Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: 22CHCV00910, Date: 2023-09-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22CHCV00910    Hearing Date: September 18, 2023    Dept: F47

Dept. F47

Date: 9/18/23                                                                            TRIAL DATE: 4/22/24

Case 22CHCV00910

 

MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENAS

 

Motion filed on 6/2/23.

 

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Blanca Fajardo

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority

NOTICE: ok

 

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order quashing four subpoenas served by Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority.  Additionally, Plaintiff requests sanctions against Defendant and its counsel of record, Eitan Yehoshua of Ashour Yehoshua APC, in the amount of $2,060.00.

 

RULING: The request to quash deposition subpoenas is granted.  The request for sanctions is denied. 

 

SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 

This action arises out of an incident that occurred on 2/15/22 wherein Plaintiff Blanca Fajardo (Plaintiff) claims that she “was seriously injured when the bus driver negligently drove off, before Plaintiff was safely seated.”  (See Complaint ¶Prem.L-1).  As a result, on 10/18/22, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Defendant) for Premises Liability.  On 5/4/23, Defendant answered Plaintiff’s complaint. 

 

On 5/12/23, Defendant issued four subpoenas to the Los Angeles City Fire Department (LAFD), Providence St. Joseph Medical Center (Medical Records), Providence St. Joseph Medical Center (Billing Records) and Providence St. Joseph Medical Center (Radiological Records) for production on 6/9/23.  (Bagdassarian Decl. ¶¶2-3, Ex.A-D). 

 

The LAFD subpoena seeks:

 

“Any and all paramedic and/or ambulance records and itemized statements of the billing charges pertaining to the care, treatment, and examination of plaintiff. The incident occurred at Van Nuys and Laurel Canyon around 12:15 p.m. but the Plaintiff was picked up at Valley Village, CA at approximately 12:30 p.m.”

 

The St. Joseph Medical Center (Medical Records) subpoena seeks:

 

“All documents and records pertaining to the care, treatment and examination of the Plaintiff including, all office reports and notes, emergency room charts and notes, inpatient and outpatient charts, radiological reports and test results from the first date of treatment to and including the present.”

 

The St. Joseph Medical Center (Billing Records) subpoena seeks:

 

“All itemized statements of the billing charges, statement of billing records, all Medicare, Medi-Cal, payment history, insurance payments and adjustments pertaining to the care, treatment and examination of the Plaintiff from the first date of treatment to and including the present.”

 

The St. Joseph Medical Center (Radiological Records) subpoena seeks:

 

“All Radiology Images including, X-Ray Films/CD, CAT Scan Films/CD and MRI’s Films/CD taken pertaining to the care, treatment and examination of the Plaintiff from the first date of treatment to and including the present.”

 

Id.

 

Finding the subpoenas to be overbroad, Plaintiff’s counsel communicated with defense counsel regarding the scope of the subpoenas.  During that process, Defendant agreed to limit the subpoenas to 10 years and exclude mental health records and records pertaining to sexually transmitted diseases.  (Bagdassarian Decl. ¶¶4-6, Ex.E; Nunez Decl. ¶¶4-5).  Plaintiff was not satisfied with the proposal; therefore, on 6/2/23, Plaintiff filed and served the instant motion seeking an order quashing four subpoenas served by Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority.  Additionally, Plaintiff requests sanctions against Defendant and its counsel of record, Eitan Yehoshua of Ashour Yehoshua APC, in the amount of $2,060.00.  Defendant has opposed the motion and Plaintiff has filed a reply to the opposition. 

 

ANALYSIS

 

CCP 1987.1(a) provides: 

 

“If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.”

In a personal injury action, discovery is permitted with regard to the physical conditions the patient-litigant has placed in issue.  See Britt (1978) 20 C3d 844, 863-864; Vinson (1987) 43 C3d 833, 842; Lantz (1994) 28 CA4th 1839, 1854-1855, 1857; Heller (1994) 8 C4th 30, 43, 55.  Accordingly, “Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant may seeking records regarding the body parts at issue.”  (See Motion, p.10:20-21). 

 

The problem here is that neither Plaintiff nor Defendant has informed the Court exactly which of Plaintiff’s body parts are at issue in this case.  Plaintiff’s complaint merely alleges that Plaintiff “was seriously injured” as a result of the incident.  (Complaint ¶Prem.L-1).  The instant motion also gives no indication as to what specific parts of Plaintiff’s body are at issue.  (See Motion, generally).  Similarly, while the opposition indicates that Plaintiff provided responses to Defendant’s initial discovery requests on 6/12/23 which Defendant claims “make it evident to us what injuries Plaintiff is claiming,” Defendant does not specify what those injuries are nor provide copies of Plaintiff’s discovery responses.  (See Opposition, p.3:4-7; Nunez Decl. ¶6).  Rather, Defendant vaguely states that “[a]s of June 12, 2023, Plaintiff is asserting claims for physical injuries, emotional distress, and pain and suffering.”  (Opposition, p.3:8-10; Nunez Decl. ¶8).  Based on such, Defendant indicates that it is willing to limit the records sought to 10 years and exclude any of Plaintiff’s gynecological and/or mental health records.  (Opposition, p.5:27-p.6:1).  However, the declaration in support of the opposition indicates that Defendant is willing to exclude mental health records, records pertaining to sexually transmitted diseases and any records over 10 years old.  (Nunez Decl. ¶9).  The Court notes that while gynecological records and records pertaining to sexually transmitted diseases may overlap, they are not necessarily the same. 

 

While it is true that Defendant has the right to obtain information about any injuries, conditions, or problems that might have contributed to the injuries claimed by Plaintiff, neither party has provided the Court with sufficient information to determine what injuries Plaintiff is actually claiming in this action. 

 

As such, Defendant has failed to meet its burden of establishing all of the following: (1) the information/records sought are directly relevant to the issues in this case; (2) there is “a compelling need for discovery, and that compelling need [is] so strong as to outweigh the privacy right when these two competing interests are carefully balanced;” (3) the scope is narrowly circumscribed and by the least intrusive manner; and (4) the information is not available from other sources or by less intrusive means.  Lantz (1994) 28 CA4th 1839, 1853-1854.    

 

However, the Court notes that if Plaintiff’s discovery responses (which, as noted above, have not been provided to the Court) generally state that Plaintiff is claiming physical injuries, without specifying which body parts Plaintiff claims were injured as a result of the incident which is the subject of this action, Defendant would be entitled to explore injuries to any parts of Plaintiff’s body within the last 10 years in order to properly prepare a defense to this action.

 

The subject subpoenas contain no time limitation and Defendant concedes that they should be limited to 10 years.  Additionally, the time period for the subpoena issued to the LAFD is unclear.  It seems that the subpoena may have been intended to be limited to the date of the incident based on the inclusion of where the incident occurred, the time of the incident and where and when Plaintiff was picked-up; however, no specific date is set forth.  (Bagdassarian Decl., Ex.A).  Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the subpoenas to be overbroad as to time.  Additionally, since Defendant is willing to exclude gynecological records and mental health records, the scope of the subpoenas is also overbroad.

 

Although the Court is quashing the subject subpoenas, it finds that sanctions against Defendant and its counsel are not warranted.  The Court finds that Defendant acted with substantial justification and did not misuse the discovery process or act in bad faith.  CCP 1987.2(a); CCP 2024.010(b); CCP 2023.030(a). 

 

The Court further notes that Plaintiff failed to give clear notice of the relief sought.  CRC 3.1110(a) provides that “[a] notice of motion must state in the opening paragraph the nature of the order being sought and the grounds for issuance of the order.”  Here, the opening paragraph of the notice of motion indicates that Plaintiff is seeking “an order quashing three subpoenas for [sic] served by Defendant the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (‘Defendant’)” when actually four subpoenas are at issue.  (See Notice of Motion, p.2:4-6).  Additionally, the notice of motion never specifies exactly which subpoenas are at issue.  The notice also claims that in addition to Plaintiff’s privacy rights, the subpoenas also violate third parties’ privacy rights.  (Notice of Motion, p.2:10-11).  However, other than concluding that the subpoenas violate third-parties privacy rights, Plaintiff’s points and authorities fail to make any argument as to how any third-party’s privacy rights are at issue/violated by the subpoenas other than claiming they require disclosure of “family medical history.”  (See  Motion, Memorandum of Points & Authorities, p.6:8-12, p.7:13-15).       

 

CONCLUSION

 

Plaintiff’s request to quash the subpoenas is granted.  Both  parties’ requests for sanctions are denied.