Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: 22CHCV00636, Date: 2023-02-08 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22CHCV00636    Hearing Date: February 8, 2023    Dept: F47

Dept. F47

Date: 2/8/23

Case #22CHCV00636

 

MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

 

Motion filed on 10/26/22.

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Nissan North America, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Patricia Mares

NOTICE: ok

 

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order compelling arbitration and staying this action during the pendency of the arbitration.

 

RULING: The motion is granted. 

 

PROCEDURAL DEFECTS

 

The parties are reminded to review the 5/3/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil.  When e-filing documents, parties must comply with the “TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS” which are set forth at page 4, line 4 through page 5, line 12 of the Court’s 5/3/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil.  See also CRC 3.1110(f)(4).  Both parties have failed to bookmark exhibits attached to declarations and requests for judicial notice submitted in support of their respective papers.  This procedural defect did not affect the Court’s ruling on the merits of the motion.  However, failure to comply with these requirements in the future may result in  matters being placed off calendar, matters being continued so documents can be resubmitted in compliance with these requirements, documents not being considered and/or the imposition of sanctions. 

 

SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 

This action arises out of Plaintiff Patricia Mares’ (Plaintiff) purchase of a used 2018 Nissan Rogue (the Vehicle) pursuant to a “Retail Installment Sales Contract – Simple Finance Charge (With Arbitration Provision)” (the Contract/RISC) Plaintiff entered with Nissan of Mission Hills.  (Chung Decl., Ex.3, 4; Complaint ¶¶9, 11, 17, 53; Cohen Decl., Ex.4).  The RISC was for the sale of a warranted vehicle.  Id.  Plaintiff contends that the Vehicle is defective and Defendant Nissan North America, Inc. (Nissan) has been unable to service or repair the Vehicle to conform to the applicable express warranties contained in the RISC after a reasonable number of opportunities.  Plaintiff further contends that despite the foregoing, Nissan has failed to promptly replace or repurchase the Vehicle as required under the Song-Beverly Act.  (Complaint ¶¶8-9, 16-25, 31-37, 43-49).     

 

As a result, on 8/12/22, Plaintiff filed this action against Nissan for: (1) Violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – Breach of Express Warranty, (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability, and (3) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Civil Code 1793.2. 

 

Nissan filed an answer to the complaint on 9/13/22.  On 10/26/22, Nissan filed and served the instant motion seeking an order compelling arbitration and staying this action during the pendency of the arbitration.  On 1/26/23, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the instant motion and on 1/31/23, Nissan filed a reply to the opposition. 

 

ANALYSIS 

 

Plaintiff does not dispute that the RISC Plaintiff signed regarding the Vehicle contains an arbitration provision which provides, in relevant part:

 

ARBITRATION PROVISION

PLEASE REVIEW – IMPORTANT- AFFECTS YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS

1. EITHER YOU OR WE MAY CHOOSE TO HAVE ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN US DECIDED BY ARBITRATION AND NOT IN COURT OR BY JURY TRIAL.

2. IF ANY DISPUTE IS ARBITRATED, YOU WILL GIVE UP YOUR RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE AS A CLASS REPRESENTATIVE OR CLASS MEMBER ON ANY CLASS CLAIM YOU MAY HAVE AGAINST USE INCLUDING ANY RIGHT TO CLASS ARBITRATION OR ANY CONSOLIDATION OF INDIVIDUAL ARBITRATIONS.

3. DISCOVERY AND RIGHTS TO APPEAL IN ARBITRATION ARE GENERALLY MORE LIMITED THAN IN A LAWSUIT, AND OTHER RIGHTS THAT YOU AND WE WOULD HAVE IN COURT MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE IN ARBITRATION.

 

Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise (including the interpretation and scope of this Arbitration Provision, and the arbitrability of the claim or dispute), between you and us or our employees, agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to your credit application, purchase or condition of this vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action.  If federal law provides that a claim or dispute is not subject to binding arbitration, this Arbitration Provision shall not apply to such claim or dispute.

 

 

Any arbitration under this Arbitration Provision shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9.U.S.C. § 1 et. seq.) and not by any state law concerning arbitration.

 

 

This Arbitration Provision shall survive any termination, payoff or transfer of this contract. If any part of this Arbitration Provision, other than waivers of class action rights, is deemed or found to be unenforceable for any reason, the remainder shall remain enforceable. If a waiver of class action rights is deemed or found to be unenforceable for any reason in a case in which class action allegations have been made, the remainder of this Arbitration Provision shall be unenforceable.

 

(bold in original; italics added) (Chung Decl., Ex.3, 4); (Opposition, generally; Cohen Decl., Ex.4).

Both California and federal law favor the enforcement of valid arbitration agreements.  Armendariz (2000) 24 C4th 83, 97; Sanchez (2015) 61 C4th 899, 924; AT&T Mobility, LLC (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 339.

 

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies where: (1) the contract evidences a transaction in involving commerce; or (2) where the parties expressly agree that the FAA governs arbitration agreement disputes under the contract.  Cronus Investments, Inc. (2005) 35 C4th 376, 383-384; Victrola 89, LLC (2020) 46 CA5th 337, 345-346; Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. (2006) 546 U.S. 440, 442-443.  Here, as noted above, the Arbitration Provision in the RISC specifically states that “[a]ny arbitration under this Arbitration Provision shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9.U.S.C. § 1 et. seq.) and not by any state law concerning arbitration.”  (Chung Decl., Ex.3, 4).  Additionally, the RISC affects commerce. 

 

A party seeking to compel arbitration under the FAA must show: (1) the existence of a valid arbitration agreement and (2) the agreement to arbitrate encompasses the dispute at issue.  Ashbey (9th Cir. 2015) 785 F3d 1320, 1323.  Here, the opposition does not dispute that Plaintiff entered the RISC which contains the above Arbitration Provision.  Additionally, Plaintiff’s claims are based on the fact that Plaintiff entered the RISC which contains the warranties sued upon.  Further, Plaintiff seeks to rescind the RISC through this action.  (See Complaint ¶¶41, 53). 

 

Pursuant to both federal and California law, under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, “a nonsignatory defendant may invoke an arbitration clause to compel a signatory plaintiff to arbitrate its claims when the causes of action against the nonsignatory are intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract obligations.” (internal quotation marks omitted)  JSM Tuscany, LLC (2011) 193 CA4th 1222, 1237.

 

With regard to the purchase of a vehicle where the plaintiff and the selling dealership entered a RISC, this very issue has recently been decided by the Court of Appeal in Felisilda (2020) 53 CA5th 486 wherein the Court held:

 

“Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, as applied in both federal and California decisional authority, a non-signatory defendant may invoke an arbitration clause to compel a signatory plaintiff to arbitrate its claims when the causes of action against the non-signatory are ‘intimately founded in and intertwined’ with the underlying contract obligations [i.e., the purchase and condition of the vehicle].” (internal citations omitted). 

 

Felisilda, supra, at 495.  

 

Because Plaintiff expressly agreed to arbitrate claims arising out of the condition of the Vehicle, including against third party non-signatories to the RISC, Plaintiff is estopped from refusing to arbitrate the claims made against Nissan in this action.  See Felisilda, supra at 497.  As explained by the Court in Felisilda:

 

“‘the fundamental point’ is that a party is ‘not entitled to make use of [a contract containing an arbitration clause] as long as it worked to [his or] her advantage, then attempt to avoid its application in defining the forum in which [his or] her dispute… should be resolved.’” (internal citations omitted)

 

Id. at 496.

 

Plaintiff’s causes of action against Nissan relate to the purchase and condition of the Vehicle; therefore, they fall under the Arbitration Provision in the RISC.  (See Complaint ¶¶8-11, 16-25, 31-37, 41, 43-49, 53).  The RISC is the source of the warranties Plaintiff relies on for the claims in this action and Plaintiff seeks to rescind the RISC through this action.  As such, the warranties and their purported breach are “intimately founded in and intertwined” with the RISC.  See Felisilda, supra at 497.

 

Plaintiff’s reliance on Ngo (9th Cir. 2022) 23 F4th 942 and other federal cases for the proposition that Nissan as a non-signatory to the RISC cannot rely on the arbitration provision because Plaintiff has not sued the dealership/signatory to the RISC is unavailing.    

 

Plaintiff’s reliance on Ngo, supra, and other federal cases is misplaced.  First, these federal cases are not binding on this Court whereas Felisilda, supra, is binding authority.  See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. (1962) 57 C2d 450, 455 (“When deciding matters of California law, the doctrine of Stare Decisis requires the Court of inferior jurisdiction follow the published decisions of California courts of superior jurisdiction.”); Ngo, supra at 946 (“State law determines whether a non-signatory to an agreement containing an arbitration clause may compel arbitration.”); Franklin (9th Cir. 2021) 998 F3d 867, 874 fn.9; Felisilda, supra at 497.  Second, Ngo is inconsistent with Ninth Circuit precedent which held that the signatory to a contract need not have been a defendant in order for a non-signatory to compel arbitration under a theory of equitable estoppel.  See Franklin, supra at 869-870, 875.

 

The warranties on which Plaintiff bases the claims in this action are an essential part of the benefits Plaintiff received when Plaintiff decided to enter the RISC.  Additionally, the protections provided by the Song-Beverly Act only apply to consumers who purchase vehicles directly from the retail seller within the meaning of the Act.  See Dagher (2015) 238 CA4th 905, 926-927; Civil Code 1791.2(a)(1).  Without the RISC from a Nissan-authorized dealer, Plaintiff would have no standing to seek relief under the Song-Beverly Act which underlies the causes of action in the complaint.  As such, Plaintiff’s claims are inextricably intertwined with the RISC and Nissan may enforce the Arbitration Provision under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 

 

Plaintiff’s reliance on “extrinsic evidence” to support her position also fails.  Plaintiff provides a blank form Dealer Agreement which Plaintiff contends is the agreement between Nissan and the dealership that sold Plaintiff the Vehicle.  (See Cohen Decl. ¶7, Ex.5).  Plaintiff fails to establish that the Dealer Agreement was ever entered by Nissan.  Even if Nissan did enter the agreement,  it would only be relevant if the RISC is vague or ambiguous.  See WYDA Associates (1996) 42 CA4th 1702, 1710; BMW of North America, Inc. (1984) 162 CA3d 980, 990.  Plaintiff does not contend the RISC is ambiguous.  Further, contrary to Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion, the Dealer Agreement does not “dispositively preclude[] [Nissan] from invoking the equitable estoppel and third-party beneficiary doctrines.”  (See Opposition, p.7:16-21). 

 

First, Plaintiff fails to explain how the Dealer Agreement has any bearing on Nissan’s equitable estoppel argument.  To the extent the Dealer Agreement is relevant, it supports Nissan’s position.  The Dealer Agreement contains a provision regarding warranties which provides in part: “Section 10. Warranties . . . Dealer shall expressly incorporate in full and without modification any warranty furnished by Seller with a Nissan Vehicle as a conspicuous part of each order form or other contract of sale of such Nissan Vehicle by Dealer to any buyer.” (Cohen Decl., Ex.5, p.30).  This provision shows that warranties are part of the sales contract. 

 

Plaintiff also incorrectly asserts that equitable estoppel does not apply because the Sales Contract “expressly disclaims all warranties.”  (See Opposition, p.6:24-25; p.9:11-25).  The warranty disclaimer provision actually shows that Plaintiff’s claims are intimately founded in and intertwined with the RISC.  Under the Song-Beverly Act, “every sale of consumer goods that are sold at retail in this state shall be accompanied by the manufacturer’s and the retail seller’s implied warranty that the goods are merchantable,” which can be disclaimed “only when a consumer good is on an ‘as is’ or ‘with all faults’ sale.”  Civil Code 1792, 1792.3.   The fact that contracting parties can disclaim implied warranties in sales contracts reinforces the conclusion that such warranties are necessarily terms of the sales contract.

 

Consistent with the foregoing, the RISC includes language that could potentially, though not automatically, disclaim certain warranties under circumstances which are not present here.  The RISC states that there would be no express or implied warranties only if the purchaser did “not get a written warranty, and the [Seller/Dealer] does not enter into a service contract within 90 days from the date of this contract[.]”  (See Chung Decl., Ex.4).  However, Plaintiff admits that express and implied warranties accompanied the sale of their vehicle.  (Complaint ¶¶8, 32).  The sale of the Vehicle was not an “as-is” sale, much less one where Plaintiff did not get a written warranty, so the warranty disclaimer provision was never triggered.  Instead, the disclaimer provision reinforces that the RISC contemplated the existence of the manufacturer’s warranty, recognizes that the warranty affects the parties’ contractual obligations, and demonstrates that such warranties are additional terms of and thus “intimately founded in and intertwined with” the obligations imposed by the RISC. 

 

Nissan may also compel arbitration as a third party-beneficiary to the Arbitration Provision.  As noted above, the Arbitration Provision provides that Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate any claim related to the RISC, including “[a]ny claim or dispute…which arises out of or relates to…condition of this vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract)… .”  (Chung Decl., Ex.3, 4).    Nissan is one of the third parties contemplated by the agreement.  See Felisilda, supra at 498-499; Ronay Family Limited Partnership (2013) 216 CA4th 830, 836; Goonewardene (2019) 6 C5th 817.

 

CONCLUSION

 

Based on the foregoing, Nissan’s request to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate this action is granted.  The action is stayed pending the resolution of the arbitration.  See CCP 1281.4; 9 U.S.C. §3.