Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: 22CHCV00705, Date: 2023-02-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22CHCV00705    Hearing Date: February 2, 2023    Dept: F47

Dept. F47

Date: 2/2/23

Case #22CHCV00725

 

MOTION TO STRIKE

 

Motion to Strike filed on 10/25/22.

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Aram Abgaryan

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Farmers Insurance Exchange

NOTICE: ok

 

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order striking: (1)  every reference to Defendant Aram Abgaryan as “CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE I” in the Complaint (Complaint, p. 2, line 28- p.3, line 1; page 2, lines 2-3 and line 22; page 3, line 16 and lines 21-22; page 4, line 6, line 15, lines 19-20 and line 24; and page 5, lines 15 and 18and (2) part of ¶9 of the Complaint at p.3:21-24 which states:

 

“It was the intent of DEFENDANT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE 1 and DOES 1 through 5 to set up and operate within the DEFENDANT UNIT an illegal marijuana extraction processing laboratory commonly referred to as a ‘honey oil laboratory.’ Illegal honey oil laboratories have a propensity to blow up.”

 

RULING: The motion is granted, in part, with 30 days leave to amend, and denied in part.

 

SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 

This is an insurance subrogation action.  Plaintiff Farmers Insurance Exchange (Plaintiff) alleges that it, “its subsidiaries, affiliates, and/or parent companies, duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California and authorized to do business in the State of California as an insurer” issued an insurance policy to the owner of Owensmouth Business Park (Owner) which was in effect on the date of the incident which is the subject of this action.     (See Complaint ¶¶1, 8).  Plaintiff alleges that on 9/18/17 Defendant Aram Abgaryan purchased a commercial condo unit within Owensmouth Business Park out of which he, and the other defendants, operated an illegal marijuana extraction processing laboratory (honey oil laboratory).  (Complaint ¶9).  Pursuant to that purchase, Abgaryan and Owner agreed to the CC&Rs which governed Owensmouth Business Park.  (Complaint ¶10).  The CC&Rs allegedly included a bar against noxious or offensive activities at the business park and required all unit owners to comply with the requirements of local or state health authorities and all other governmental authorities with respect to the light industrial and business use of each condo.  (Complaint ¶11).

 

Plaintiff alleges that Abgaryan and the other defendants ignored the CC&Rs by operating the honey oil laboratory on the premises.  (Complaint ¶12).  As a result, on or about 9/21/19, Plaintiff alleges that the condo unit purchased by Abgaryan blew up and caught fire causing damage to Plaintiff’s insured and the death of an individual working with/for defendants.  (Complaint ¶13).  Additionally, Abgaryan and the other defendants were arrested and charged with involuntary manslaughter, drug manufacturing and controlling a space, building, or room, or allowing someone to use same for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing or distributing  any controlled substance for sale or distribution.  (Complaint ¶14).

 

Based on the foregoing, on 8/30/22, Plaintiff filed its complaint for equitable subrogation for damages to property alleging causes of action for: (1) negligence, (2) negligence per se, (3) gross negligence and (4) strict liability for ultrahazardous activities. 

 

On 10/25/22, Abgaryan filed and served a demurrer to the entire complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to allege standing thereby making the entire complaint uncertain and also that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to state any of the causes of action alleged in the complaint.  Plaintiff opposed the demurrer.  On 1/4/23, Abgaryan’s demurrer was sustained with 60 days leave to amend.  (See 1/4/23 Minute Order).

 

On 10/25/22, Abgaryan also filed a motion to strike portions of the complaint.  For unknown reasons, Abgaryan scheduled the motion to strike for hearing on 2/2/23 rather than the same day as the demurrer.  The motion to strike seeks an order striking: (1)  every reference to Defendant Aram Abgaryan as “CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE I” in the Complaint (Complaint, p. 2, line 28- p.3, line 1; page 2, lines 2-3 and line 22; page 3, line 16 and lines 21-22; page 4, line 6, line 15, lines 19-20 and line 24; and page 5, lines 15 and 18)* and (2) part of ¶9 of the Complaint at p.3:21-24 which states:

 

“It was the intent of DEFENDANT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE 1 and DOES 1 through 5 to set up and operate within the DEFENDANT UNIT an illegal marijuana extraction processing laboratory commonly referred to as a ‘honey oil laboratory.’ Illegal honey oil laboratories have a propensity to blow up.”

 

*The Court notes that certain of the portions of the complaint specified in the notice of motion do not include the term CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE I (i.e., p.2:28-p.3:1) and Abgaryan has failed to specify other portions of the complaint which include the term CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE I

(i.e., p.3:19).

 

Plaintiff has opposed the motion to strike.

 

ANALYSIS

 

Abgaryan’s Request for Judicial Notice (RJN) is granted only as to the existence of the documents in the court record.

 

CCP 431.10 provides:

 

“(a) A material allegation in a pleading is one essential to the claim or defense and which could not be stricken from the pleading without leaving it insufficient as to that claim or defense.

(b) An immaterial allegation in a pleading is any of the following:

(1) An allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense.

(2) An allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense.

(3) A demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint.

(c) An “immaterial allegation” means “irrelevant matter” as that term is used in Section 436.”

 

                   (emphasis added)

 

CCP 436 provides:

 

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper:

(a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.

(b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”

 

When placed together the words “criminal enterprise” imply a distinct meaning under the law.  See 21 U.S.C 848 (referenced as example only as the statute has been recognized as repealed by implication – U.S. Stitt - 4th Cir.(Va.) 552 F.3d 345).  Since the complaint does not include facts which indicate that Abgaryan was part of a “criminal enterprise” as recognized under the law, the Court finds that the use of that term in the complaint is immaterial and/or irrelevant as a matter of law.

 

However, the Court finds that the remaining portion of paragraph 9 of the complaint sought to be stricken (once the reference to “CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE I) is removed to be acceptable.        

 

CONCLUSION

 

As noted above, pursuant to motion or at any time in its discretion, the Court may strike out irrelevant matter.  CCP 436(a).  Therefore, in an amended pleading, Plaintiff is to remove all references to defendants, including, Abgaryan, as “CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE I,” “CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE II,” and/or “CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE III” whether referenced in the notice of motion or not.