Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: 22STCV06945, Date: 2023-10-18 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22STCV06945    Hearing Date: April 18, 2024    Dept: F47

Dept. F47

Date: 4/18/24

Case #22STCV06945

DEMURRER & MOTION TO STRIKE

TO THE

(FIRST) AMENDED COMPLAINT

Demurrer & Motion filed on 2/23/24.

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Rinaldi Convalescent Hospital

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Maria Magarita Carranza

NOTICE: ok

Demurrer is to the entire (First) Amended Complaint which does not set forth any distinct causes of action. 

RELIEF REQUESTED IN MOTION TO STRIKE: An order striking various portions of the (First) Amended Complaint relating to punitive damages.

RULING: The demurrer is sustained and the motion to strike is granted, both, without leave to amend. 

SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action arises out of Plaintiff Maria Margarita Carranza’s (Plaintiff) care and treatment at Defendant Rinaldi Convalescent Hospital (Defendant) from 4/10/21 to 4/12/21.  Plaintiff alleges that she suffered “[s]evere infliction of injuries sustained by employees from Rinaldi Convalescent Hospital” by refusing to give her prescription drugs, including medication for pain and anxiety.  Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant’s employees and staff were ordered to “not speak or assist Plaintiff with any requests,” that staff refused to take her blood pressure, and that her “complaint issued focus[es] around the infliction of injuries.”  Further, Plaintiff alleges that she was “[d]efrauded by the Brochures shown to plaintiff,” that she was not allowed hygiene after she “soiled [her] legs unable to reach [the] toilet (in use by another Patient),” that Defendant’s employees stole her prescribed opioids, and that she was kidnapped and held against her will “during [a] 48-hour mandatory stay” at Defendant. 

On 2/25/22, representing herself, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant.  On 3/18/22,  Plaintiff filed the operative (First) Amended Complaint (FAC) which does not assert any distinct causes of action.  After Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant’s meet and confer efforts regarding the (First) Amended Complaint, on 7/6/23, Defendant filed and served a demurrer as to the entire (First) Amended Complaint and motion to strike which sought to strike various portions of the (First) Amended Complaint.  Although Plaintiff had opposed the demurrer and Defendant had filed a reply, the hearing on the demurrer and motion to strike did not proceed on the merits because default had been entered against Defendant on 12/14/22.  (See 10/18/23 Minute Order).

Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to have the default set aside which was granted on 2/15/24.  (See 2/15/24 Minute Order).  On 2/23/24, after Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant’s meet and confer efforts, Defendant filed and served the instant demurrer to the entire (First) Amended Complaint  and motion to strike portions of the (First) Amended Complaint.  Plaintiff has not filed an opposition or other response to the demurrer or motion to strike. 

ANALYSIS

A complaint must include a statement of facts constituting the cause or causes of action in ordinary and concise language.  CCP 452.10(a).  A defendant may challenge a complaint by demurrer which admits all properly pleaded facts, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  Gruenberg (1973) 9 C3d 566, 572; Carter (2011) 198 CA4th 396, 403.  Among other things, a demurrer may be based on grounds that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and/or is uncertain, ambiguous and unintelligible.  CCP 430.10(e), (f). 

A demurrer may be sustained without leave to amend where it is probable that Plaintiff cannot state a cause of action.  Banerian (1974) 42 CA3d 604, 616; Moore (1977) 65 CA3d 896, 903; Berkley Police Association  (1977) 76 CA3d 931, 942.  Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that there is a reasonable possibility that the defects in the complaint can be cured by amendment.  Blank (1985) 39 C3d 311, 318.  If the Plaintiff does not meet this burden, the demurrer is properly sustained without leave to amend.  Hendy (1991) 54 C3d 723, 742.

Where the complaint is so poorly pled that the defendant cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against it, a demurer for uncertainty lies.  Khoury (1993) 14 CA4th 612, 616.  Here, the (First) Amended Complaint is so poorly pled that Defendant cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied and Defendant is left to speculate as to what causes of action Plaintiff is alleging against it.

Similarly, the (First) Amended Complaint is uncertain because it fails to separately state each cause of action, its nature, the party asserting it and/or the parties against whom it is directed.  See CRC 2.112.

To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to plead a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, she has failed to adequately do so.  The elements of such a claim are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.  Potter (1993) 6 C4th 965, 1001; Christensen (1991) 54 C3d 868, 903.  For purposes of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, conduct is “outrageous” when it is so “extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.”  Potter, supra at 1001.  Additionally, the defendant’s conduct must be “intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.”  Id. 

Here, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts to support each of the elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Rather, Plaintiff merely makes conclusory, ambiguous, and unintelligible allegations regarding Defendant’s employees.  (See FAC p.1:20, p.2:8-9, p.3:3-4, p.3:14-15, p.8:4-17).

To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to plead a cause of action for fraud, she has failed to adequately do so.  The elements of a fraud cause of action are: (1) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity; (3) intent to defraud; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.  Lazar (1996) 12 C4th 631, 638.  Additionally, a fraud cause of action must be pled with factual particularity.  Id. at 645.  Here, Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient specific facts to support any of the elements of a fraud claim. 

To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to state a cause of action for elder or dependent adult abuse/neglect, she has failed to do so.  Such a statutory claim must be pled with particularity.  See Welfare & Institutions Code 15600, et seq.; Carter, supra at 410.

The elements of such a claim are: (1) plaintiff is an elder or dependent adult as defined by the Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (the Act); (2) defendant is liable for physical abuse, neglect, or fiduciary abuse; (3) defendant has been guilty of recklessness, oppression, fraud or malice in the commission of the abuse or neglect; (4) defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff harm; (5) the employer had advanced knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others, or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded, or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation; and (6) damage or harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the abuse or neglect.  Welfare & Institutions Code 15657(c); CCP 3294(b); Delaney (1999) 20 C4th 23, 31; Covenant Care, Inc. (2004) 32 C4th 771. 

Here, Plaintiff has failed to plead that she is a dependent adult or elder as defined by the Act.  See Welfare & Institutions Code 15610.23(a).  Plaintiff has also failed to allege facts showing Defendant had responsibility for her basic needs as an elder or dependent adult as required.  See Carter, supra 406-407, 410.  Additionally, Plaintiff has not pled the necessary specific facts regarding any alleged neglect or abuse.  Id. 

Plaintiff has also failed to plead sufficient facts to show that Defendant acted with malice, oppression, fraud and/or recklessness which are necessary to obtain the enhanced remedies under the Act or punitive damages.  Welfare & Institutions Code 15657.  Delaney, supra at 31-32; Civil Code 3294.

To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to state a cause of action for general or medical negligence, she has failed to do so.  The elements of a negligence cause of action are: (1) a legal duty to use due care; (2) a breach of such legal duty; and (3) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.  Ladd (1996) 12 C4th 913, 917.   The elements of a cause of action for medical malpractice are: (1) a duty to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of the profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of the duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the injury; and (4) resulting loss or damage. Chakalis (2012) 205 CA4th 1557, 1571.  Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to support  the elements of either claim.       

Even considering the opposition filed by Plaintiff on 7/31/23 in response to Defendant’s previously filed demurrer to the (First) Amended Complaint (which was taken off calendar due to the default which has now been set aside) which made the same arguments as the instant demurrer, Plaintiff failed to address the arguments and authorities presented by Defendant in the demurrer or motion to strike.  Rather, Plaintiff made incomprehensible arguments regarding Defendant’s counsel not being authorized to act and conspiring with unidentified “previous Attorneys for Plaintiff.”  Plaintiff has represented herself throughout this entire action.  Plaintiff also referred to a purported “Court Ordered Judgment of 5/14/23.”  However, no court judgment has been entered in this case and there is no entry in eCourt on 5/14/23.  Plaintiff did not file a separate opposition to the motion to strike.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s (First) Amended Complaint is so uncertain that Defendant cannot determine the causes of action being asserted against it so that it can formulate a response.  Similarly, to the extent that Defendant and/or the Court can surmise what claims Plaintiff is attempting to assert against Defendant, she has failed to allege sufficient facts to state such claims.  Plaintiff has not filed oppositions to the instant demurer and motion to strike.  However, even considering Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s previously filed demurrer which made the same arguments as the instant demurrer, Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of establishing how she can cure the defects in her pleading, which she has already amended once.

Therefore, the demurrer is sustained and the motion to strike is granted, both without leave to amend.