Judge Melvin D. Sandvig, Case Number: 22CHCV00474, Date: 2023-10-05 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: 22CHCV00474, Date: 2023-10-05 Tentative Ruling

Counsel wishing to submit on a tentative ruling may inform the clerk or courtroom assisant in North Valley Department F47, 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311, at (818) 407-2247. Please be aware that unless all parties submit, the matter will still be called for hearing and may be argued by any appearing/non-submitting parties. If the matter is submitted on the court's tentative ruling by all parties, counsel for moving party shall give notice of ruling. This may be done by incorporating verbatim the court's tentative ruling. The tentative ruling may be extracted verbatim by copying and specially pasting, as unformatted text, from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s website, http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org. All hearings on law and motion and other calendar matters are generally NOT transcribed by a court reporter unless one is provided by the party(ies).

Case Number: 22CHCV00474 Hearing Date: October 5, 2023 Dept: F47

Dept. F47

Date: 10/5/23

Case #22CHCV00474

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES

(Special Interrogatories, Set 1)

Motion filed on 6/12/23.

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Prestige Default Services, LLC and Center Street Lending VIII SPE, LLC

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Sam Ostayan

NOTICE: ok

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order compelling Plaintiff Sam Ostayan to provide further responses to Special Interrogatories, Set 1, Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15, and 16. Additionally, Defendants seek sanctions.

RULING: The request to compel further responses is granted. Further responses are due within 30 days. Sanctions are denied.

SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action arises out of Plaintiff Sam Ostayan’s (Plaintiff) claim that Defendant Prestige Default Services, LLC (Prestige), as trustee of the nonjudicial foreclosure sale of real property located at 10711 Sunnybrae Avenue, Chatsworth, California 91311 (the Property), failed to comply with Civil Code 2924m when conducting the foreclosure sale of the Property.

Civil Code 2924m was enacted to give families, renters and housing nonprofits an opportunity to purchase foreclosed properties after the trustee’s sale by enlarging the timeline for the recordation of the trustee’s deed depending on who the bidder is.

The version of Civil Code 2924m operative at the relevant time period (1/1/21 – 12/31/21) defined an eligible tenant bidder as a natural person, who at the time of the trustee’s sale:

“(A) Is occupying the real property as their primary residence.

(B) Is occupying the real property under a rental or lease agreement entered into as the result of an arm's length transaction with the mortgagor or trustor on a date prior to the recording of the Notice of Default against the property.

Civil Code 2924m(a)(2).

The statute further provided that a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of a residential property (one to four units) would not be deemed final until the earliest of the following:

“(1) If a prospective owner-occupant is the last and highest bidder at the trustee's sale, the date upon which the conditions set forth in Section 2924h of the Civil Code for the sale to become final are met. The trustee shall require the prospective owner-occupant to submit the affidavit described in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a). The trustee may reasonably rely upon this affidavit.

(2) Fifteen days after the trustee's sale unless at least one eligible tenant buyer or eligible bidder submits to the trustee either a bid pursuant to paragraph (3) or (4) or a nonbinding written notice of intent to place such a bid. The bid or written notice of intent to place a bid shall be sent to the trustee by certified mail, overnight delivery, or other method that allows for confirmation of the delivery date and shall be received by the trustee no later than 15 days after the trustee's sale.

(3) The date upon which a representative of all of the eligible tenant buyers submits to the trustee a bid in an amount equal to the full amount of the last and highest bid at the trustee's sale… This bid shall be accompanied by an affidavit stating that the persons represented meet the criteria set forth in paragraph (2) of subdivision (a). The trustee may reasonably rely on this affidavit.

(4) Forty-five days after the trustee's sale, except that during the 45-day period, an eligible bidder may submit to the trustee a bid in an amount that exceeds the last and highest bid at the trustee's sale… The bid shall be accompanied by an affidavit identifying the category set forth in paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) to which the eligible bidder belongs and stating that the eligible bidder meets the criteria for that category. The trustee may reasonably rely on this affidavit.”

Civil Code 2924m(c)(1)-(4).

If the winning bidder at the foreclosure sale was a “prospective owner occupant” and completed all of the requirements, the sale was deemed final on the date of the sale, and was deemed perfected as of that date as long as the trustee’s deed was recorded within 18 calendar days. Civil Code 2924m(c)(1). If not, the foreclosure trustee must, within 48 hours of the trustee’s sale, post the following information on the internet:

“(a) The date on which the trustee's sale took place. (Civil Code 2924m(d)(1)(A)).

(b) The amount of the last and highest bid at the trustee's sale. (Civil Code 2924m(d)(1)(B)).

Civil Code 2924m(d)(1)(C).

Thereafter, an eligible tenant bidder or eligible bidder may submit to the trustee a nonbinding written notice of intent to bid within 15 days after the sale. An eligible tenant bidder or eligible bidder will have additional time (no later than 45 days after the sale) to submit a bid and a code-compliant affidavit. If an eligible tenant bidder submits a bid and a compliant affidavit, then the eligible tenant bidder will be deemed the last and highest bidder notwithstanding bids from other classes of eligible bidders. Civil Code 2924m(c)(3). If an eligible bidder submits a bid and a compliant affidavit 45 days after the trustee’s sale, the eligible bidder that submitted the highest bid will be deemed the last and highest bidder. Civil Code 2924m(c)(4).

Here, the foreclosure sale occurred on 6/29/21. At the sale, the Property was sold to U.S. Bank Trust National Association, as Trustee for ABS Trust VI Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., who is not an owner occupant, for $401,000.00. (FAC ¶¶10-11). Because U.S. Bank is not an “eligible bidder” under Civil Code 2924m, Prestige published the bid amount and started to accept post-sale Notices of Intent to Bid pursuant to Civil Code 2924m.

On 7/12/21, Plaintiff sent a written letter indicating his intent to bid on the Property as his personal residence. (FAC ¶12). Prestige informed Plaintiff that he must submit a bid by 8/13/21, which is the statutory cut-off date (45th day) following the sale. Id. On 8/13/21, Plaintiff delivered a sealed post-sale bid for $555,500. (FAC ¶13). That same day, Defendant Soldiers of America (SOA) also delivered a post-sale bid. Id. Prestige also received a post-sale bid in the amount of $401,000 from a purported “Eligible Tenant.” (FAC ¶14). On 8/13/21, Prestige rejected and refunded both Plaintiff’s and SOA’s respective bids advising Plaintiff and SOA that it was accepting a bid for $401,000 from an “Eligible Tenant,” which bid held higher priority over Plaintiff’s and SOA’s bids. Id.

On 8/16/21, Prestige returned the deposited funds to the purportedly “Eligible Tenant” upon determining that the bid was submitted by a corporation on behalf of a bidder that was deceased at the time of the foreclosure sale and who was, therefore, ineligible to bid under Civil Code section 2924m. (FAC ¶15).

Prestige never issued a trustee’s deed upon sale to any Eligible Tenant. (FAC ¶16). Instead, on 8/23/21, Prestige issued a Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale (TDUS) to SOA based on a new bid submitted outside the 45-day deadline. Id. The TDUS stated that SOA had the highest bid in the amount of $556,000 (just $500 over Plaintiff’s bid of $555,500). Id. Thereafter, Plaintiff learned that SOA’s original sealed but rejected bid submitted to Prestige on 8/13/21, was for $700,000, and not for $556,000, the amount for which SOA purportedly purchased the Property at a later date outside the 45-day window through a new bid. (FAC ¶17). SOA’s original bid and its proffered payment is evidenced by three cashier’s checks that it submitted to Prestige with its bid in the amounts of $500,000, $125,000, and $75,000, which bid was rejected and refunded to SOA on that same date, along with Plaintiff’s bid. Id.

After rejecting Plaintiff’s and SOA’s bids, Plaintiff alleges that Prestige informed SOA of the amount of Plaintiff’s bid, and Prestige allowed only SOA to submit a new bid of $556,000.00. (FAC ¶17). Prestige did not offer Plaintiff the same opportunity to submit a new bid. (FAC ¶18).

Plaintiff contends that Prestige’s acts were unlawful, and that SOA’s new bid was not permitted as it was done outside of the 45-day statutory deadline provided in Civil Code 2924m(c)(4), making the sale void. (FAC ¶18). Plaintiff alleges that SOA then sold the Property to Defendant SoCal Innovative Group, LLC (SoCal) for approximately $1,010,000.00, thereby realizing a substantial profit from its alleged improper purchase of the Property. (FAC ¶19). Plaintiff further alleges that on or about 6/13/22, Defendant Center Street Lending VIII SPE, LLC (Center Street) executed a deed of trust in the amount of $1,152,450.00 secured by the Property. (FAC ¶29). Plaintiff claims that SoCal was not a bona fide purchaser of the Property because the TDUS in favor of SOA was void, as is the legal title of SoCal, a defaulted entity. (FAC ¶21). Therefore, Plaintiff claims that Center Street has no valid lien secured by the Property.

On 6/28/22, Plaintiff filed this action against Prestige, Center Street, SOA, and SoCal. On 7/27/22, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleging causes of action for: (1) Declaratory Relief (against all defendants); (2) Violation of Civil Code 2924m (against Prestige and SOA); (3) Bid Rigging (against Prestige and SOA) and (4) Quiet Title (against SOA, SoCal and Center Street).

By way of the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff seeks a judicial declaration of the rights and obligations of the parties concerning the rights, title to, and ownership of the Subject Property. (FAC ¶23). Plaintiff further requests a judicial declaration that neither SoCal nor Center Street have any right, title, lien, or ownership to the Property because the TDUS under which SOA purportedly obtained title was null and void, in addition to the grant deed to SoCal, and therefore, SoCal has no valid interest in the Property, nor does its lender, Center Street have any secured lien. (FAC ¶24). Plaintiff also seeks a judicial declaration that his bid was the last and highest legitimate bid and that he is the owner of the Property for a purchase price of $555,500, which he offers to immediately tender to Prestige. (FAC ¶25). Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Prestige violated the procedures in Civil Code 2924m and participated in a bid rigging scheme by manipulating and artificially determining the post-sale bidding process and by accepting an untimely new bid from SOA, among other things. (FAC ¶¶30, 35).

On 2/24/23, Prestige and Center Street’s demurrer to the First Amended Complaint was overruled. On 3/24/23, Prestige filed an answer to the First Amended Complaint. On 3/27/23, Center Street filed an answer to the First Amended Complaint.

On 3/10/23, Prestige and Center Street (collectively, Defendants) served Plaintiff with Special Interrogatories, Set 1. (Davieau Decl., Ex.A). After being granted an extension, Plaintiff served responses on 4/26/23. (Id., Ex.B-C). Defendants found certain of the responses to be deficient. (Davieau Decl.). Meet and confer efforts between the parties failed to resolve the discovery issues. (Davieau Decl., Ex.D-E). Therefore, on 6/12/23, Defendants filed and served the instant motion seeking an order compelling Plaintiff to provide further responses to Special Interrogatories, Set 1, Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15, and 16. Additionally, Defendants seek sanctions. On 9/21/23, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion wherein he seeks sanctions against Defendants. On 9/28/23, Defendants filed a reply to the opposition.

On 9/28/23, Plaintiff dismissed his 1^st and 4^th causes of action.

ANALYSIS

Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice is granted.

Upon receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move to compel further responses if the propounding party deems that an objection is without merit or too general. CCP 2030.300(a)(3). The responding party has the burden of justifying its objections and responses. See Fairmont Insurance Co. (2000) 22 C4th 245, 255.

The subject interrogatories seek information relating to Plaintiff’s history of submitting bids to purchase property in foreclosure as a prospective owner-occupant and subsequent sales of such properties and facts related to Plaintiff’s primary residence.

Plaintiff responded only with objections to Special Interrogatories 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15 and 16.

Special Interrogatory 3 asks Plaintiff what his primary residence is/was from January 2021 to the present. Special Interrogatories 4, 5, 6 and 7 ask Plaintiff why he submitted a Prospective Owner Occupant (POO) Affidavit for the Trustee’s Sales of several different properties. Special Interrogatory 14 asks Plaintiff why he sold a certain property less than a year after taking title. Special Interrogatories 15 and 16 ask Plaintiff whether he lives(ed) at two different addresses from January 2022 to present.

Plaintiff objected to these interrogatories on the ground that they violate CCP 2030.060(d) because the definitions for certain terms are included in a prefatory statement rather than in each interrogatory. The Court finds this objection places form over substance and overrules it. Plaintiff also objects to these interrogatories on relevance grounds. Plaintiff contends that any POO Affidavits he submitted for property and any alleged sales of property consummated after the sale of the Property which is the subject of this action are not relevant to any claims or defenses in this action and are not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

The Court disagrees. In discovery, the concept of relevance is broader than evidence that is admissible at trial with any doubts regarding relevance generally being resolved in favor of allowing discovery. Mercury Interactive Corp. (2007) 158 CA4th 60, 98; See also Gonzalez (1995) 33 CA4th 1539, 1546 (in discovery, information is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial or facilitating settlement).

The information sought may assist in establishing whether or not Plaintiff complied with Civil Code 2924m entitling him to seek damages for Defendants’ claimed violation. Plaintiff has not established that the information is not discoverable merely because it concerns conduct that occurred after the sale of the Property at issue in this action.

Special Interrogatory 9 asks Plaintiff to identify all of the documents that support his response to Special Interrogatory 1 and Special Interrogatory 10 asks Plaintiff to identify all of the documents that support his response to Special Interrogatory 3. Special Interrogatory 1 asks Plaintiff what his occupation is and Special Interrogatory 3 asks Plaintiff what his primary residence is/was from January 2021 to present.

Again, Plaintiff objects on the ground that these interrogatories do not comply with CCP 2030.060(d). As noted above, the Court finds this objection to put form over substance and overrules it. Without waiving the objection, Plaintiff responds by stating that “[n]o documents have been identified in response to that interrogatory.” Plaintiff’s claim that no documents were identified in response to Special Interrogatories 1 and 3 does not make sense. Special Interrogatories 9 and 10 are not requests for production. Rather, they are asking Plaintiff to identify documents which would support his claim that he is self-employed as he indicated in response to Special Interrogatory 1 and to support where he has lived from January 2021 to present.

Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is denied as it does not comply with CCP 2023.040. CCP 2023.040 provides:

“A request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought. The notice of motion shall be supported by a memorandum of points and authorities, and accompanied by a declaration setting forth facts supporting the amount of any monetary sanction sought.”

Here, the notice of motion merely indicates that Defendants seek sanctions without indicating the type of sanctions or against whom the unspecified sanctions are sought. (See Notice of Motion, pp.1-2).

Defendants’ request in the reply that the Court issue an Order to Show Cause Re Why Plaintiff’s Counsel Should Not Be Sanctioned based on conflict of interest in its representation of Plaintiff against Center Street is denied without prejudice. As noted above, Plaintiff has now dismissed his 1^st and 4^th causes of action, which were the only causes of action alleged against Center Street.

If Defendants still believe that disqualification of Plaintiff’s counsel is warranted, a noticed motion for such relief should be filed. If Defendants believe that some other sanctions should be imposed upon counsel, they may file a noticed motion for such relief or a new request for the issuance of an Order to Show Cause specifying the type of sanctions to be imposed.

CONCLUSION

The request to compel further responses to Special Interrogatories Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15, and 16 is granted. Further responses are due within 30 days. Sanctions are denied. The request for issuance of an Order to Show Cause is denied without prejudice.

The Court notes that both Plaintiff and Defendant have failed to electronically bookmark the exhibits attached to their respective papers. The parties are reminded to review the 5/3/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil. When e-filing documents, parties must comply with the “TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS” which are set forth at page 4, line 4 through page 5, line 12 of the Court’s 5/3/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil. See also CRC 3.1110(f)(4).

Continued failure to comply with these requirements in the future may result in matters being placed off calendar, matters being continued so documents can be resubmitted in compliance with these requirements, documents not being considered and/or the imposition of sanctions.

Dept. F47

Date: 10/5/23
TRIAL DATE: 1/29/24

Case #22CHCV00474

MOTION TO
COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES

(Requests for
Admission, Set 1)

Motion filed on 6/12/23.

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Prestige Default Services, LLC
and Center Street Lending VIII SPE, LLC

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Sam Ostayan

NOTICE: ok

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order
compelling Plaintiff Sam Ostayan to provide further responses to Requests for
Admissions, Set 1, Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,
20, 21, 22, and 23. Additionally, Defendants seek sanctions.

RULING: The request to compel further responses is
granted. Further responses are due
within 30 days. Sanctions are
denied.

SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action arises out of Plaintiff Sam Ostayan’s
(Plaintiff) claim that Defendant Prestige Default Services, LLC (Prestige), as
trustee of the nonjudicial foreclosure sale of real property located at 10711
Sunnybrae Avenue, Chatsworth, California
91311 (the Property), failed to comply with Civil Code 2924m when conducting
the foreclosure sale of the Property.

Civil Code 2924m was enacted to give families, renters
and housing nonprofits an opportunity to purchase foreclosed properties after
the trustee’s sale by enlarging the timeline for the recordation of the
trustee’s deed depending on who the bidder is.

The version of Civil Code 2924m operative at the relevant
time period (1/1/21 – 12/31/21) defined an eligible tenant bidder as a natural
person, who at the time of the trustee’s sale:

“(A) Is occupying the real property as
their primary residence.

(B) Is occupying the real property
under a rental or lease agreement entered
into as the result of an arm's length transaction with the mortgagor or trustor
on a date prior to the recording of the Notice of Default against the property.

Civil Code 2924m(a)(2).

The statute
further provided that a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of a residential property
(one to four units) would not be deemed final until the earliest of the
following:

“(1) If a prospective
owner-occupant is the last and highest bidder at the trustee's sale, the date
upon which the conditions set forth in Section 2924h of the Civil Code for the
sale to become final are met. The trustee shall require the prospective owner-occupant
to submit the affidavit described in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a). The
trustee may reasonably rely upon this affidavit.

(2) Fifteen days after the
trustee's sale unless at least one eligible tenant buyer or eligible bidder
submits to the trustee either a bid pursuant to paragraph (3) or (4) or a
nonbinding written notice of intent to place such a bid. The bid or written notice
of intent to place a bid shall be sent to the trustee by certified mail,
overnight delivery, or other method that allows for confirmation of the
delivery date and shall be received by the trustee no later than 15 days after
the trustee's sale.

(3) The date upon which a
representative of all of the eligible tenant buyers submits to the trustee a
bid in an amount equal to the full amount of the last and highest bid at the
trustee's sale… This bid shall be accompanied by an affidavit stating that the
persons represented meet the criteria set forth in paragraph (2) of subdivision
(a). The trustee may reasonably rely on this affidavit.

(4) Forty-five days after the
trustee's sale, except that during the 45-day period, an eligible bidder may
submit to the trustee a bid in an amount that exceeds the last and highest bid
at the trustee's sale… The bid shall be accompanied by an affidavit identifying
the category set forth in paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) to which the
eligible bidder belongs and stating that the eligible bidder meets the criteria
for that category. The trustee may reasonably rely on this affidavit.”

Civil Code 2924m(c)(1)-(4).

If the winning bidder at the foreclosure sale was a
“prospective owner occupant” and completed all of the requirements, the sale
was deemed final on the date of the sale, and was deemed perfected as of that
date as long as the trustee’s deed was recorded within 18 calendar days. Civil Code 2924m(c)(1). If not, the foreclosure trustee must, within
48 hours of the trustee’s sale, post the following information on the internet:

“(a) The date on which the
trustee's sale took place. (Civil Code 2924m(d)(1)(A)).

(b) The amount of the last and
highest bid at the trustee's sale. (Civil Code 2924m(d)(1)(B)).

Civil Code 2924m(d)(1)(C).

Thereafter, an eligible tenant bidder or eligible bidder
may submit to the trustee a nonbinding written notice of intent to bid within
15 days after the sale. An eligible
tenant bidder or eligible bidder will have additional time (no later than 45
days after the sale) to submit a bid and a code-compliant affidavit. If an eligible tenant bidder submits a bid and
a compliant affidavit, then the eligible tenant bidder will be deemed the last
and highest bidder notwithstanding bids from other classes of eligible bidders.
Civil Code 2924m(c)(3). If an eligible bidder submits a bid and a
compliant affidavit 45 days after the trustee’s sale, the eligible bidder that
submitted the highest bid will be deemed the last and highest bidder. Civil Code 2924m(c)(4).

Here, the foreclosure sale occurred on 6/29/21. At the sale, the Property was sold to U.S.
Bank Trust National Association, as Trustee for ABS Trust VI Select Portfolio
Servicing, Inc., who is not an owner occupant, for $401,000.00. (FAC ¶¶10-11). Because U.S. Bank is not an “eligible bidder”
under Civil Code 2924m, Prestige published the bid amount and started to accept
post-sale Notices of Intent to Bid pursuant to Civil Code 2924m.

On 7/12/21, Plaintiff sent a written letter indicating
his intent to bid on the Property as his personal residence. (FAC ¶12).
Prestige informed Plaintiff that he must submit a bid by 8/13/21, which
is the statutory cut-off date (45th day) following the sale. Id.
On 8/13/21, Plaintiff delivered a sealed post-sale bid for $555,500. (FAC ¶13).
That same day, Defendant Soldiers of America (SOA) also delivered a
post-sale bid. Id. Prestige also received a post-sale bid in the
amount of $401,000 from a purported “Eligible Tenant.” (FAC ¶14).
On 8/13/21, Prestige rejected and refunded both Plaintiff’s and SOA’s
respective bids advising Plaintiff and SOA that it was accepting a bid for
$401,000 from an “Eligible Tenant,” which bid held higher priority over
Plaintiff’s and SOA’s bids. Id.

On 8/16/21, Prestige returned the deposited funds to the
purportedly “Eligible Tenant” upon determining that the bid was submitted by a
corporation on behalf of a bidder that was deceased at the time of the
foreclosure sale and who was, therefore, ineligible to bid under Civil Code
section 2924m. (FAC ¶15).

Prestige never issued a trustee’s deed upon sale to any
Eligible Tenant. (FAC ¶16). Instead, on 8/23/21, Prestige issued a Trustee’s
Deed Upon Sale (TDUS) to SOA based on a new bid submitted outside the 45-day
deadline. Id. The
TDUS stated that SOA had the highest bid in the amount of $556,000 (just $500
over Plaintiff’s bid of $555,500). Id.
Thereafter, Plaintiff learned that SOA’s original sealed but
rejected bid submitted to Prestige on 8/13/21, was for $700,000, and not for
$556,000, the amount for which SOA purportedly purchased the Property at a
later date outside the 45-day window through a new bid. (FAC ¶17). SOA’s original bid and its proffered payment
is evidenced by three cashier’s checks that it submitted to Prestige with its
bid in the amounts of $500,000, $125,000, and $75,000, which bid was rejected
and refunded to SOA on that same date, along with Plaintiff’s bid. Id.

After rejecting Plaintiff’s and SOA’s bids, Plaintiff
alleges that Prestige informed SOA of the amount of Plaintiff’s bid, and Prestige
allowed only SOA to submit a new bid of $556,000.00. (FAC ¶17).
Prestige did not offer Plaintiff the same opportunity to submit a new
bid. (FAC ¶18).

Plaintiff contends that Prestige’s acts were unlawful,
and that SOA’s new bid was not permitted as it was done outside of the 45-day
statutory deadline provided in Civil Code 2924m(c)(4), making the sale void. (FAC ¶18).
Plaintiff alleges that SOA then sold the Property to Defendant SoCal Innovative
Group, LLC (SoCal) for approximately $1,010,000.00, thereby realizing a
substantial profit from its alleged improper purchase of the Property. (FAC ¶19).
Plaintiff further alleges that on or about 6/13/22, Defendant Center
Street Lending VIII SPE, LLC (Center Street) executed a deed of trust in the
amount of $1,152,450.00 secured by the Property. (FAC ¶29).
Plaintiff claims that SoCal was not a bona fide purchaser of the
Property because the TDUS in favor of SOA was void, as is the legal title of
SoCal, a defaulted entity. (FAC ¶21). Therefore,
Plaintiff claims that Center Street has no valid lien secured by the Property.

On 6/28/22, Plaintiff filed this action against Prestige,
Center Street, SOA, and SoCal. On 7/27/22,
Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleging causes of action
for: (1) Declaratory Relief (against all defendants); (2) Violation of Civil
Code 2924m (against Prestige and SOA); (3) Bid Rigging (against Prestige and
SOA) and (4) Quiet Title (against SOA, SoCal and Center Street).

By way of the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff seeks a
judicial declaration of the rights and obligations of the parties concerning
the rights, title to, and ownership of the Subject Property. (FAC ¶23). Plaintiff further requests a judicial
declaration that neither SoCal nor Center Street have any right, title, lien,
or ownership to the Property because the TDUS under which SOA purportedly
obtained title was null and void, in addition to the grant deed to SoCal, and
therefore, SoCal has no valid interest in the Property, nor does its lender,
Center Street have any secured lien.
(FAC ¶24). Plaintiff also seeks a
judicial declaration that his bid was the last and highest legitimate bid and
that he is the owner of the Property for a purchase price of $555,500, which he
offers to immediately tender to Prestige.
(FAC ¶25). Finally, Plaintiff
alleges that Prestige violated the procedures in Civil Code 2924m and
participated in a bid rigging scheme by manipulating and artificially
determining the post-sale bidding process and by accepting an untimely new bid
from SOA, among other things. (FAC ¶¶30,
35).

On 2/24/23, Prestige and Center Street’s demurrer to the
First Amended Complaint was overruled.
On 3/24/23, Prestige filed an answer to the First Amended Complaint. On 3/27/23, Center Street filed an answer to
the First Amended Complaint.

On 3/9/23, Prestige and Center Street (collectively,
Defendants) served Plaintiff with Requests for Admissions, Set 1. (Davieau Decl., Ex.A). After being granted an extension, Plaintiff
served responses on 4/26/23. (Id.,
Ex.B-C). Defendants found certain of the
responses to be deficient. (Davieau
Decl.). Meet and confer efforts between
the parties failed to resolve the discovery issues. (Davieau Decl., Ex.D-E). Therefore, on 6/12/23, Defendants filed and
served the instant motion seeking an order compelling Plaintiff to provide
further responses to Requests for Admissions, Set 1, Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23. Additionally, Defendants seek sanctions. On 9/21/23, Plaintiff filed an opposition to
the motion wherein he seeks sanctions against Defendants. On 9/28/23, Defendants filed a reply to the
opposition.

On 9/28/23, Plaintiff dismissed his 1^st and 4^th
causes of action.

ANALYSIS

Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice is granted.

Upon receipt of a response to requests for admissions,
the propounding party may move to compel further responses if the propounding
party deems that an objection is without merit or too general. CCP 2033.290(a)(2). The responding party has the burden of
justifying its objections and responses.
See Fairmont Insurance Co. (2000) 22 C4th 245, 255.

The subject requests for admissions seek admissions of
fact relating to Plaintiff’s history of submitting bids to purchase property in
foreclosure as a prospective owner-occupant and subsequent sales of such
properties and facts related to Plaintiff’s primary residence.

Plaintiff responded only with objections to Requests for
Admissions 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23.

Plaintiff objected to these requests on the ground that
they violate CCP 2033.060(d) because the definitions for certain terms are
included in a prefatory statement rather than in each request. The Court finds this objection places form
over substance and overrules it. Plaintiff
also objects to these requests on relevance grounds. Plaintiff contends that any POO Affidavits he
submitted for property and any alleged sales of property consummated after the
sale of the Property which is the subject of this action are not relevant to
any claims or defenses in this action and are not likely to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.

Additionally, Plaintiff objected on the ground that the
requests are vague, ambiguous and unintelligible because they reference
“SECTION 2924” which is not defined.
Based on the totality of circumstances and the subject of this action,
the Court finds it clear that the reference is to Civil Code 2924m. If Plaintiff had any real doubt, this could
have been resolved through the meet and confer process. Plaintiff’s objections in relation to the
defined term “POO” are similarly place form over substance and/or are without
merit.

In discovery, the concept of relevance is broader than
evidence that is admissible at trial with any doubts regarding relevance
generally being resolved in favor of allowing discovery. Mercury Interactive Corp. (2007) 158
CA4th 60, 98; See also Gonzalez (1995) 33 CA4th 1539, 1546 (in
discovery, information is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in
evaluating the case, preparing for trial or facilitating settlement).

The information sought may assist in establishing whether
or not Plaintiff complied with Civil Code 2924m entitling him to seek damages
for Defendants’ claimed violation.
Plaintiff has not established that the information is not discoverable
merely because it concerns conduct that occurred after the sale of the Property
at issue in this action.

Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is denied as it does
not comply with CCP 2023.040. CCP
2023.040 provides:

“A request for a sanction shall, in
the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom
the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought. The notice of
motion shall be supported by a memorandum of points and authorities, and
accompanied by a declaration setting forth facts supporting the amount of any
monetary sanction sought.”

Here, the notice of motion merely indicates that
Defendants seek sanctions without indicating the type of sanctions or against
whom the unspecified sanctions are sought.
(See Notice of Motion, pp.1-2).

Defendants’ request in the reply that the Court issue an
Order to Show Cause Re Why Plaintiff’s Counsel Should Not Be Sanctioned based
on conflict of interest in its representation of Plaintiff against Center
Street is denied without prejudice. As
noted above, Plaintiff has now dismissed his 1^st and 4^th
causes of action, which were the only causes of action alleged against Center
Street.

If Defendants still believe that disqualification of
Plaintiff’s counsel is warranted, a noticed motion for such relief should be
filed. If Defendants believe that some
other sanctions should be imposed upon counsel, they may file a noticed motion
for such relief or a new request for the issuance of an Order to Show Cause
specifying the type of sanctions to be imposed.

CONCLUSION

The request to compel further responses to Requests for
Admissions 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,
21, 22, and 23 is granted. Further
responses are due within 30 days.
Sanctions are denied. The request
for issuance of an Order to Show Cause is denied without prejudice.

The Court notes that both Plaintiff and Defendant have
failed to electronically bookmark the exhibits attached to their respective
papers. The parties are reminded to
review the 5/3/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing
for Civil. When e-filing documents,
parties must comply with the “TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS” which are set forth at
page 4, line 4 through page 5, line 12 of the Court’s 5/3/19 First Amended
General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil. See also CRC 3.1110(f)(4).

Continued failure to comply with these requirements in
the future may result in matters being
placed off calendar, matters being continued so documents can be resubmitted in
compliance with these requirements, documents not being considered and/or the
imposition of sanctions.