Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: 22CHCV01155, Date: 2025-05-14 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22CHCV01155    Hearing Date: May 14, 2025    Dept: F47

Dept. F47

Date: 5/14/25

Case #22CHCV01155

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Motion filed on 12/5/24.

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Rita Istanbulian

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants Ford Motor Company and Galpin Ford

NOTICE: ok

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order awarding Plaintiff Rita Istanbulian attorney fees in the amount of $74,641.50, updated to $74,476.50 in the reply, pursuant to Civil Code 1794(d) of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and the settlement in which Ford Motor Company agreed to pay Plaintiff’s attorney fees. 

RULING: The motion is granted as set forth below. 

SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action arose out of the warranty and repair obligations of Defendant Ford Motor Company (Ford) in connection with a vehicle purchased by Plaintiff Rita Istanbulian (Plaintiff) and for which Ford issued a written warranty and Defendant Galpin Ford’s (Galpin) alleged breach of duty to Plaintiff regarding the standard of care for repair, storage and notation of work performed.

On 11/16/22, Plaintiff filed this action against Ford and Galpin alleging causes of action against Ford for violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and negligent repair against Galpin. 

On 2/13/24, Plaintiff accepted Ford’s second CCP 998 Offer to settle the case for $165,000.00 plus Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses.  (Wirtz Decl., Ex.7).  Pursuant to the parties settlement and Civil Code 1790, et seq., Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees pursuant to a noticed motion.

Therefore, on 12/5/24, Plaintiff filed and served the instant motion seeking an order awarding Plaintiff attorney fees in the amount of $74,641.50, updated to $74,476.50 in the reply, pursuant to Civil Code 1794(d) of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and the settlement in which Ford Motor Company agreed to pay Plaintiff’s attorney fees.  Plaintiff seeks lodestar fees in the amount of $49,651.00, a multiplier of $24,825.50 for the contingent risk and delay for a total fee award of $74,476.50.  Defendants have opposed the motion and Plaintiff has filed a reply (one day late) to the opposition.  The Court considered the late reply in ruling on the motion.  See CRC 3.1300(d).

ANALYSIS 

There is no dispute that Plaintiff is entitled recover attorneys’ fees in this matter.  However, the parties disagree regarding the amount of attorneys’ fees Plaintiff should recover. 

Pursuant to the settlement and statute, Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees based on actual time expended which the court determines to have been reasonable incurred in connection with the commencement and prosecution of the action.  See Civil Code 1794(d); (Wirtz Decl., Ex.7, ¶2).  In determining a reasonable fee award, the trial court may consider factors such as the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the skill exhibited and the results achieved.  See Morris (2019) 41 CA5th 24, 34 (internal citations omitted).  Additionally, the lodestar method of calculation gives the trial court discretion to decide the reasonable number of hours expended by the attorneys as well as the reasonable hourly rates charged.  Id. at 35.  If the court finds that the time expended or the rates charged for the time expended are not reasonable under all of the circumstances, the court must award fees in a lesser amount.  Id.  Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the fees incurred were allowable, reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation and were reasonable in amount.  Id.  A trial court’s order awarding attorney fees and costs under the Song-Beverly Act is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Id. at 35.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has met her burden of establishing that the hourly rates charged by the attorneys and paralegals that worked on her case are reasonable.  (See Taylor Decl.; Wirtz Decl.).  Defendant has failed adequately support its argument that a reasonable hourly rate for the different attorneys that worked on Plaintiff’s case should be $300/hour across the board and/or that the paralegal fees should be reduced to $150/hour. 

Defendant also takes issue with the number of different billers claiming that there must have been duplication, redundancy and inefficiency.  However, the evidence indicates that once a second firm associated into the case on Plaintiff’s behalf, the original law firm did not bill for work.  (See Taylor Decl., Ex.1; Wirtz Decl., Ex.1).  Defendant incorrectly claims that Plaintiff’s counsel charged for counsel to “get up to speed;” however, a review of the billing records indicates that while time was spent on such tasks, such time was not included in the billing.  (See Wirtz Decl., Ex.1, p.1 of 13).  Nor has Defendant pointed to any specific entries which show that the paralegals time was billed for administrative work that cannot be compensated.  (See Opposition, p.5:5-14).

The Court also finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently supported the time her counsel spent communicating with her regarding the case.  The Court does not find the amount of time spent by Plaintiff’s counsel on preparing various documents in this case (i.e., the complaint, discovery requests) to be unreasonable.  Plaintiff’s counsel explains that had it not been for the use of form documents, the time expended would have been more.  For example, the Court finds that 2.6 hours to revise and file a form complaint for this matter is not unreasonable as drafting a complaint from scratch would take considerably more time. 

The Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to recover $49,651.00 in attorneys’ fees for prosecuting this action and in relation to the instant motion.  However, based on the lack of complexity of the case and the fact that it settled before trial without any law and motion matters, the Court does not find that a multiplier is warranted. 

CONCLUSION

The motion is granted.  Plaintiff is awarded $49,651.00 in attorneys’ fees against Defendant Ford Motor Company, payable within 30 days.

Plaintiff’s request for an order requiring Ford Motor Company to pay Plaintiff’s costs and expenses in the amount of $4,413.10 is denied without prejudice.  Plaintiff did not provide clear notice that such relief was being sought in this motion.  See CRC 3.1110(a).  The motion is titled as one for attorneys’ fees and the body of the motion specifically states: “Plaintiff does not seek her attorney’s costs and expenses here because FMC did not timely contest Plaintiff’s Memoranda of Costs filed on July 1, 2024.”  (See Notice of Motion, p.1:18-19).  The Court also notes that Plaintiff does not explain why she filed two different Memorandum of Costs on 7/1/24, one seeking $1,016.30 in costs and another seeking $3,396.80 in costs.