After Settlement Conference filed 9/7/23, p.3;
Salvador Decl., Ex.1).
The Settlement Agreement does not provide for any credits
to Defendant based on mortgage payments made or costs he paid during the period
Minerva Santos occupied the property but did not contribute to any payments. Defendant cannot now re-negotiate the
settlement terms to which he agreed on 9/7/23.
CONCLUSION
The parties have already complied with the settlement
term to list the property for sale.
To facilitate the remaining express terms of the
Settlement Agreement, the Court orders: (1) Defendant to make the Subject
Property available for showings seven days a week at any time between 9:00 a.m.
and 6:00 p.m. whenever Defendant is given at least 24 hours advance notice,
until escrow closes on the sale of the Subject Property; and (2) Defendant to
draft and circulate to Plaintiffs a proposed mutual release document(s) as
required by the Settlement Agreement.